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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores issues related to health in China by looking at three different issues.  
The first chapter investigates the role of nutrition as one of the major determinants of 
bodyweight and estimates the income effects on individual nutritional intakes using 
China Health and Nutrition Survey from 1989-2006 and finds hump-shaped Engel 
curves in calories for both non-agricultural and agricultural households.  
The second chapter looks at the long-run impact of the Cultural revolution and finds 
that it has induced the treated cohorts to obtain significantly more years of primary 
education, adopt healthier consumption habits and engage more actively in the labor 
market,though with a mixed health impact.  
Thethird chapter aims to evaluate and compare the health impact of two air quality 
regulations in China. It finds that being more regulated by the FYP was inversely 
associated with significantly higher incidences of pollution-related illnesses.To explain 
this perverse health-policy relationship, this chapter suggests that the FYP did not 
succeed in inducing pollution-heavy industries to substantially alter their pollution 
control technologies and may have caused heavy polluters to relocate from more to less 
regulated areas, leading to persistently worse ambient air quality in High provinces and 
larger pollution increases in Low provinces over the regulation period. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The first chapter investigates the role of nutrition as one of the major determinants of 
bodyweight and estimates the income effects on individual nutritional intakes using China 
Health and Nutrition Survey from 1989-2006. It explicitly accounts for the problem of 
endogenous income when obtaining the nutrition-income relationship and distinguishes 
between incomes from agricultural sources and those earned from non-agricultural activities. 
In practice, the impact of the former is identified from variation in weather shocks and the 
impact of the latter is identified from institutional changes in marginal tax rates. This chapter 
finds hump-shaped Engel curves in calories for both non-agricultural and agricultural 
households. Women were more income elastic towards both total calorie intakes and more 
specific macro-nutrient intakes (fats, proteins and carbohydrates). There may also be a shift 
in women's diet pattern away from a more traditional and carbohydrate rich one while no 
such pattern can be found for men. Also, couples were the least income elastic towards 
calories and other nutrition intakes in the non-agricultural sector, but they appear to be the 
most income elastic in the agricultural sector. 
 
The second chapter provides new evidence for the long-term impact of early 
educational interventions on a wide range of individual adulthood outcomes, including 
educational attainment, health, health-related consumption habits and labor supply. The 
education intervention is the 1968-1976 Cultural Revolution education system that almost 
universalized primary education among school-aged kids and improved primary school 
quality. Policy intensity varied by year-of-birth in terms of when the intervention was 
introduced and place-of-birth in terms of its quantitative and qualitative relevance. 
Specifically, the treated cohorts consist of those born in 1955-1970 while the control is those 
born in 1949-1954. The More Rural cohorts (born in rural-villages or suburban areas) 
benefited much more than the More Urban cohorts (born in rural-towns or cities) from the 
Cultural Revolution. Exploiting both the More Rural and year-of-birth differentials, this study 
finds that the Cultural Revolution has induced the treated cohorts to obtain significantly more 
years of primary education, adopt healthier consumption habits and engage more actively in 
the labor market, though with a mixed health impact. The estimates can be viewed as reliable 
since they remain stable across various robustness checks. Then to better understand the 
estimated results, this chapter provides evidence suggesting the existence of two potential 
pathways through which the impact of the Cultural Revolution may have operated, that is, by 
shaping individual preferences and influencing individual investment in education. The 
dataset used is from China Health and Nutrition Survey for years 2000-2009. 
 
The third chapter aims to evaluate and compare the health impact of two air quality 
regulations in China. The two air quality regulations, the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) 
and the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), asked for nationwide reductions in pollutant 
discharges of sulfur dioxide and Total Suspended Particulates. Due to the lack of direct 
measures for regulatory pressure, existing evidence on their health effectiveness remains 
limited. This analysis proposes using province High and Low pollution status to proxy for 
province High and Low FYP regulatory pressure.  Because first there was geographical 
variation in province ambient air quality before each FYP and second after each FYP the 
High provinces experienced larger pollution reductions than the Low provinces. The health 
impact is then estimated by comparing pre-post FYP changes in individual health in High 
provinces to the corresponding changes in in Low provinces, using China Health and 
Nutrition Survey from 2000-2006. This chapter finds that being more regulated by the FYP 
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was inversely associated with significantly higher incidences of pollution-related illnesses. 
This perverse finding is insensitive to attempts made to deal with the limitations of the 
province High/Low, alternatives measures of health and regulation relevance and remains 
stable across different socioeconomic subgroups.  To explain this perverse health-policy 
relationship, this chapter suggests that the FYP did not succeed in inducing pollution-heavy 
industries to substantially alter their pollution control technologies and may have caused 
heavy polluters to relocate from more to less regulated areas, leading to persistently worse 
ambient air quality in High provinces and larger pollution increases in Low provinces over 
the regulation period. 
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Chapter 1 The Impact of Chinese Income Growth on Nutritional Outcomes 
 
1  Introduction 
In recent years, obesity and overweight arose as one of the most prevalent health risks in 
modern society. While obesity and overweight levels are especially high in developed 
countries like the US and the UK (Bleich et al., 2008), overweight prevalence is with 22% 
comparatively low in emerging economies like China (Figure 1). However, countries such as 
China and India face a double challenge with respect to weight: A relatively persistent 
fraction of the population which is underweight and in parallel a fast rising fraction which is 
overweight or obese. Furthermore, obesity levels are rising fast.  
Both these health risks – under- and overweight- are related to diet, as individual bodyweight 
evolves through the (im)balance between calorie intake (Chou et al., 2004; and Bleich et al., 
2008) and occupational and other physical activity (Lakdawalla et al., 2007; Ng et al., 2009). 
According to Ng et al. (2011), around 5% of weight gain can be attributed to declines in 
occupation and/or home activities and around 3% of weight gain in China results from dietary 
changes between 1991 and 2006.  
The two main economic factors determining such dietary changes are incomes and prices. 
This paper investigates the role of income changes in altering diets based on a sample of 
Chinese men and women from 1989 to 2006. China has experienced an unprecedented period 
of strong economic growth and a large economic transition over the last decades. Figure 2A 
showsthe massive individual income (at 2009 price) growth in China of around 259% for 
males and 204% for females - resulting in increasesin household income (at 2009 yuan) of 
around 181% for singles, 248% for couples, and 162% for larger households (see Figure 2B). 
In face of these strong rises in incomes, we estimate income elasticities in nutrients, in 
particular those for calories, carbohydrates, fats and proteins. These can help explain the 
evolution and dispersion of healthy lifestyles. Knowledge of income elasticities for different 
nutrients further allows anticipating the impact of policy changes involving income transfers 
on diet and yields a better understanding of the efficiency of such policies in regulating 
bodyweight. Existing empirical evidence on the effect of public policies using transfers, e.g. 
food stamps,is mixed (Alaimo et al., 2002; Whitmore, 2002; Krueger, 2004; and Kaushal, 
2007). However, these studies have focused on conditional cash or in-kind programs. 
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Unconditional income transfers like welfare benefit programs may have a different effect on 
nutritional intake and consequently recipients’ health status.  
Policy interventions may alternatively target food prices. Goldman et al. (2010) focus on the 
role of food prices in contributing to weight gains using the Chinese Health and Nutrition 
Survey from 1991 to 2006. They find that decreases in the price of energy-dense foods have 
consistently led to elevated body fat. For body weight, however, they get mixed results. Their 
reduced form approach does not establish the transmission channel between food prices and 
body fat.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways: first, there are few studies that focus 
on income effects on calorie intake in a country with strong income growth, China. One of 
the reasons for this gap in the literature is the difficulty of identifying income effects due to 
the lack of suitable instruments for endogenous individual or household income which biases 
conventional estimates.  We propose an innovative instrumentation strategy that exploits 
changes in income tax rates as well as bracket creep, i.e. tax increases resulting from inflation 
leading to higher nominal incomes and higher marginal taxation due to nominally fixed tax 
brackets. Our instrumentation strategy carefully distinguishes between households working in 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sector, reflecting the fact that the former group are food 
consumers and producers at the same time, while the latter consume food only. The 
instrumentation strategy is applied for the non-agricultural sector which is liable to income 
taxes, while instruments for the agricultural sector are based on weather shocks that have 
been shown to explain income variation in this group (Wolpin, 1982; Paxson et al., 1992; 
Maccini et al., 2009).  
Second, we test the theoretical predictions on the correlation between food consumption and 
individual income from the model in Lakdawalla et al. (2002), which establishes a non-linear 
relationship between food consumption and its nutrient content, e.g. calorie intake and 
income.  
Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005) develop a theoretical model of obesity that takes into 
account individual preferences for weight, food and leisure consumption. They postulate an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between food consumption and individual income within 
countries, conditional on occupational physical activity. Conditional on physical activity, 
calorie intake is increasing in individual income for countries with low per capita income and 
high food production costs, and calorie intake is decreasing in individual income for countries 
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with high per capita income and low food production costs in their model. We test whether 
the postulated non-monotonic relationship between calorie intake and individual income is 
observable in our data. 
We find evidence of calorie income profiles that are hump-shaped for both non-agricultural 
and agricultural households. Unexpectedly, people from non-agricultural and agricultural 
background have similar attitudes towards calorie consumption: similar income elasticities 
that are around 0.093 for non-agricultural and 0.082 for agricultural households are 
estimated. Females are more income elastic towards calorie and other nutrient consumption 
than males in both sectors. Males from a non-agricultural background are more income 
elastic towards fat consumption at low income levels. Couples are the least income elastic 
towards calorie and other nutrient intakes in the non-agricultural sector, but they are the most 
income elastic in the agricultural sector. Agricultural households of various types do not have 
different tastes for fat consumption when their incomes reach a certain level (around 35,000 
at 2009 prices in the sample). In contrast, singles with an agricultural background have 
opposite protein intake pattern to that of couples and people from larger households. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
theoretical model in Lakdawalla (2002 and 2005). Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
discusses the empirical model. The identification strategy, choice of instruments, and first 
stage results are presented in Section 5. Section6presents the main results and robustness 
checks. Section 7concludes. 
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2  Theoretical Model 
We base our analysis of income effects on bodyweight on a model developed by Lakdawalla 
et al. (2002 and 2005). Agent’s period utility 𝑈(𝐹, 𝐶, 𝑊)is a function of food consumption 
(𝐹), consumption of other goods (𝐶), and current weight (𝑊). Utility is increasing in the 
consumption of food and other goods, and it is non-monotonic in bodyweight. 
Bodyweight depends on the (im)balance between energy ingested and energy spent on 
physical activity. Every agent has an ideal weight (𝑊0). She prefers to gain weight if her 
weight is below her ideal weight, and she prefers to lose weight if her weight is above her 
ideal weight. Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005) express utility as a quadratic function of 
bodyweight with the ideal weight as the bliss point. 
Food consumption and consumption of other goods are not substitutes. The marginal utility 
of food consumption is non-decreasing in consumption of other goods (𝑈𝐹𝐶 ≥ 0. 
An agent manages her weight by solving a dynamic problem in which her weight is the state 
variable. Weight is a capital stock that depreciates over time1, and can be accumulated by 
eating and de-cumulated throughphysical activity. The transition equation for weight can be 
written as 
𝑊′ = (1 − 𝛿)𝑊 + 𝑔(𝐹, 𝑆) 
Where the depreciation rate is 0 < 𝛿 < 1, and 𝑔 is a continuous and concave function that is 
increasing in food consumption (𝑔𝐹 > 0) and decreasing in physical activity (𝑔𝑆 < 0). 𝑆isa 
composite of the durationand strenuousness of physical activity. Hence, weight is increasing 
in food consumption (𝑊𝐹
′ > 0) and decreasing in physical activity (𝑊𝑆
′ < 0). 
The associated value function for an agent is given by2 
 𝑉(𝑊) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹,𝐶,𝑊′{𝑈(𝐹, 𝐶, 𝑊) + 𝛽𝑉(𝑊
′)}(1) 
  𝑠. 𝑡. : 𝑝𝐹 + 𝐶 ≤ 𝑌                                                                  (2) 
𝑊′ = (1 − 𝛿)𝑊 + 𝑔(𝐹, 𝑆)(3) 
where𝑌 is agents’ income, and 𝑝 is the price of food. The price of other consumption goods is 
normalised to one. 
                                                        
1The depreciation rate is defined by the basal metabolic rate which is the energy the body uses to 
maintain metabolic functioning. 
2The model assumes separability of leisure and ignores the impact of choices made on physical activities during 
leisure time. All physical activities an agent engages in are summarized in the strenuousness variable. 
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Provided that the utility function is continuous, strictly concave, differentiable, and bounded, 
and that the transition function is continuous and concave, the first-order and envelope 
conditions could be obtained as 
𝑈𝐹(𝐹, 𝑌 − 𝑝𝐹, 𝑊) + 𝛽𝑉
′(𝑊′)𝑔𝐹 = 𝑝𝑈𝐶(𝐹, 𝑌 − 𝑝𝐹, 𝑊)(4) 
𝑉′(𝑊) = 𝑈𝑊(𝐹, 𝑌 − 𝑝𝐹, 𝑊) + 𝛽𝑉
′(𝑊′)(1 − 𝛿)(5) 
Equation (4) implies that the marginal utility of consumption of other goods is equal to the 
marginal utility of food consumption. The latter is the sum of the direct marginal utility of 
food consumption, i.e. the joy of eating, and the marginal value of the weight change induced 
by food consumption. Equation (5) implies that the long-run marginal value of weight is 
equal to the marginal utility of current weight plus the discounted future marginal value of 
weight.  
Equation (4) and equation (5) together yieldthe unique and stable steady-state equilibrium 
food consumption (𝐹∗(𝑝, 𝑌, 𝑆)) and weight (𝑊∗(𝑝, 𝑌, 𝑆)).  
If we further allow occupational physical activity, S(Y),to vary with income  to reflect the 
more sedentary nature of high-skilled (and paid) jobs, the effect of income on steady-state 
equilibrium food consumption and weight can be written as 
𝜕𝐹∗(𝑝, 𝑌, 𝑆)
𝜕𝑌
= 𝐹𝑌
∗ + 𝐹𝑆
∗ ∙ 𝑆𝑌(𝑌)(6) 
𝜕𝑊∗(𝑝, 𝑌, 𝑆)
𝜕𝑌
= 𝑊𝑌
∗ + 𝑊𝑆
∗ ∙ 𝑆𝑌(𝑌)(7) 
Under the assumptions imposed by Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005), the model implies an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between food consumption and income, conditional on 
occupational physical activity. That is, for steady-state equilibrium food consumption, it is 
increasing in income when an agent is below her ideal weight (Lakdawalla et al., 2002) or if 
she is poor (Lakdawalla et al., 2005); and it is decreasing in income when an agent is above 
her ideal weight (Lakdawalla et al., 2002) or if she is rich (Lakdawalla et al., 2005), 
conditional on occupational physical activity (see Figure 3). 
In the following, we examine and test the hypothesis of a quadratic relationship between 
income and food consumption, and extend our analysis to the estimation of Engel curves in 
nutrients other than calories. An Engel curve shows how the consumer’s demand for one 
particular commodity varies with his/her income, with prices and other factors affecting 
demand (such as consumer preferences and demographics etc.) held constant. 
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To test if the inverted U-shaped Engel curve derived by Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005) 
also applies to the Engel curve with daily calorie intake in place of food consumption, the 
functional form specification for the Engel curve should, among other things, be as consistent 
with equation (6) as possible3. 
 
3 Data 
This paper uses a representative sample of working males and females aged 18 to 604from the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for the years 1989 to 2006. The panel survey was 
designed to examine the effects of health, nutrition, and family planning policies and 
programs implemented by national and local governments in China. Itcontains rich health and 
nutrition information of the Chinese population during a period of rapid economic transition.  
4,400 households with a total of 19,000 individuals from nine provinces5, which vary in 
geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators, are surveyed over 
three consecutive days which start at a random weekday. During this time, daily calorie 
intakeswere obtained from a household dietary survey6recording detailed information on 
household food production and consumption. Since surveys that directly record calorie intake 
by asking individuals what they ate are subject to non-negligible reporting biases (Bingham 
et al., 1995;Briefel et al., 1997; Rennie et al., 2007), household food consumption in the 
CHNS was calculated using reports on food purchases, initial and final food stocks and 
reports on food waste. Household nutrient intakes were then computed by CHNS using 
quantities of food consumed in a household and the nutrition content table provided by the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety (NINF). Individual nutrition intake was 
household nutrition intake averaged over the number of household members, data on which 
were also collected in the household dietary survey. 
We use a sample of working males and females aged 18 to 60 from 1989 to 2006. We 
abstract from modelling labour force participation as China has the highest labour force 
participation rates for males and females worldwide – at 67% for women aged 15-65 and 
                                                        
3The Engel curve specification should also, ideally, be as consistent with consumer demand theory and/or 
consumer expenditure data as possible. Many studies have been searching for the best functional form 
specification for Engel curves, either in terms of goodness-of-fit for the consumer expenditure data (Working, 
1943; Leser, 1963), or in terms of consistency with consumer demand theory (Deaton et al., 1980; Blundell et 
al., 1993; Banks et al., 1997). 
4 The standard retirement age is at 55years for females and around 60years for males. 
5These are: Liao Ning, HeiLongjiang, Jiang Su, Shan Dong, He Nan, Hu Bei, Hu Nan, Guang Xi, and Gui Zhou 
6The household survey was carried out by CHNS field workers who were trained nutritionists.  
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above 80% for men in the same age group. After dropping extreme outliers with daily 
working hours greater than 24 hours and the upper 1% of the individual income distribution 
as well as the top 1% of the wave-specific calorie intake distribution, the resulting sample has 
a total of 31,699 observations, with an average of around 4,600 observations per wave. 
Additional information on food price indices, progressive individual income tax rates, and 
weather variation is obtained from two external data sources: NBSC (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China) and CSAT (China State Administration of Taxation).For more 
information on all three sources of data, please refer to appendix A. 
 
3.1. Variable Definition and Trends in Variables 
We use four measures to capture some main components of diet composition: calories as a 
measure of the intake level, and the macronutrients fat, carbohydrates, and proteins as 
compositional measures. We convert intakes of fats, carbohydrates and proteins into calorie 
units using the following conversion factors: 1 gram fat equals 9 kcal, 1 gram carbohydrate 
equals 4 kcal, and 1 gram protein equals 4 kcal. Individual daily total calorie intake is the 
sum of daily fat, carbohydrate, and protein intake. For males, calories declined strongly by 
24% between 1989 and 2006 (Figure 4), composed of declines in calories from fats by 13%, 
those from carbohydrates by 30% and calories from proteins by 15%; females experienced a 
similar decline in calories (25%)and similar trends in its decomposition. 
Caloric imbalance and weight growth do not only arise from eating patterns but also from the 
intensity of physical activity (Lakdawalla et al., 2002, 2005, and 2007; and Philipson et al., 
2008). Several papers argue that technological innovation, i.e. a shift to sedentary 
occupations, is a driver of underlying changes in calorie intake and bodyweight (Lakdawalla 
et al., 2002, 2005, and 2007; Bleich et al., 2008; and Philipson et al., 2010). Hence, we 
control for the largest source of physical activity (or lack thereof) in the most time-intensive 
activity – work –by conditioning on occupational physical activity.Self-reported occupational 
physical activity is measured on a 1 to 5 scale, which we collapse to three categories: 
sedentary (=1 if 1 or 2), moderate (=1 if 3) and heavy (=1 if 4 or 5)occupational activity. 
Figure 5 shows the large shift in activity over the sample period: there was an around 14% 
decline in the percentage of males with a moderately active occupation and an increase in the 
percentageof workers in sedentary occupations of about 16%; we see a similar increase in 
sedentary occupations among females, and a larger decline of the fraction working in 
moderately active occupations of around 20%. 
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The CHNS records individual income from three sources: earnings, household businesses, 
and agricultural activities (farming, fishing, raising livestock, and gardening), and does not 
include individual income from subsidies (such as subsidies for health, one-child, food, and 
utilities) or income from sources not mentioned above (such as gifts, rents, and other in-kind 
payments). Individual earnings include on-the-job bonuses, other cash income, and value of 
non-cash income. Income is measured as net (after tax) income in the previous year.7 Table 2 
shows that around 12% of individuals receive income from household business, 44% are 
wage earners, and 59% have income from agricultural activities.Figure 2A shows the strong 
real income (in 2009 prices) growth in China of around 259%for males, and around 204% for 
females. 
Household income is comprised of the sum of individual incomes plus pensions, subsidies, 
and income from sources not mentioned (such as rents and other in-kind payments). It is 
measured as net (after tax) income in the previous year.8 Growth in real household income 
can be seen in Figure 2B: around 181% for singles, 248% for couples, and 162% for larger 
households. 
Due to the presence of economies of scale in household food consumption (Deaton et al., 
1998; Vernon, 2005), we use equivalised household income. What constitutes a proper 
equivalence scale is intensively discussed in the literature. Goldman et al. (2010) uses 
household income per capita, while Meng et al. (2004) use more equivalence scale 
adjustments with different weights for adults, children and elderly9. Our equivalised income 
measure is based on the square root of household size (Buhrmann et al., 1988; Atkinson et al., 
1995) which gives a weighting similar to that of the also widely used modified OECD scales. 
We performed a robustness check using per-capita income which assumes no economies of 
scale, and find very similar results.  
                                                        
7Negative individual incomes from agricultural activities and/or household business were recoded to 0, with a 
corresponding dummy variable generated (=1 if recoded). Percentage with 0 individual income was around 2% 
in 1989, 3% in 1991, 3% in 1993, 1% in 1997, 1% in 2000, 1% in 2004, and 1% in 2006, respectively. Results 
are virtually unchanged when we drop observations with negative individual income. 
8 Same as individual income, there are also observations with negative household income in the sample. 
Similarly, they were recoded to 0, with a corresponding dummy variable generated (=1 if recoded). Percentage 
with 0 household income was around 0.8% in 1989, 0.4% in 1991, 0.4% in 1993, 0.4% in 1997, 0.1% in 2000, 
0.1% in 2004, and 0.1% in 2006, respectively. Results are virtually unchanged when we drop observations with 
negative household income. 
9 These weights are: 0.35 for infants (0-2y), 0.5 for children (3-14y) and elderly (above 65y). Alternatively, 
they attach an equivalence scale of 0.5 to infant and a weight of 0.75 to children and the elderly. 
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Retail food price indices (relative to 1989 retail food prices) are obtained from NBSC, and 
the food price indices are those of grain, non-staple food, fresh vegetables, meat, and fish. 
There was an upward trend in all the food price indices from 1989 to 2006. 
Individual characteristics are captured using educational attainment (dummies for primary, 
low middle and high middle/technical school degree; college degree or higher), household 
size, gender and age. We alsocontrol for community level characteristics using 11 indicators 
(capturing differences and trends in population density and diversity, economic conditions, 
education standards, quality of housing, health services and sanitation, traditional market, 
modern market, and the quality of transportation and communication infrastructure). They 
allow us to control for systematic regional differences in calorie intake patterns, and for 
community level differences in income10. A high index value (with a range between 0 and 10) 
of each community-level covariate indicates better quality of institutions/infrastructure and 
better economic conditions.Descriptive statistics for individual- and community-level 
characteristics are summarized in Table 1, and more information on these indices can be 
found in the data appendix A. 
 
4 Empirical Model 
Equation (8) in Section 2 describes the Engel curve specification for daily calorie intake: 
(8)   𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝛿1𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡
1′ 𝜃1 + 𝑍𝑐𝑡
2′𝜃2
+ 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
where𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 is daily calorie intake of individual 𝑖 in community 𝑐 at time 𝑡. The inverted U-
shaped Engel curve derived by Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005) is obtained after 
conditioning on occupational physical activity (𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡, ) in equation (8). 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡; 𝛽) is a smooth function of income𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡(deflated to 2009 Yuan). 𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a vector of 
community-level retail food price indices (grain, non-staple food, fresh vegetables, meat, and 
fish). 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡
1  is a vector of individual-level covariates and 𝑍𝑐𝑡
2  is a vector of community level 
covariates. 𝜏𝑡  is a time trend, and 𝛼  is a constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
(𝛾′, 𝛽′, 𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝜃1
′ , 𝜃2
′ )′ is a vector of parameters. 
                                                        
10For example, the correlation between community economic condition and individual income is around 0.38, 
the correlation between community education and individual income is around 0.31, and the correlation between 
community housing quality and individual income is around 0.39. 
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Following Lakdawalla and Philipson, we start with a 2nd order polynomial in income, 
i.e.𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡; 𝛽) = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 . Consequently, we will test for functional form using higher 
order polynomials, e.g.𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡; 𝛽) = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡
3 . 
 
4.1. Identification and instruments 
Pooled OLS estimation of specification (8) is only valid under the assumption: 
𝐸(𝑊𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 0  
𝑤here 𝑊𝑖𝑐𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑡
2 , 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ , 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡
1′ , 𝑍𝑐𝑡
2′, 𝜏𝑡)
′ . 
However, unobserved heterogeneity may be present which is correlated with income. Sources 
of unobserved heterogeneity could be genetic factors, innate ability, family background, 
eating habits and food preferences, time discounting, and individual perceptions of ideal 
weight or heterogeneous social norms. Unobserved heterogeneity could bias our estimated 
income parameters in both directions: If daily calorie intake is decreasing in smoking (Chou 
et al., 2004) and individuals with higher educational attainment and income smoke less 
(Autor et al., 2005; Cutler et al., 2006), there will be an upward bias. If daily calorie intake is 
increasing in the discount rate (Ikeda et al., 2010), and higher income individuals have a 
lower discount rate, our estimates will be biased downwards. 11 Following Behrman and 
Deolalikar (1990), we present individual-level rather than community-level fixed effects 
estimates to address this issue.  
However, unobserved heterogeneity is not necessarily time-constant. Unobserved social 
network and contextual characteristics are likely to change over time, e.g. individual eating 
habits (Yaniv et al., 2009), social norms of thinness and individual perceptions of ideal 
weight (Levy, 2002; Trogdon et al., 2008). The assumption of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity seems particularly problematic given the massive growth and major transitions 
in economic structure and lifestyles in China. For example, the availability of fast and junk 
food (Currie et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2011) may change individual food preferences. In 
spite of controlling for time-constant individual heterogeneity and controlling for the 
accessibility of supermarkets, traditional markets and cafes through the community-level 
indices, estimates may still be biased. In addition, simultaneity bias may arise. Lecocq et al. 
(2006) and Deaton (1997) argue in an agricultural context that common shocks determine 
                                                        
11Based on evidence by Cawley (2004), we hypothesize a downward bias resulting from social norms and 
perceptions of bodyweight (Dragone et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
25 
both daily calorie intake and individual income. Other studies emphasizethe role of 
technological innovationswhichinduce a simultaneous change in individual food consumption 
patterns and income (Lakdawalla et al., 2002, 2005, and 2007; Philipson et al., 2008, 2010; 
Bleich et al., 2008; Ng et al., 2009). Households in transition economies face high levels of 
economic uncertainty, as market infrastructure and economic institutions in these countries 
are often underdeveloped (Stillman, 2001). Also, (im)balances between calorie intakes and 
physical activity can affect the earnings potential of individuals and thus incomes (Register et 
al., 1990; Behrman et al., 2001; Cawley, 2004; and Morris, 2006).  
 
5 Identification 
We explore exogenous variation in income induced by Chinese tax reforms as well as spatial 
and temporal variability in environment (2SLS) to identify income effects on daily calorie 
intake. To our knowledge, the set of instruments exploiting variation in taxation has not been 
used in the context of estimating Engel curves.In fact, many studies ignore the potential 
endogeneity of their income measures and do not seek to employ instrumental techniques at 
all (Lakdawalla et al., 2002; Chou et al., 2004; Goldman et al., 2010). Valid instrumental 
variables (𝑧) for endogenous income should, among other things, satisfy two conditions: they 
are uncorrelated with unobserved idiosyncratic error term (𝐸(𝑧𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 0), which includes 
unobserved heterogeneity (𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡)
12, and they are partially correlated with income. 
We use two sets of instruments to reflect the different income sources: weather shocks 
identify income effects among agricultural businesses and propose variation in marginal 
income tax rates to be used as instruments for income generated outside of agriculture.  
 
5.1. Instrument I: Weather shocks 
Weather shocks have been shown to be correlated with agricultural income and used as 
instruments for income in other studies. Maccini et al. (2009) find that rainfall variation 
across space and time in Indonesia generates variation in agricultural output and thus 
household income. Wolpin (1982), Paxson et al. (1992) and Jacoby et al. (1998) use weather 
shocks and unusual village level rainfall to examine consumer behaviour of agricultural 
                                                        
12𝜂𝑖is unobserved heterogeneity, and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 is another idiosyncratic error term. 
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households in rural India.The dimensions of weather variation across provinces and time used 
in the literature are: monthly temperatures, rainfall levels and hours of sunshine.13 
We exploit variation in average monthly levels of all three weather dimensions in spring 
across provinces and time using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). We measure weather shocks at the province level and define them as deviations 
from their long-run average. The choice of spring weather dimensions only is first to avoid 
multicollinearity and second, statistics published by Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s 
Republic of China show that in 2006 the majority of grain products (accounted for almost 
35% of total agricultural products) were harvested in autumn. Liu et al. (2004) point out that 
spring drought frequently happens in China, with adverse impacts on harvests. Hence, we 
focus on capturing weather shocks in the growing season (i.e. in spring). Panel B in Table 3 
shows the considerable variation across provinces and time in all of the weather dimensions. 
5.2. Instrument II: Variation in marginal tax rates 
 
For non-agricultural income sources, we exploit changes in marginal income tax rates14. 
Income taxation in China applies to individual income and includes exemption amounts and 
several tax brackets so that marginal tax rates vary across the population. Two tax reforms 
during our sample period--31st October 1993, and 27th October 2005--give us additional 
exogenous time-series variation in the marginal tax rates an individual faces. 15 Figure 
6illustrates the tax schedules applicable at different points in time, and Panel A of Table 3 
summarizes thetime series variation in earnings tax rates. We construct instruments for 
household income using the following strategy: first, we compute marginal tax rates based on 
individual income. Three dummies for the applicability of tax brackets--5%, 10 to 15%, and 
20% to 35%16--are generated. Since we observe net but not gross incomes, we cannot always 
                                                        
13 Other instrumental variables such as educational attainment of the head of household and the partner (if 
present), widow status and gender of the head of household, and log household income (and squared) (Kalwij et 
al., 2007), and characteristics of cities (densities, population, distance to the dynamic center of the county, 
average wage level, and average wage level squared) have also been used(Azzoni et al., 2008), but they are 
likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in this  study. 
14Other instruments used in the literature are Social Security contributions (Parker, 1999), income tax refunds 
(Souleles 1999) and extra wage payments (Browning et al., 2001).  
15Since there was no variation in the individual income tax law on income from household business, we include 
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if individual income was earned from a household business. This group 
accounts for around 18% of the sample and hence is a relatively small proportion. 
16Percentage of tax payers falling into each tax bracket is around 9% for 0.05, 4% for 0.1, 0.2% for 0.15, 1% for 
0.2, 0.04% for 0.25, 0.08% for 0.3, and 0.04% for 0.35. No one was paying a tax rate higher than 0.35. As few 
observations fall into a tax bracket higher than 0.2, we summarized these observations into one single bracket 
[0.2, 0.35], similarly for the tax brackets 0.1 and 0.15. 
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match net individual incomes and applicable tax brackets (and thus rates) uniquely. However, 
as Figure 7 shows by plotting net and corresponding gross incomes, the area of ambiguity is 
negligibly small. 
 Next, we construct instruments for equivalised household income. These are the shares of tax 
payers falling into each tax bracket within a household over time.  
5.3. Instrument III: Variation in marginal tax rates and bracket creep 
The validity of tax rules as income instrument has been criticized by Lindsey (1987) and 
Feldstein (1995) who point out that existing tax rules provide substantial opportunity for 
individuals to reduce their taxable income by adjusting their income and expenses in response 
to high marginal tax rates. For example, individuals can vary their labour supply by varying 
their work effort, their location and the types of jobs they accept. They can also choose forms 
of compensation that are untaxed or subject to lower effective tax rates. Further, changes in 
tax rate policies aimed at reducing income inequality resulting from technological change, 
declining union membership, increasing import competition, lessening of government 
pressure to increase minority employment, increasing immigration, and changing supplies of 
college workers can also lead to endogenous individual income tax rates in the income-tax 
rate equation (Auten et al., 1999).  
Hence, while large tax reforms (such as the one used here) are natural experiments that create 
exogenous variation in incomes, individual income tax rates could still be correlated with the 
error term in the income-tax rate equation (Saez, 2003). This concern is supported by 
discrepancies between studies (Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995; Sammartino et al., 1997; and 
Goolsbee, 2000) that use the U.S. tax reforms of 1981, 1986, and 1993 to estimate taxpayers’ 
responses.  
However, tax reforms can still provide good instruments due to an additional source of 
variation which results from tax schedules that are fixed in nominal terms and highly 
progressive.In a study of the response of taxpayers to changes in marginal tax rates using the 
University of  Michigan tax panel 1979, 1980, and 1981, Saez (2003) notices high inflation 
during the sample period (around 10%). Due to the nominal tax schedule, a taxpayer near the 
top-end of a bracket was likely to creep to the next bracket even at constant real income, 
while taxpayers far from the top-end of a bracket were less likely to experience an increase in 
the marginal rates. This characteristic of “bracket creep” allows him to construct instruments 
for endogenous marginal tax rates.  
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We exploit this additional variation in our study as inflation in China was  high (around 5% 
on average from 1989 to 2006) during the sample period and tax schedules are  fixed in 
nominal terms and highly progressive. Hence, we construct taxpayer’s predicted annual tax 
rates using initial individual income in the first survey year, inflated to corresponding 
nominal income in the same wave17: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡18 
Instrumental variables are then dummies for the applicability of predicted tax brackets (5%, 
between 10% and 15%, and between 20% and 35%) and predicted shares of tax payers falling 
into each tax bracket within a household over time. The raw correlation between individual 
income tax rates and predicted individual income tax rates is around 0.71. 
 
5.4. Instrumenting for individual financial control 
As existing empirical investigations have found that intra-household allocation of 
consumption depends on the financial control of the household members (Lee, 2004), we 
additionally include the ratio of individual income relative to household income 
(unequivalised) in each regression, and use the household member’s computed marginal tax 
rate to instrument for it. 
 
6 Results 
6.1. First stage results 
In Table 4, we show the first stage results of our IV estimation. We split the sample into 
households without (Columns 1 and 2) and with (Columns 3 and 4) an agricultural 
background . In Columns 1 and 3, the share instruments are separately and jointly significant 
at the 1% level. The magnitude of the tax effects is larger among non-agricultural households 
as expected, but significant throughout.19 Agricultural equivalised household income is also 
                                                        
17 For example, if an individual entered the CHNS survey for the first time in 1989 and remained in the survey 
till 1991. His predicted tax rate in 1991 is the tax rate under the 1991 individual income tax law using his 1989 
income inflated to corresponding 1991 nominal income. Inflation data was obtained from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC). 
18 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is individual 𝑖 ’s predicted income in year 𝑡 . 1𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 is 
individual 𝑖’s income in the first survey year. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡is the inflation rate taking the first survey year as the base 
year. 
19This may be due to the fact that individuals are classified as agricultural in the CHNS as long as they have any 
income from agricultural activities. They may however receive income from other sources as well: for example, 
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affected by unusual variation in weather conditions, measured as deviations from long-run 
trend. Temperature is statistically significant at the 1% level for agricultural and non-
agricultural individuals separately and negatively related to income. This may in part be due 
to earnings from other weather-sensitive occupations like construction or some areas of retail 
business. In contrast, rainfall only has a significant and negative impact on incomes from 
agricultural activities. In Columns 2 and 4, the two tax bracket dummies are significant at the 
1% level and hence are correlated with individuals’ relative income in a household. 
Results for the alternative set of tax instruments including bracket creep are reported in the 
first stage estimates in Table 5. Our new set of instruments is statistically significant at the 
1% significance level, and hence highly correlated with income.  
We first estimate income effects on daily calorie intake using the quadratic functional form 
postulated by Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005) for the Engel curve. Table 6 reports 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates in Column 1 and Fixed-Effects (FE) estimates in 
Column 2. Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) estimates based on the first stage from Table 4 
are reported in Column 3. 
The OLS and FE estimates of income coefficients differ statistically from the 2SLS results at 
the 5% level, which suggests a downward bias in these estimates due to endogeneity of 
equivalised household income. In Column 3, income is significant and positively correlated 
with calorie intake, and the non-linear relationship between calorie intake and income is 
confirmed. We find a hump-shaped calorie income profile for both non-agricultural (Panel A) 
and agricultural (Panel B) households (see Figure 8). The negative correlation between 
calorie intake and income at higher income levels could be due to two reasons. First, as 
incomes rise, people’s diets may shift from quantity towards higher quality foods that are low 
in calories. Second, wealthier people may be more concerned about their health and thus 
choose healthier lifestyles that include healthier diets (Philipson and Posner, 2010). In this 
sense, without other effects operating at the same time, income growth can make obesity 
growth self-limiting (by lowering calorie intake). 
Unexpectedly, people from non-agricultural and agricultural background have similar income 
elasticities in calories at their respective median incomes (which are almost double as high 
                                                                                                                                                                            
9% of the sample had income from both employment and agricultural activities, and around 6% of the sample 
had income from both household business and agricultural activities. 
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among individuals working in the non-agricultural sector: these are around 0.093 for non-
agricultural and 0.082 for agricultural households. 
We further find that individuals in sedentary occupations reduce their calorie intake, pointing 
to a downward adjustment of calories in reaction to a less active lifestyle. We additionally 
estimated a specification in which we do not condition on physical activity – and find very 
similar income elasticities. In consequence, it seems that the potential positive correlation 
between a sedentary occupation and income is not biasing our results.20 We further add our 
more sophisticated instruments using the bracket creep, and investigate whether our results 
are sensitive to the choice of instruments. Results are reported in Column 4 of Table 6. 
Income coefficients in Column 4 do not differ statistically from those in Column 3, at the 5% 
level. Income is significant and positively correlated with calorie intake, and the quadratic 
income measure further captures non-linearity in the calorie-income relationship. They also 
imply an almost identical calorie income profile (see Figure 9). The implied income 
elasticities are somewhat larger, however, around 0.152 and 0.119, for non-agricultural and 
agricultural households, respectively. As our bracket creep instruments capture income 
dynamics to a larger extent, they are likely to provide a refined estimate of the Engel curves.  
We further examine the sensitivity of our choice of equivalence scale and use per capita 
income instead of dividing by the square root of household size. There is no statistical 
difference between the two sets of results for agricultural households at the 5 percent level, 
while parameter estimates change for the non-agricultural sector – however, with very little 
impact on the Engel curves. Detailed results can be found in appendix B, Figure 20 and Table 
12. 
A study related to ours is Meng et al. (2004) who examine income elasticities of calorie 
consumption of urban households in China between 1986 and 2000. Their results range from 
0.322 to 0.719. Using the same Engel curve specification but restricting to urban households, 
we get much lower calorie income elasticities that are around 0.084 (actual tax rates as 
instruments) and 0.187 (predicted tax rates as instruments). Apart from different functional 
form specification and the use of equivalent household income, two other factors may explain 
these large differences. First, the lack of instruments in their study can lead to an upward bias 
in income effects (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990), which aligns with the fact that our income 
effects are smaller. Second, we use more recent waves and income elasticities decline 
                                                        
20The results can be found in appendix B. 
 
 
31 
significantly over time, as is pointed out by Meng et al. (2004). All in all, our low 
incomeelasticities are consistent with earlier findings in, for example, Behrman and 
Deolalikar (1990) for India. 
 
6.2. Engel Curves in Calorie and other Nutrients by Gender 
Due to differences in height and body composition, recommended calorie intake levels for 
men and women differ. We control for this by always including gender dummies in our 
estimations. Furthermore, males and females have different preferences for particular types of 
commodities (Anderson and Balland, 2002; and Doepke et al., 2011), including different 
dietary preferences. In this section, we thus allow Engel curves in calories and other nutrients 
to differ by gender. Results are reported in Table 7.21Female calorie intake is more income 
elastic than that of males in both sectors, as is reflected by a more steeply hump-shaped 
income profile (see Figure 10). However, the income-gender interaction term is only 
significant and positively correlated with calorie intake in agricultural households in Column 
1. Again, results obtained using more sophisticated instruments in Column 2 do not differ 
statistically from those in Column 1, at the 5% level. F-tests of the joint significance of the 
two gender-specific income terms point to gender differences in Engel curves in the non-
agricultural sector, while we the F-tests are not statistically significant in the agricultural 
sector. Since families in the agricultural sector work and live together and are hence likely to 
share all meals and eat out less, this effect is not surprising. Furthermore, the concept of 
individual income of household members in a common agricultural business is probably less 
clear cut than in the non-agricultural sector with a higher fraction of partners working for 
different employers. In the non-agricultural sector, females’ income elasticity of calorie 
intake is around 104% larger than that of males. This difference reduces to around 39% when 
more sophisticated instruments are used. (see Table 9). 
Males from non-agricultural background are more income elastic towards fat intake at low 
income levels (see Figure 11), with their income elasticity of fat intake being around 13% 
larger than that of females. What should also be noted is the gender differential in 
carbohydrate consumption of agricultural individuals. Rather than having a hump-shaped 
income profile, males’ carbohydrate intake becomes almost linearly increasing in income, 
                                                        
21We present income effects obtained using more sophisticated instruments for calorie intake. Results based on 
the other set of instruments  are available upon request. 
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indicating substantial gender differences in carbohydrate consumption at high income levels 
(see Figure 13). Females are generally more income elastic towards the consumption of other 
nutrients. 
As existing empirical investigations have found that intra-household bargaining power 
depends on the household members’ control over financial resources (Lee, 2004), we follow 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) and include the ratio of individual income relative to 
household income (unequivalised) in each regression, but in contrast to their approach, we 
use computed (individual) marginal tax rates to instrument for it. Female control over 
financial resources has been found to be associated with different expenditures compared to 
male income control (Haddad et al., 1994; Duflo, 2003; and Duflo et al., 2004). Duflo (2003) 
finds that pensions received by females had a large impact on the anthropometric status 
(weight-for-height and height-for-age) of girls but little effect on that of boys; no effect is 
found for pensions received by males. 
We find that females’ relative income is always significantly and positively correlated with 
their calorie and other nutrient intakes in the agricultural sector. For females in non-
agricultural settings, calorie and protein intakes also increase significantly with their relative 
income share. Hence, females spend more on calories when they have more control over 
financial resources, a result that is consistent with earlier findings in the literature. 
 
6.3. Engel Curves in Caloriesand other Nutrients by Household Type 
Banks et al. (1997) find shifts in Engel curves for food in the UK as household size varies. 
Beneito (2003) and Rajapakse (2011) emphasize the importance of the effect of household 
size on household consumption pattern. In this section, we investigate whether Engel curves 
in calories differ by household size and also extend this comparison to other nutrient intakes. 
Results are reported in Table 8. Similarly, we present income coefficients based on predicted 
marginal tax rates for calorie intake only. As can be seen in Columns 1 and 2, significant 
differences between the two sets of estimated income effects are not detected.22 
We find substantial household size differential in calorie Engel curves in the non-agricultural 
sector, in spite of generally insignificant household size interaction terms. Single households’ 
calorie income profiles are U-shaped, that of couples is almost flat with a slightly downward 
                                                        
22Results for other nutrients are the same and available upon request. 
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trend, and the calorie Engel curve of larger households is hump-shaped (see Figure 13), 
suggesting that couples are the least income elastic towards calorie consumption. Couples’ 
income elasticity of calories is around 85% (or 90%) smaller than that of singles and 75% (or 
86%) smaller than that of people from larger households. Non-agricultural individuals’ 
calorie income profiles diverge at low income levels, gradually converge up to an income 
level of around 20,000 (at 2009 price), and again diverge afterwards. 
In contrast, couples from agricultural background are the most income elastic towards calorie 
intake, and calorie Engel curves are hump-shaped across all household types. Couples’ 
income elasticity of calorie intake is around 51% (or 24%) larger than that of singles and 71% 
(or 63%) larger than that of people from larger households. It is also worth noting that 
agricultural households’ calorie income profiles only diverge at high income levels. We still 
do not find significant household size interaction terms in the agricultural sector. 
For other nutrients, agricultural households’ Engel curves in calories from fat converge (not 
diverge) at high income levels (see Figure 15), suggesting that households of various types do 
not have different tastes for fat consumption when their incomes reach a certain level (around 
35,000 at 2009 prices in the sample). Agricultural singles have opposite protein intake pattern 
to that of couples and people from larger households: their protein consumption decreases 
with income till around 10,000 (at 2009 price) and steadily increases with income afterwards. 
This contrast is also reflected by significant income-household size interaction terms for 
protein (for the resulting Engel curves, see Figure 16). In general, non-agricultural couples 
are the least and agricultural couples are the most income elastic towards the intakes of other 
nutrients. 
 
 6.4. Choice of Functional Form 
So far, we have postulated the functional form derived from the model by Lakdawalla et al. 
(2002 and 2005). We now test our choice of functional form by allowing for higher order 
polynomials. Table 10 shows results for daily calorie intake using 3rd and 4th order 
polynomials of income. For non-agricultural individuals, we find empirical evidence of the 
existence of a 3rd order polynomial: it is significant at the 5% level in Column 1. However, 
as Figure 18A shows, the 3rd order Engel curve is hump-shaped over most of the relevant 
support of the data. For individuals from the agricultural sector, we also find little empirical 
evidence supporting the inclusion of higher order polynomials. Despite that the 3rd and 
 
 
34 
4thorder polynomial terms are significant separately at the 1% level in Column 4, Figure 18B 
again shows that the higher order income profiles are hump-shaped over most of the relevant 
support of the data and increases strongly only among very high incomes (4th order). In 
summary, we find little evidence that would be inconsistent with the theory proposed by 
Lakdawalla et al. (2002 and 2005). 
 
7  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of income in altering diets. China has experienced an 
unprecedented period of strong growth and a large economic transition over the last decades. 
Figure 2A showsthe massive individual income growth in China of around 259% for males 
and 204% for females (see Figure 2B). In face of these strong rises in incomes, we estimate 
income elasticities in nutrients, in particular those for calories, carbohydrates, fats and 
proteins. 
We find evidence supporting the hypothesis of biased OLS and FE estimates due to omitted 
variables and simultaneity bias. Exploiting exogenous changes in Chinese tax system and 
weather shocks, we find a hump-shaped calorie income profile for both non-agricultural and 
agricultural households. Unexpectedly, people from non-agricultural and agricultural 
backgrounds have similar attitudes towards calorie consumption: similar income 
elasticitiesthat are around 0.093 for non-agricultural and 0.082 for agricultural households are 
found. Our more sophisticated instruments using bracket creep confirms the exogeneity of 
marginal tax rates. The implied income elasticities are somewhat larger, however, around 
0.152 and 0.119, for non-agricultural and agricultural households, respectively. Females are 
more income elastic towards calorie consumption than males in both sectors. In the non-
agricultural sector, females’ income elasticity of calorie intake is around 104% larger than 
that of males. This difference reduces to around 39% when more sophisticated instruments 
are used. In the agricultural sector, females’ calorie income elasticity is around 266% (or 
146%) larger than that of males, depending on which set of instruments is used. 
Extending to other nutrient intakes, males from non-agricultural background turn out to be 
more income elastic towards fat consumption at low income levels, with their income 
elasticity of fat intake being around 13% larger than that of females. Notably, rather than 
having a hump-shaped income profile, males’ carbohydrate intake becomes almost linearly 
increasing in income, indicating substantial gender difference in carbohydrate consumption at 
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high income levels. Females are more income elastic towards the consumption of other 
nutrients. 
Lastly, we find differences in calorie Engel curves by household size, especially for those not 
in agriculture. In the non-agricultural sector, single households’ calorie income profile is U-
shaped, that of couples is almost flat with a slight downward trend, and the calorie Engel 
curve of larger households is hump-shaped, suggesting that couples are the least income 
elastic towards calorie consumption. Couples’ income elasticity of calories is around 85% (or 
90%) smaller than that of singles and 75% (or 86%) smaller than that of people from larger 
households. Non-agricultural individuals’ calorie income profiles diverge at low income 
levels, gradually converge up to an income level of around 20,000 (at 2009 price), and again 
diverge afterwards. 
In contrast, couples from agricultural background are the most income elastic towards calorie 
intake, and calorie Engel curves are all hump-shaped across household types. Couples’ 
income elasticity of calorie intake is around 51% (or 24%) larger than that of singles and 71% 
(or 63%) larger than that of people from larger households. Agricultural households’ calorie 
income profiles only diverge at high income levels. 
For other nutrients, agricultural households’ fat Engel curves converge (not diverge) at high 
income levels, suggesting that households of various types do not have different tastes for fat 
consumption when their incomes reach a certain level (around 35,000 at 2009 price in the 
sample). Agricultural singles have opposite protein intake pattern to that of couples and 
people from larger households: their protein consumption decreases with income till around 
10,000 (at 2009 price) and steadily increases with income afterwards. In general, non-
agricultural couples are the least while agricultural couples are the most income elastic 
towards the intakes of other nutrients. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Time trends in bodyweight by weight group and gender ,1989 to 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Time trend in individual income (deflated to 2009 Yuan) 
A. Individual income by gender  
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B. Household  income by household size 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Steady-state equilibrium food consumption and individual income 
 
Source: Lakdawalla et al. (2002) 
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Figure 4: Time trends in daily intakes of calories, fat, carbohydrates, and proteins, by gender 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Time trends in self-reported strenuousness of occupation (in % of working 
population), by gender 
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Table 1: Sample mean and standard deviation of individual and community level 
covariates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006
Panel A: Individual level covariates
Primary schoo degree (=1 if yes) 0.232 0.227 0.236 0.249 0.238 0.217 0.175
 (0.422) (0.419) (0.425) (0.432) (0.426) (0.412) (0.380)
Low middle school degree (=1 if yes) 0.33 0.308 0.327 0.324 0.344 0.345 0.351
(0.470) (0.462) (0.469) (0.468) (0.475) (0.475) (0.477)
High middle/technical school degree (=1 if yes) 0.18 0.153 0.162 0.186 0.209 0.255 0.247
(0.384) (0.360) (0.368) (0.389) (0.407) (0.436) (0.431)
College degree or higher (=1 if yes) 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.046 0.054 0.078
(0.151) (0.150) (0.129) (0.167) (0.210) (0.225) (0.268)
Household size (unit) 4.416 4.468 4.493 4.186 4.03 3.861 3.804
(1.437) (1.441) (1.488) (1.335) (1.328) (1.366) (1.408)
Female (=1 if yes) 0.524 0.528 0.526 0.507 0.508 0.487 0.488
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Age 31.76 36.518 37.429 38.132 39.829 41.422 42.509
(7.049) (11.112) (11.000) (10.648) (10.366) (10.042) (9.789)
Panel B: Community level covariates (0-10)
Population density 5.78 5.782 5.779 5.478 5.568 5.751 5.562
(1.281) (1.306) (1.326) (1.528) (1.589) (1.480)  (1.567)
Population diversity 3.82 3.727 3.896 4.109 4.418 4.589 5.064
(1.039) (0.971) (0.970) (0.935) (1.089) (1.163) (1.185)
Economic condition 2.938 2.544 2.743 3.844 4.288 5.569 6.18
(1.670) (1.913) (1.737) (3.012) (3.179) (3.192) (3.046)
Education 2.449 2.472 2.592 2.816 3.273 3.286 3.357
(1.287) (1.257) (1.193) (1.291) (1.442) (1.459) (1.547)
Housing quality 2.992 3.557 3.984 5.027 5.776 6.415 6.812
(2.580) (2.518) (2.509) (2.652) (2.652) (2.456) (2.236)
Health-care service quality 5.655 5.568 5.385 5.537 5.434 5.075 4.811
(2.004) (2.026) (2.182) (2.160) (2.180) (2.290) (2.330)
Sanitation 4.991 5.065 4.89 5.338 5.519 6.155 6.317
(3.110) (3.233) (3.199) (3.299) (3.191) (3.019) (2.960)
Traditional market quality 4.531 4.493 4.267 4.967 5.7 4.681 4.675
(3.040) (3.137) (3.292) (3.476) (3.529) (3.661) (3.863)
Modern market quality 3.638 3.692 4.115 3.977 4.465 4.582 4.512
(2.991) (3.206) (3.083) (3.202) (3.328) (2.933) (2.872)
Transportation 4.108 4.763 4.937 5.251 5.564 5.712 5.725
(2.603) (2.965) (2.614) (2.654) (2.585) (2.535) (2.497)
Communication 2.755 3.831 4.139 4.559 4.755 5.643 6.126
(1.640) (1.418) (1.487) (1.311) (1.198) (1.527) (1.388)
Observations 3,695 5,716 5,189 5,006 4,963 3,485 3,645
 
 
45 
Table 2: Percentage with income from labour market, household business, and agricultural 
activities 
 
 
 
Table 3: Variation in instrumental variables 
 
 
  
Income source Percentage Liability for income tax
% With income from household business 12% Yes
% With income from labour market 44% Yes
% With income from agricultural activities 59% No
Variable Std. Dev.
Panel A: Individual income tax rates
Tax bracket 1: tax rate 0.05 Across individuals 0.231
Across time 0.202
Tax bracket 2: tax rate [0.1,0.15] Across individuals 0.162
Across time 0.139
Tax bracket 3: tax rate [0.2,0.35] Across individuals 0.108
Across time 0.083
Panel B: Weather variation
Lagged spring temperature shock Across provinces 0.542
Across time 1.153
Lagged spring rainfall shock Across provinces 549
Across time 917
Lagged spring sunshine hour shock Across provinces 238
Across time 519
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Figure 6: Time series variation in the income tax schedule across three tax regimes 
 
Notes: the exemption amount of monthly individual wage was 800 Yuan before 2005, and it rose to 1,600 Yuan 
after 2005. The 1999 tax reforms did not change regulations related to this current study, and hence the tax 
schedules in 1993-1999 and 1999-2004 are the same. 
 
Figure 7: Mapping between (unobserved) gross and (observed) net monthly earnings in 2006  
 
Notes: the solid line shows the relationship between monthly individual wage after taxation (Yuan) and monthly 
individual wage before taxation in 2006 (Yuan), using the tax rates adopted in estimation. Due to the lack of 
individual income data before taxation, there is not a one-to-one link between monthly individual wage after 
taxation and monthly individual wage before taxation in 2006. The dashed line shows alternative possible values 
of monthly individual wage before taxation using tax rates that are also possible for that range of monthly 
individual wage after taxation. The dotted line shows the exemption amount (1,600 Yuan). 
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Table 4: First stage using actual marginal tax rates 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Share 
1=number of tax payers paying 0.05/total number of tax payers in a household. Share 2=number of tax payers 
paying [0.1,0.15]/total number of tax payers in a household. Share 3=number of tax payers paying 
[0.2,0.35]/total number of tax payers in a household. Ratio=individual income/household income. Additional 
individual level covariates are educational attainment dummy variables (primary school degree, low middle 
school degree, high middle/technical school degree, and college degree or higher), a dummy variable equal to 1 
if income was from household business, female (=1 if yes), household size, age (and age squared), and rural (=1 
if living in rural areas). Additional community level covariates are population density, population diversity, 
educational level, economic condition, traditional market condition, modern market condition, transportation 
quality, communication quality, housing quality, sanitation quality, and health-care service quality. Controls for 
provincial food retail prices are retail price indices of grain, non-staple food, fresh vegetables, meat, and fish 
(relative to food retail prices in 1989). Also included is a set of time dummy variables from 1991 to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Income Ratio Income Ratio
Marginal tax rate:0.05 1,010*** 0.141*** -483.2* 0.0536**
(295.2) (0.00982) (293.6) (0.0220)
Marginal tax rate:[0.1,0.15] 2,466*** 0.271*** 381.3 0.228***
(419.0) (0.0139) (400.5) (0.0300)
Marginal tax rate:[0.2,0.35] 5,503*** 0.345*** 1,232** 0.318***
(761.6) (0.0253) (620.9) (0.0464)
Lagged spring temperature shock -280.3*** -0.00244 -159.4*** -0.000629
(50.77) (0.00169) (38.70) (0.00289)
Lagged spring rainfall shock 0.0211 3.92e-06** -0.123*** 9.28e-06***
(0.0511) (1.70e-06) (0.0355) (2.66e-06)
Lagged spring sunshine hour shock 0.0868 3.45e-06 0.109 1.42e-05**
(0.110) (3.66e-06) (0.0825) (6.17e-06)
Share 1 4,173*** -0.0939*** 2,330*** -0.0874***
(259.5) (0.00864) (186.8) (0.0140)
Share 2 7,230*** -0.152*** 4,388*** -0.152***
(386.3) (0.0129) (270.1) (0.0202)
Share 3 7,413*** -0.179*** 6,977*** -0.211***
(717.6) (0.0239) (437.7) (0.0327)
Observations 12,698 12,698 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.456 0.332 0.293 0.087
Non-agri Agri
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Table 5: First stage using predicted marginal tax rates 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level. Predicted share 1=number of predicted tax payers paying 0.05/total number of predicted 
tax payers. Predicted share 2=number of predicted tax payers paying [0.1,0.15]/total number of predicted tax 
payers. Predicted share 3=number of predicted tax payers paying [0.2,0.35]/total number of predicted tax 
payers. Additional individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Income Ratio Income Ratio
Predicted marginal tax rate:0.05 -328.4 0.0850*** -889.0*** 0.0288*
(307.3) (0.00984) (213.2) (0.0157)
Predicted marginal tax rate:[0.1,0.15] 284.0 0.184*** -478.6 0.121***
(484.4) (0.0155) (383.1) (0.0282)
Predicted marginal tax rate:[0.2,0.35] 2,699*** 0.205*** -1,301* 0.170***
(757.9) (0.0243) (672.0) (0.0495)
Lagged spring temperature shock -235.3*** -0.00239 -134.3*** -0.00120
(53.46) (0.00171) (39.40) (0.00290)
Lagged spring rainfall shock 0.00570 3.31e-06* -0.132*** 9.73e-06***
(0.0538) (1.72e-06) (0.0362) (2.66e-06)
Lagged spring sunshine hour shock -0.0244 2.21e-06 0.105 1.45e-05**
(0.116) (3.70e-06) (0.0840) (6.19e-06)
Predicted share 1 2,919*** -0.0757*** 726.3*** -0.0623***
(270.4) (0.00866) (164.0) (0.0121)
Predicted share 2 4,730*** -0.110*** 2,436*** -0.102***
(448.2) (0.0144) (288.7) (0.0213)
Predicted share 3 5,293*** -0.118*** 5,638*** -0.141***
(694.7) (0.0222) (494.5) (0.0364)
Observations 12,698 12,698 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.397 0.314 0.268 0.082
Non-agri Agri
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Table 6: OLS, FE, and 2SLS estimates 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Additional 
individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. NR denotes Not Reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable OLS FE 2SLS 2SLSP
Household income 0.00392 0.00765** 0.0543** 0.0866**
(0.00239) (0.00386) (0.0232) (0.0340)
Household income^2 -6.52e-08 -1.12e-07 -1.46e-06** -2.20e-06**
(5.98e-08) (9.08e-08) (6.46e-07) (8.99e-07)
Ratio -8.997 12.35 240.7 390.7*
(29.33) (49.65) (146.5) (208.5)
Light -53.78** -11.40 -61.51** -76.08***
(25.05) (46.38) (26.10) (28.16)
Moderate -22.23 56.44 -30.57 -44.29
(25.57) (46.10) (26.49) (28.28)
Observations 12,698 12,698 12,698 12,698
R-squared 0.163 0.098 0.125 0.074
Household income 0.00163 0.00526* 0.0856** 0.128**
(0.00238) (0.00303) (0.0372) (0.0535)
Household income^2 5.05e-08 -5.95e-08 -2.75e-06** -4.60e-06**
(8.71e-08) (1.07e-07) (1.37e-06) (2.03e-06)
Ratio 56.13*** 4.698 857.4*** 1,007***
(14.00) (16.08) (200.8) (276.7)
Light -127.1*** -66.80** -175.3*** -177.3***
(21.66) (32.52) (29.09) (35.42)
Moderate -161.6*** -64.99** -245.7*** -263.8***
(20.93) (31.36) (36.94) (46.95)
Observations 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.188 0.142 0.009 NR
Panel A: Non-agricultural individuals
Panel B: Agricultural individuals
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Figure 8: OLS, FE, and 2SLS Engel curves in calories 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side denotes 2SLS predicted daily calorie intake, and the right-hand-side denotes OLS and 
FE predicted daily calorie intake. The dashed x-line indicates median income among non-
agricultural/agricultural individuals 
 
Figure 9: Predicted V.S. actual marginal tax rates 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side denotes predicted calorie intake using actual tax rates, and the right-hand-side denotes 
predicted calorie intake using predicted tax rates. 
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Table 7: 2SLS by gender 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Additional 
individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Calories Calories-P Fat Protein Carbohydrate
Household income 0.0386 0.0713* 0.0237* 0.00685* 0.00811
(0.0260) (0.0372) (0.0141) (0.00368) (0.0165)
Household income^2 -9.75e-07 -1.74e-06* -5.61e-07 -1.42e-07 -2.73e-07
(7.29e-07) (1.01e-06) (3.96e-07) (1.03e-07) (4.63e-07)
Household income*Female 0.0441 0.0318 -0.000348 0.00263 0.0418*
(0.0398) (0.0547) (0.0216) (0.00563) (0.0253)
Household income^2*Female -1.35e-06 -9.53e-07 -6.08e-08 -8.01e-08 -1.21e-06*
(1.14e-06) (1.55e-06) (6.19e-07) (1.61e-07) (7.24e-07)
Ratio 244.0 346.5* 121.6 37.06* 85.36
(151.0) (210.3) (82.02) (21.37) (95.95)
Light -63.42** -76.94*** 15.19 -8.840** -69.77***
(26.33) (28.17) (14.30) (3.727) (16.73)
Moderate -31.30 -43.85 -4.134 -7.647** -19.52
(26.71) (28.22) (14.51) (3.781) (16.97)
Observations 12,698 12,698 12,698 12,698 12,698
R-squared 0.111 0.075 0.068 0.082 0.207
Household income 0.0352 0.0660 0.0281 0.00453 0.00261
(0.0435) (0.0657) (0.0199) (0.00532) (0.0298)
Household income^2 -8.12e-07 -2.45e-06 -9.26e-07 -8.36e-08 1.97e-07
(1.75e-06) (2.66e-06) (8.00e-07) (2.14e-07) (1.20e-06)
Household income*Female 0.0952* 0.0838 0.0298 0.00850 0.0570
(0.0567) (0.0713) (0.0259) (0.00693) (0.0388)
Household income^2*Female -3.48e-06 -2.79e-06 -1.10e-06 -3.05e-07 -2.08e-06
(2.41e-06) (3.05e-06) (1.10e-06) (2.95e-07) (1.65e-06)
Ratio 1,060*** 1,151*** 389.4*** 79.92*** 591.1***
(208.5) (255.3) (95.16) (25.49) (142.7)
Light -174.2*** -163.9*** 10.41 -9.465*** -175.1***
(29.99) (35.34) (13.69) (3.668) (20.54)
Moderate -235.6*** -237.9*** -34.92** -20.58*** -180.1***
(36.02) (45.70) (16.44) (4.405) (24.66)
Observations 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,654
R-squared NR NR NR 0.033 0.153
Panel A: Non-agricultural individuals
Panel B: Agricultural individuals
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Figure 10: Calorie intake by gender 
 
 
Figure 11: Fat intake by gender 
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Figure 12: Protein intake by gender 
 
 
Figure 13: Carbohydrate intake by gender 
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Table 8: 2SLS by household size 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Additional 
individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. Couple is a dummy equal to 1 if 
household size is 2. Three is a dummy equal to 1 if household size is greater than or equal to 3. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Calories Calories-P Fat Protein Carbohydrate
Household income -0.0587 -0.0978 -0.0265 -0.00856 -0.0237
(0.0530) (0.0653) (0.0292) (0.00756) (0.0337)
Household income^2 1.37e-06 2.24e-06 3.84e-07 2.75e-07 7.12e-07
(1.37e-06) (1.62e-06) (7.53e-07) (1.95e-07) (8.68e-07)
Household income*Couple 0.0534 0.0868** 0.0174 0.0104* 0.0256
(0.0380) (0.0440) (0.0210) (0.00543) (0.0242)
Household income^2*Couple -1.34e-06 -1.91e-06 -1.72e-07 -3.17e-07** -8.49e-07
(1.10e-06) (1.20e-06) (6.05e-07) (1.56e-07) (6.97e-07)
Household income*Three 0.101 0.184** 0.0400 0.0137 0.0476
(0.0682) (0.0850) (0.0376) (0.00973) (0.0433)
Household income^2*Three -2.53e-06 -4.46e-06** -6.87e-07 -3.71e-07 -1.47e-06
(1.80e-06) (2.15e-06) (9.93e-07) (2.57e-07) (1.14e-06)
Ratio 267.8** 476.2** 161.4** 47.45** 58.89
(134.2) (188.5) (74.03) (19.15) (85.27)
Light -57.01** -74.98*** 19.33 -8.143** -68.20***
(26.00) (28.49) (14.35) (3.712) (16.52)
Moderate -28.70 -45.99 -2.070 -7.399** -19.23
(26.40) (28.60) (14.57) (3.769) (16.78)
Observations 12,698 12,698 12,698 12,698 12,698
R-squared 0.135 0.078 0.064 0.091 0.228
Household income 0.0902 0.156 0.0377 -0.0125 0.0650
(0.104) (0.124) (0.0500) (0.0132) (0.0724)
Household income^2 -2.14e-06 -3.50e-06 -1.16e-06 7.12e-07 -1.69e-06
(3.83e-06) (4.18e-06) (1.84e-06) (4.86e-07) (2.67e-06)
Household income*Couple 0.0194 -0.00500 0.0209 0.0192* -0.0207
(0.0789) (0.0903) (0.0379) (0.0100) (0.0549)
Household income^2*Couple -2.21e-06 -1.86e-06 -7.78e-07 -1.06e-06*** -3.73e-07
(3.21e-06) (3.40e-06) (1.54e-06) (4.07e-07) (2.24e-06)
Household income*Three -0.0215 -0.0484 0.00831 0.0191 -0.0489
(0.116) (0.146) (0.0558) (0.0147) (0.0809)
Household income^2*Three 1.26e-08 -3.83e-07 -4.65e-07 -8.78e-07 1.36e-06
(4.32e-06) (5.16e-06) (2.08e-06) (5.48e-07) (3.01e-06)
Ratio 752.4*** 820.3*** 344.1*** 46.73* 361.6**
(203.7) (252.5) (97.84) (25.81) (141.7)
Light -170.2*** -170.8*** 10.80 -8.679** -172.4***
(29.26) (34.58) (14.05) (3.708) (20.35)
Moderate -237.1*** -252.4*** -36.82* -20.38*** -179.9***
(39.68) (48.88) (19.06) (5.029) (27.61)
Observations 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.049 NR NR 0.094 0.237
Panel A: Non-agricultural individuals
Panel B: Agricultural individuals
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Figure 14: Calorie intake by household size 
 
 
Figure 15: Fat intake by household size 
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Figure 16: Protein intake by household size 
 
 
Figure 17: Carbohydrate intake by household size 
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Table 9: Income elasticities in Tables 6-8 
 
Notes: All income elasticities are evaluated at median income and nutrient intakes. Income elasticities obtained 
when predicted tax rates are used are in the brackets. 
 
Table 10: Robustness check for higher order functional form 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. * indicates being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Additional 
individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Female Male Single Couple Larger
Calories 0.093 0.139 0.068 -0.118 -0.018 0.072
[0.152] [0.178] [0.128] [-0.198] [-0.020] [0.148]
Fat 0.134 0.151 -0.201 -0.063 0.084
Protein 0.137 0.106 -0.123 0.034 0.080
Carbohydrate 0.146 0.021 -0.074 -0.003 0.066
Calories 0.082 0.128 0.035 0.075 0.113 0.066
[0.119] [0.145] [0.059] [0.131] [0.163] [0.100]
Fat 0.273 0.130 0.135 0.261 0.213
Protein 0.120 0.042 -0.077 0.056 0.061
Carbohydrate 0.090 0.007 0.082 0.070 0.025
Panel A: Non-agricultural individuals
Panel B: Agricultural individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable 3rd order 4th order 3rd order 4th order
Household income -0.0735 -0.522 -0.00559 -0.519**
(0.0658) (0.469) (0.0674) (0.209)
Household income^2 5.85e-06 5.37e-05 4.87e-06 7.51e-05***
(3.58e-06) (4.95e-05) (4.91e-06) (2.73e-05)
Household income^3 -1.13e-10** -1.91e-09 -1.65e-10 -3.54e-09***
(5.41e-11) (1.86e-09) (1.02e-10) (1.29e-09)
Household income^4 0 0***
(0) (0)
Ratio 322.1** 301.5* 725.3*** 339.5
(155.3) (181.1) (215.5) (279.6)
Light -41.50 -63.88 -158.0*** -94.47**
(28.44) (40.22) (30.80) (41.73)
Moderate -14.58 -38.95 -217.9*** -186.3***
(28.23) (41.24) (40.51) (46.33)
Observations 12,698 12,698 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.079 NR 0.023 NR
Non-agri Agri
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Figure 18A: Higher order Engel curves in the non-agricultural sector 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side uses 2nd order specification, and the right-hand-side uses 3rd and 4th order 
specifications. 
 
Figure 18B: Higher order Engel curves in the agricultural sector 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side uses 2nd order specification, and the right-hand-side uses 3rd and 4th order 
specifications. 
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Appendix A: Data 
A.1. China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
CHNS is an ongoing international collaborative project between the Carolina Population 
Center (UPC) at the University of North Carolina (UNC) and the National Institute of 
Nutrition and Food Safety (NINFS) at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CCDCP). This survey was designed to examine the effects of the health, nutrition, and 
family planning policies and programs implemented by the national and local governments, 
and to analyze how the social and economic transformation is affecting its population’s 
health and nutritional status. 
The survey was performed by an international team of researchers whose backgrounds 
include nutrition, public health, economics, sociology, Chinese studies, and demography. 
And it took place over a 3-day period using a multistage, random cluster process to draw a 
sample of about 4,400 households with a total of 19,000 individuals in nine provinces, which 
vary in geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators. Counties 
in the nine provinces were stratified by income (low, middle, and high), and a weighted 
sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in each province. The provincial 
capital and a lower income city were selected when feasible. Villages and townships within 
the counties, and urban and suburban neighborhoods within the cities, were selected 
randomly.  
The survey collects information on household and individual economic activities (such as 
occupational activity, farming, and household business), time allocation (such as shopping, 
cooking, and child care), insurance coverage, use of health facilities, individual lifestyle (such 
as smoking, and drinking etc.), household asset ownership, individual health status, marriage 
and birth history. Furthermore, it includes anthropometric measures (such as weight, height, 
and arm circumference) and information on community level economic conditions, such as 
health service quality, infrastructure availability etc. was collected in the community survey. 
CHNS constructed a separate longitudinal data file with community level covariates, using 
established scaling procedures and CHNS community level data collected in the community 
survey. A higher value (0-10) of each community level covariate indicates a higher degree of 
urbanization/quality. The community level covariates are population density, population 
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diversity, economic condition, education, housing quality, health service quality, sanitation, 
traditional market, modern market, transportation, and communication. 
Community population density was constructed as the ratio between total population of the 
community and community area (from official records). Community population diversity was 
constructed using information on the variation in educational attainment and income level 
within the community. Community economic condition was constructed using information on 
typical daily wage for an ordinary male worker and percentage of non-agricultural labour 
force. Community education was constructed using information on average educational 
attainment among adults aged over 21y. Community housing quality was constructed using 
information on access to electricity and access to gas etc. within a community. Community 
health service quality was constructed using information on number and type of health-care 
facilities within 12 km within the community. Community sanitation was constructed using 
information on proportion of households with treated water etc. within the community. 
Community traditional market was constructed using information on traditional markets 
(such as distance to a traditional market etc.). Community modern market was constructed 
using information on number of supermarkets, cafes, internet cafes etc. within the 
community. Community transportation was constructed using information on type of road, 
distance to the closest bus stop etc. within the community. Community communication was 
constructed using information on availability of a cinema, availability of postal service, 
percentage of households with a television etc. within the community.  
 
A.2. National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and China State Administration of 
Taxation (CSAT) 
NBSC provides China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) for each year (CSY 1989), which is an 
annual statistical publication and covers very comprehensive data in each year and some 
selected data in historically important years and the most recent 20 years at national level and 
local levels of province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central 
government, reflecting various aspects of China’s social and economic development. CSAT 
is a ministerial-level department within the government of the People’s Republic of China. It 
is under the direction of the State Council, and is responsible for the collection of taxes and 
enforces the state revenue laws. CSAT is responsible for, among other things, drafting tax 
laws and regulations, formulating detailed implementation rules for tax laws and regulations, 
and putting forward suggestions on tax policies. 
Appendix B: Additional results 
 
 
61 
 
 B.1. Robustness Check I: Calories and Physical Activity 
Calorie intake and physical activity determine the evolution of body weight. Increases in 
bodyweight consequently result from eating too much given the level of physical activity the 
individual engages in. Hence, we control for one important dimension of physical activity, 
which is occupational physical activity. However, it is likely that the control variables for 
occupational physical activity (sedentary occupation and moderate occupation) are also 
endogenous. On the one hand, occupational type is likely to be correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity such as innate ability, family background, and/or time discounting. For 
example, if daily calorie intake is increasing in the strenuousness of occupational physical 
activity, and if individuals with a lower discount rate are more likely to have a sedentary 
occupation (Murphy et al., 2005), the correlation between daily calorie intake and the 
strenuousness of occupational physical activity will be biased upward. On the other hand, 
since there also exists common shocks (for example, technological innovation) that affect 
both daily calorie intake and the strenuousness of occupational physical activity (Lakdawalla 
et al., 2002, 2005, and 2007; Philipson et al., 2008 and 2010; Bleich et al., 2008; and Ng et 
al., 2009), endogeneity of occupational type in turn is due to simultaneity bias instead of 
omitted variables bias. 
Table 11 shows results for daily calorie intake with and without conditioning on occupational 
physical activity, for both non-agricultural (see Columns 1 and 2) and agricultural (see 
Columns 3 and 4) individuals. We find very similar coefficient estimates for the income 
profiles in both specifications, in spite of significant and negative effects of occupational 
physical activity among individuals from both sectors. These negative effects indicate that 
calorie intake is adjusted according to daily energy expended. The resulting Engel curves 
(Figure 19) are almost identical and differ only at very high incomes. 
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Table 11: Robustness check for endogeneity of physical activity 
 
Notes: *** indicates being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Additional individual and community level covariates are the same as those in 
Table 4. 
 
Figure 19: Conditional V.S. unconditional Engel curves 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side denotes conditional Engel curves, and the right-hand-side denotes unconditional Engel 
curves. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional
Household income 0.0543** 0.0531** 0.0856** 0.109***
(0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0372) (0.0399)
Household income^2 -1.46e-06** -1.43e-06** -2.75e-06** -3.81e-06**
(6.46e-07) (6.44e-07) (1.37e-06) (1.48e-06)
Ratio 240.7 231.9 857.4*** 811.4***
(146.5) (146.1) (200.8) (199.2)
Light -61.51** -175.3***
(26.10) (29.09)
Moderate -30.57 -245.7***
(26.49) (36.94)
Observations 12,698 12,698 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.009 NR
Non-agri Agri
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B.2. Robustness Check II: Equivalence Scale Adjustment 
What constitutes a proper equivalence scale is intensively discussed in the literature. 
Goldman et al. (2010) uses household income per capita, while Meng et al. (2004) use more 
equivalence scale adjustments with different weights for adults, children and elderly23. Our 
equivalised income measure is based on the square root of household size (Buhrmann et al., 
1988; Atkinson et al., 1995) which gives a weighting similar to that of the also widely used 
modified OECD scales. We performed a robustness check using per-capita income which 
assumes no economies of scale, and find very similar results.  
Results obtained under the alternative measure are reported in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 12. 
For comparison, income effects obtained under the original square root measure are shown in 
Columns 1 and 3. 
There is no statistical difference between the two sets of results for agricultural households at 
the 5 percent level, while significant differences are detected for people from non-agricultural 
background. But as Figure 20 shows, there is little change in the calorie income profile of 
non-agricultural households, and their income elasticity of calories under the alternative 
equivalence scale adjustment is around 0.139, similar that predicted in Table 6 (0.093). 
Therefore, our results are robust to the use of different equivalence scale adjustments. 
 
  
                                                        
23 These weights are: 0.35 for infants (0-2y), 0.5 for children (3-14y) and elderly (above 65y). Alternatively, 
they attach an equivalence scale of 0.5 to infant and a weight of 0.75 to children and the elderly. 
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Table 12: Square root of household size V.S. household size 
 
Notes: *** indicates being significant at the 1 percent level. ** indicates being significant at the 5 percent level. 
Additional individual and community level covariates are the same as those in Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 20: Engel curves: household size adjusted income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Size^1/2 Size Size^1/2 Size
Household income 0.0543** 0.116*** 0.0856** 0.129**
(0.0232) (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0518)
Household income^2 -1.46e-06** -5.26e-06*** -2.75e-06** -7.63e-06**
(6.46e-07) (1.71e-06) (1.37e-06) (3.62e-06)
Ratio 240.7 393.3** 857.4*** 793.3***
(146.5) (168.0) (200.8) (184.7)
Light -61.51** -58.59** -175.3*** -169.1***
(26.10) (27.10) (29.09) (27.72)
Moderate -30.57 -30.02 -245.7*** -226.5***
(26.49) (27.56) (36.94) (30.91)
Observations 12,698 12,698 18,654 18,654
R-squared 0.125 0.047 0.009 0.034
Non-agri Agri
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Chapter 2  When Culture Dictates: The Long-term Impact of the Chinese Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
1. Introduction 
The role of education interventions has been a basic concern for economists for some 
time. One central motivation behind various education interventions is that increased 
schooling may pay off in the long-term (Currie 2009; Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011). In 
particular, the health returns to education have been attracting increasingly more attention 
from the academic circle. As Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios (2006) noted: “the positive 
association between schooling and health has been called one of the strongest generalisations 
to emerge from empirical research on health in the United States”. Yet so far existing 
evidence on the health impact of education interventions (or education) has been mixed. On 
the one side, education interventions have proved to positively influence health (Currie and 
Moretti 2003; Lleras-Muney 2005; Oreopoulos 2006). On the other, scepticisms have also 
been cast on the potential health benefits of further expenditures on education (Heckman 
2000; McCrary and Royer 2011; Clark and Royer 2013). One reason for this 
inconclusiveness is that individuals who are affected by education interventions may differ 
systematically from those who are not, in terms of initial endowment (Behrman and 
Rosenzweig 2004), innate ability (Card 2001), preferences (Butcher and Case 1994) and 
parental characteristics (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens 2006). Since health is one of the most 
important human capitals (Grossman 1972) and education policies have long been perceived 
as a cost-effective way to improve health (Devereux and Hart 2010), more empirical 
estimates of the health impact of education policies are warranted. This analysis aims to add 
more insight into this ongoing literature by taking advantage of a nationwide education 
expansion campaign in China that may overcome some of the selection problems highlighted 
by previous studies. It also examines how this education campaign has altered individual 
health behaviours and labour supply, as they are two of the well-established correlates of 
health (Arendt 2005; Chavas 2013). 
The education intervention examined in this study is the Chinese proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. The Cultural Revolution created a once-and-for-all education system, i.e. change 
that lasted from 1968-1976 and had no counterpart in the education history of China (Pepper 
1991; Lin 1997; Song 2009). Since both the onset and termination of the Cultural Revolution 
were unexpected, abrupt and comprehensive (Harding 1991; MacFarquhar 1991; Pepper 
1991), the education system ensued from it can be used as a quasi-experiment for better 
understanding the health-policy relationship. In particular, one major feature of the Cultural 
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Revolution education system was the nationwide expansion of primary education. This 
analysis examines the long-term impact of this feature of the Cultural Revolution on 
individual health and health-related outcomes. The dataset used is China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) panel, which has rich information on various measures of health. 
The Cultural Revolution education policies almost universalised primary education 
among school-aged children, as a result of a wider availability of primary schools across the 
country and the abolition of various entrance exams used to restrict grade progression 
(Andreas 2004; Deng and Treiman 1997; Hannum 1999). But evidence on how education 
quality was affected by the Cultural Revolution has been mixed. On the one hand, because 
the Cultural Revolution overstretched limited school resources (to meet the demand by newly 
constructed schools), shortened primary school length (from 6 to 5 years), simplified teaching 
curricula (from academic to vocational) and lowered study morale (future career 
opportunities no longer linked to academic performance), it was blamed for leading to a 
disastrous decline in education standard (Deng and Treiman 1997; Wu 2008; Hannum 1999; 
Andreas 2004). On the other, Meng and Gregory (2002 and 2007) and Zhang, Liu and Yung 
(2007) observed that there was a gradual return to normalcy in the primary school system 
since around 1969. Statistics from the Ministry of Education suggest that during the Cultural 
Revolution the number of full-time teachers in primary schools increased, there were more 
teachers with better teaching qualifications (teacher-training and academic senior-middle 
school graduates), the student-to-teacher ratio declined and there was little change in class-
size (Table 1). These seem to suggest that primary school quality may have suffered little or 
even improved. 
Specifically, these policy implications varied by both cohort year-of-birth and place-
of-birth. Time-wise, the expansion of primary education affected only those cohorts who 
were at primary school age during the Cultural Revolution: Cohorts born in 1955-1970 (-1 to 
14 years old in 1968) were potentially exposed to the revolution while cohorts born in 1949-
1954 (15 to 20 years old in 1968) were not. In addition, policy intensity also differed by 
urban and rural place-of-birth. Before the Cultural Revolution, children with rural place-of-
birth had more limited access to primary education than children with urban place-of-birth. 
The revolution education policies explicitly favoured rural children, leading to a relative 
increase in education quantity among them, compared to their urban counterparts (Deng and 
Treiman 1997; Hannum 1999; Lu and Treiman 2008). There may also be a relative increase 
in education quality received by rural children, although the overall impact of the Cultural 
Revolution on education quality is not clear. Giles, Park and Wang (2008) and Meng and 
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Gregory (2002 and 2007) found that school life for rural children was likely less disrupted 
than that for urban children (e.g. the student-teacher movements seemed mainly concentrated 
in the cities). Andreas (2004) suggested that the expansion policies made basic education 
available to some village youth for the first time, leaving no scope for decline in education 
quality. Thirdly, the problem of teacher shortage may also be less acute for primary schools 
in rural areas. Because statistics from the Ministry of Education show that rural primary 
schools hired more teachers than urban primary schools between 1965 and 1976 (Table 1). 
Andreas (2004) noted that village youth graduating from teacher-training schools were 
required to return to their villages of origin during the Cultural Revolution. And the various 
rustication programs (targeted at urban middle school graduates and other academic 
professionals) put forward by the revolution authority may avail rural primary schools of 
more teachers (Hou and Zhou 1999). Interestingly, available evidence also appears to suggest 
that, within rural cohorts, those with rural-village (More Rural) place-of-birth may likewise 
have benefited more from the Cultural Revolution than those with rural-town (More Urban) 
place-of-birth, in terms of both education quantity and quality (Section 2). 
 Exploiting both the year-of-birth and More Rural-More Urban place-of-birth 
differentials in treatment intensity, this study identifies the policy parameter of interest using 
difference-in-differences. Using the More Rural-More Urban differential instead of the 
urban-rural differential helps minimise confounding due to the forced Rustication Program 
(middle school graduates were forced to the countryside to engage in agricultural labour) that 
was also part of the Cultural Revolution and may have long-term implications for cohort 
health. But since CHNS contains only information on cohort rural-village (More Rural) and 
rural-town (More Urban) place-of-residence (instead of place-of-birth) and since place-of-
residence can well differ from place-of-birth due to migration (Mullan et al. 2010), this study 
uses and compares four alternative definitions of More Rural and More Urban which differ 
by how rural-village and rural-town are classified, as an attempt to provide more reliable 
estimates of interest. 
Yet it is still likely that changes in the health (or health-related outcomes) of the More 
Rural cohorts would not have been the same as the changes in the health of the More Urban 
cohorts even without the Cultural Revolution. This study therefore re-estimates the baseline 
specification on a more comparable discontinuity sample of the More Rural and More Urban 
cohorts created by one institutional feature of the revolution education agenda. Second, since 
the treatment group includes those who were in school at the beginning (the 1955-1960 
cohorts) and the end (the 1966-1970 cohorts) of the Cultural Revolution, it is possible that the 
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baseline results are picking up the effects of events other than the education policy occurring 
during the especially turbulent years of the revolution (beginning and end). This study next 
restricts the treatment group to those who started and completed primary education within the 
revolution decade (the 1961-1965 cohorts), the cohorts who may be less affected by events 
that occurred either before or after they were at primary school age. Thirdly, cohorts may 
differ systematically in their demand for education due to e.g. changing attitudes toward 
education. This study then examines whether the baseline is sensitive to controlling for cohort 
pre-treatment difference in education attainment. Fourth, a similar difference-in-differences is 
applied to the control (the 1949-1954 cohorts) in order to see if a significant policy impact 
can be found where it is not expected. Lastly, the comparison of outcomes of the urban and 
rural cohorts is likely plagued by non-random rural-to-urban migration. This study uses 
exogenous shocks to agricultural labour supply to model individual decisions to move and 
correct for potential selection bias caused by endogenous migration. 
This study builds upon and contributes to three strands of existing literature. First, it 
adds more information to an emerging literature that focuses on the long-term impact of the 
Cultural Revolution24. The most related are Giles, Park and Wang (2008) and Meng and 
Gregory (2002; 2007) who also exploited the education policies during the Cultural 
Revolution. Both these two studies noticed that the Cultural Revolution caused substantial 
education disruptions by closing schools at its onset (1966-1968) and simplifying school 
curricula. Meng and Gregory (2007) asked how these education disruptions affected cohorts’ 
later education and earnings. The urban youth with disturbed school years (the 1947-1961 
cohorts) were significantly less likely than their undisturbed counterparts (the 1942-1946 and 
the 1962-1966 cohorts) to have a senior-high school and college degree, by 17 and 7 
percentage points. The cohorts with interrupted education also earned significantly less, by 
6%. Giles, Park and Wang (2008) used the Cultural Revolution as an instrument for 
education and estimated the earnings return to education. They argued that the extent to 
which education was interrupted differed by parental education and occupation. Using this 
within-cohort variation and controlling for unobserved cohort differences, they found that the 
disrupted urban cohorts (disrupted secondary education: the 1948-1963 cohorts; disrupted 
college education: the 1945-1963 cohorts) with more educated fathers were less likely to 
                                                        
24Harmel and Yeh (2013), Gong, Lu and Xie (2014), Li, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2008), Giles, Park and Wang 
(2008) and Meng and Gregory (2000 and 2007). Among them, Harmel and Yeh (2013), Gong, Lu and Xie 
(2014) and Li, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2008) were interested in the rustication program instead of the education 
system during the Cultural Revolution. All the three studies found a significant long-term impact of the 
rustication program. 
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graduate from colleges (1-4 percentage points; 5-22%) and high schools (2 percentage points; 
3%). Though intended as a placebo test, an additional finding in Giles, Park and Wang (2008) 
is that the Cultural Revolution seems not significantly related to individual health. This study 
differs from theirs by focusing on a different aspect of the Cultural Revolution, i.e. the 
restoration and expansion of the school system during the later consolidation phase of this 
movement (1968-1976). 
This study is also related to an extensive literature that uses supply-side features of the 
school system as exogenous determinants of individual education and estimates returns to 
education25. Specifically, Maurin and McNally (2008) is related to this study in that the 
education intervention exploited is essentially a historical event (the May 1968 student riots 
in France that abandoned normal examination procedures and enabled a fair proportion of 
students to pursue more years of higher education than would otherwise have been possible). 
Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Whitmore (2001) are related 
because they used education policies targeted at primary schools (specifically class-size in 
primary schools) to estimate the impact of school quality on student performance. Duflo 
(2001) is the most relevant. The setting is in a developing country (Indonesia) and the 
education intervention is a primary school construction program. Between 1973 and 1978, 
more than 61,000 primary schools (two schools per 1,000 children aged 5-14 in 1971) were 
built up in Indonesia. Duflo observed that program intensity differed by both individual year-
of-birth in terms of when the program was implemented and region-of-birth in terms of the 
number of schools constructed. Exploiting both these two differentials, her estimates suggest 
that each primary school constructed (per 1,000 children) led to an average increase of 0.12-
0.19 years of education and 1.5-2.7% increase in wages. This study contributes to this 
literature by asking how education intervention in a setting with low levels of education may 
have shaped individual health outcomes. Relatively few studies have considered the health 
returns to education policy in a developing background (Currie and Moretti 2003; Oreopoulos 
2006). 
Thirdly, this study adds some new insight into an ongoing literature that more closely 
examines the intermediate pathways linking education policies or education to health26. For 
                                                        
25For example, for school availability, see Card (1995), Currie and Moretti (2003) and Duflo (2001); for 
compulsory schooling laws, see Oreopoulos (2006), Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Chou (2007); for education 
benefits, see Stanley (2003) and Lemieux and Card (1998); for examination procedure, Maurin and McNally 
(2008); for class-size, see Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Whitmore (2001). 
26For example, Currie and Moretti (2003), Clark and Royer (2013), de Walque (2007), Lleras-Muney (2005), 
Grimard and Parent (2007) and Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios (2006). 
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example, Currie and Moretti (2003) found that, after obtaining estimates suggesting that 
college openings in a mother’s county-of-birth at age 17 significantly increased her education 
and improved child health, a higher number of colleges was associated with a higher 
probability that a new mother was married and higher husband education, reduced parity, 
increased prenatal care usage and reduced smoking. They interpreted this as suggesting that 
these aspects are important pathways for the ultimate effect on health. Clark and Royer 
(2013) estimated the education impact on smoking to better understand their results of a mild 
relationship between increased secondary education (induced by the 1947 and 1972 British 
compulsory schooling laws) and health. Their results seem not point to smoking as a strong 
health mediator. These two studies and others also noted that education may affect 
individuals’ health by influencing their health knowledge and perceptions of health-related 
risks. This contention is supported by a few studies summarised in Grimard and Parent 
(2007) and Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios (2006).  
This study exploits rich data from the CHNS and asks whether the health impact of 
the Cultural Revolution may operate through its impact on individual health-related 
preferences or through the possibility that increased education induced individuals to adopt 
health-improving behaviours (e.g. medical care utilisation). 
 This study finds that the Cultural Revolution significantly increased primary 
education obtained by the treated More Rural (the cohorts with More Rural place-of-
residence who were affected by the expansion of primary education). In particular, the full-
treat More Rural (the cohorts with More Rural place-of-residence who began and finished 
their primary schooling during the Cultural Revolution) and partial-after More Rural (the 
cohorts with More Rural place-of-residence who began their primary schooling during the 
Cultural Revolution but were still in school at the end of it) seem have benefited more from 
the Cultural Revolution in terms of education attainment. The results also suggest that the the 
education estimates are not sensitive to various robustness checks. 
 Yet the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on cohort health is more mixed. 
While the Cultural Revolution seems have significantly reduced underweight among the 
treated More Rural, by 4.5-5.6 percentage points or 123-153% (based on sample means), 
reduced self-reported poor health, by 11.3-23.5 percentage points (33-68%), it seems have 
significantly increased the incidence of high blood pressure, by 6.9-7.6 percentage points 
(107-117%). Results for overweight are also inconclusive with flipping signs. Further 
exploring the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the two health correlates – health 
behaviours and labour supply – leads to estimates suggesting that the treated More Rural was 
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more likely to have medical insurance (15-59%), less likely to smoke (31-43%) and more 
likely to take physical activities (137%), while working more actively (19%) and having a 
higher income (34.2-120.5%). (The labour supply results are only for the partial-after More 
Rural.) The difference-in-differences estimates also tend to suggest that the more treated (in 
terms of education), the healthier the health behaviours and the more active the labour supply. 
Lastly, the Cultural Revolution is estimated to have a significant impact on cohort 
health-related lifestyle and consumption preferences and the preference results seem able to 
explain those obtained for its long-term impact. For example, the lower prevalence of 
underweight among the treated More Rural cohorts may be explained by their higher 
likelihood of liking less healthful foods (fast foods, salty snacks and soft drinks) and 
sedentary activities (watching TV, playing computer and reading), while the higher tendency 
for the full-treat More Rural to take physical activities and consume a fatty diet may be 
explained by this group’s preferences for active activities (walking, sports and body-shaping) 
and similarly less healthful foods. Moreover, more primary schooling (induced by the 
Cultural Revolution) seems have increased medical insurance ownership (20-49%), reduced 
smoking (33%), increased exercising (103-166%), led to higher probability of working (22%) 
and increased income (38.1-116.8%), within the study sample. It therefore seems that the 
long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution may come from its influence on cohort health-
related preferences and the positive correlation between education and health outcomes. 
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the historical and theoretical 
setup for the current study. Section 3 describes in detail the research design. More 
information on the China Health and Nutrition Survey data is in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
the education results for the Cultural Revolution, which is followed by some robustness 
checks in Section 6. Results for the health impact of the Cultural Revolution are in Section 7. 
Section 8 exploits the mechanism and Section 9 concludes. 
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2. Historical and Theoretical Setup 
2.1 The Cultural Revolution Education System (1968-1976) 
This section briefly summarises the educational aspect27 of the Chinese proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. The radical Cultural Revolution education campaign was carried out in 
order to “drag out the academic power holders and bourgeois intellectual authorities who 
presided over the breeding ground for intellectual aristocrats” (Pepper 1991). It went through 
two phases. During the first mobilisation phase (1966-1967), the pre-revolution education 
system was turned over by students and teachers as a result of a series of student-teacher 
movements and day to day management of schools was severely disrupted. Normal school 
life was gradually resumed during the second consolidation phase (1968-1976) when the 
Cultural Revolution education system was nationally institutionalised (Lin 1997; Song 2009). 
This revolution education system was then abruptly and comprehensively dismantled in 1977, 
after the official’s denunciation and termination of the broader Cultural Revolution. 
One major feature of the Cultural Revolution education system was the nationwide 
expansion of primary2829 education. In fact, part of the education policy was also designed to 
promote secondary and college education, but since identifying the policy impact of the 
former is much more difficult30 and only around 6% of the study sample had some college 
education 31 , this study leaves this aspect of the Cultural Revolution for future research 
(Appendix B provides a brief description of the revolution education policies at the secondary 
and tertiary levels). Specifically, the Cultural Revolution education policies at the primary 
level had three implications for the affected cohorts. First, quantitatively, primary education 
was almost universalised among school-aged kids. This can be explained by a wider 
availability of primary schools and the fact that exams previously used to determine grade 
progression were abolished 32  (Andreas 2004; Deng and Treiman 1997; Hannum 1999). 
                                                        
27A more comprehensive description (including non-educational aspects) of the Chinese proletarian Cultural 
Revolution is given in The Cambridge History of China edited by MacFarquhar and Fairbank (1991). 
28To be more specific, the major feature of the Cultural Revolution education policies should be the nationwide 
expansion of basic education (including both primary and secondary education). But since this current analysis 
does not examine the policy impact of the expansion of secondary education, the main text is somewhat vague 
about this point. 
29In fact, it should be primary education obtained from regular schools. But since all the primary schools were 
regular, the main text is also vague about this point. 
30This is because among the sampling cohorts, those born between 1949 and 1970, there does not exist a group 
of cohorts who was neither affected by the expansion of secondary education nor affected by the expansion of 
primary education, i.e. there does not exist a clean control group for the treatment in terms of secondary 
education. 
31This is consistent with previous findings in e.g. Lin (1997). 
32Before 1966, admission examinations were required for progressing onto each higher level, starting with 
junior middle schools. In the revolution decade, more emphasis was placed instead on student family class 
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Figure 1A plots trend in enrolment rate of school-aged kids in primary schools from 1952-
1983. Around the onset of the Cultural Revolution education system (in 1965), roughly 
84.7% of total school-aged children were enrolled in primary schools; this number rose to 
about 96% at the end of it. Including both school-aged and non-school-aged kids, Figure 1B 
shows a similar upward trend in both primary school enrolment and graduation over the 
period when the revolution system was in existence. From 1968-1976, there was an around 
50% (10036.3 ten thousand in 1968) and 74% (1428.2 ten thousand in 1968) increase in 
primary school enrolment and graduation, respectively. 
Second, existing evidence on the qualitative impact of the Cultural Revolution is 
mixed. On the one hand, the Cultural Revolution education policies have been blamed for 
leading to a disastrous decline in education standards. The rapid expansion of education 
likely lowered teaching quality substantially because it made the problem of limited school 
resources and qualified teachers more acute (Deng and Treiman 1997). Primary school length 
was reduced from 6 years in the pre-system to 5 years (Wu 2008). School curricula were 
simplified and became more practical: Before the revolution academic curricula coexisted 
with rural-oriented (or vocational) curricula, with the former emphasising education quality 
and the latter focusing on popularising education among workers and peasants; the Cultural 
Revolution made all the curricula rural-oriented (Hannum 1999). In addition, the Cultural 
Revolution also abolished the pre-revolution examination system in which students competed 
in exams to enter a hierarchy of increasingly selective middle schools and (ultimately) 
colleges. This undermined student motivation to study: Success in the old meritocratic system 
was closely correlated with future job opportunities in state sectors, while the elimination of 
it blocked this route (Andreas 2004).  
Conversely , researchers (Meng and Gregory 2002 and 2007; Zhang, Liu and Yung 
2007) observed that academic curricula were  restored in primary schools since around 1969 
and there was a gradual return to normalcy in the entire education system throughout the 
1970s. Statistics from the Ministry of Education show that the number of full-time teachers in 
primary schools rose by around 37% from 1965-1976. Over the same period, there were more 
teachers from teacher-training and academic senior middle schools (top two teacher 
credentials) 33 , by around 724% and 1337%, respectively. The student-to-teacher ratio 
                                                                                                                                                                            
origin and his/her political loyalty. This criterion favoured children of workers and peasants who were less 
academically successful and hence positively improved their educational opportunities. 
33It should be noted that direct official statistics on types of primary school teachers are not available. Hence 
teacher type here is approximated by number of graduates from institutions including teacher-training middle 
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declined by around 6%. And little change in class-size occurred (Table 1). These descriptive 
statistics then suggest that primary school quality may have improved over the revolution 
decade. Lastly, though  post-revolution education officials made explicit effort to retrench the 
provision of secondary education in order to restore education quality (by cutting down the 
number of secondary schools), no comparable effort could be observed for primary 
education, suggesting (indirectly) that primary school quality may suffer less than secondary 
school quality because of the Cultural Revolution (Knight and Shi 1996). 
Thirdly and most importantly, the Cultural Revolution education policies seem to 
have relatively increased both education quantity and quality in rural areas, compared to 
urban areas. Before the Cultural Revolution, rural children had more limited access to 
primary education. The Cultural Revolution policies instead favoured children from rural 
families and hence narrowed the urban-rural differential in education quantity (Deng and 
Treiman 1997; Hannum 1999; Lu and Treiman 2008). For example, the abolition of various 
entrance examinations made progression onto higher levels of the education ladder easier for 
rural kids who were in general less academically successful. More direct evidence is given in 
Figure 4A, which shows that while the number of students in urban primary schools declined 
by around 35% from 1965-1976, that for rural primary schools rose by 38% over the same 
period. Likewise in Figure 4B, there was a disproportionate increase in the number of 
primary school graduates in rural areas from 1965-1976, i.e. 330% in rural versus 85% in 
urban. 
Moreover, education quality in rural primary schools may also have improved relative 
to that in urban primary schools. First, day-to-day management of primary schools in the 
countryside was likely to be less disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, according to Giles, 
Park and Wang (2008) and Meng and Gregory (2002 and 2007). Second, Andreas (2004) 
suggested that the radical policies made basic education available to some village youth for 
the first time (leaving no scope for decline in education quality). Meanwhile, the problem of 
teacher shortage may be less severe in rural primary schools during the Cultural Revolution. 
Official statistics suggest that rural primary schools recruited more teachers between 1965 
and 1976 than their urban counterparts, i.e. an increase of around 43% compared to a decline 
of about 7% (Figure 4C). The revolution government required village youth graduating from 
teacher-training schools to return to their villages of origin. And the various rustication 
programs (targeted at urban middle school graduates and other academic professionals) could 
                                                                                                                                                                            
schools, academic senior middle schools and academic junior middle schools. These three types of graduates 
formed the major part of primary school teachers over the revolution decade. 
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avail schools in the countryside of more teachers (Hou and Zhou 1999). It also seems that 
while the elimination of the examination system led urban students to lose interest in study 
(academic performance was no longer tied to career opportunities in state sectors), rural 
students were less discouraged because the rural-oriented curricula made rural education 
remain directly connected with future work in the villages (Andreas 2004); besides, the 
recommendation procedure which replaced all the entrance exams gave priority to children 
with agricultural background (Wu 2008). 
 Interestingly, for rural children from the same county (administrative level equivalent 
to city and immediately below province in China), those with More Rural (i.e. rural village in 
a county) place-of-birth also turn out to be more likely to be enrolled in and graduate from 
primary schools during the Cultural Revolution, compared to those with More Urban (i.e. 
rural town in a county) place-of-birth. This can be seen from Figures 5A and 5B. Data 
compiled by the Ministry of Education suggest that the number of More Rural kids enrolled 
in primary schools was around 41% higher in 1976 than in 1965; the corresponding figure for 
More Urban kids was lower, of around 3%. In Figure 5B, while primary school graduates 
became about 355% more prevalent in More Rural areas from 1965-1976, the upward trend 
was (comparatively) milder for More Urban areas with a magnitude of about 166%. Similarly 
for education quality, Figure 5C shows that the number of full-time teachers in More Rural 
primary schools rose by around 45% in 1965-1976, which was about 34 percentage points 
higher than the corresponding increase in More Urban primary schools. It may also be 
assumed that the More Rural-More Urban contrast in other dimensions of school quality 
resembled its rural-urban counterpart described in the previous paragraph. Therefore, the 
Cultural Revolution education system, with its explicit goal of narrowing any urban-rural (or 
class) difference in educational attainment, likely also has benefited the More Rural kids 
more than the More Urban kids, with respect to both education quantity and quality.  
As will become clearer later, this last feature of the Cultural Revolution is crucial for 
the empirical analysis of this study, which is intended to estimate the long-term impact of the 
Cultural Revolution on individual adulthood health and health-related outcomes. What also 
remains unclear is why individual health (and health-related outcomes) could be affected by 
the Cultural Revolution and through what channels. Hence, before giving more details on the 
empirical design, the next section first uses the life-cycle model developed in Heckman, 
Stixrud and Urzua (2006) to illustrate some hypothesised effects of the Cultural Revolution 
on health. 
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2.2 A Life-cycle Model 
Although the life-cycle model in Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) is about 
explaining the role of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, it can also be used to ground the 
theoretical foundation for this current study in the light of the development of human capital. 
Assume that utility at period 𝑡 (𝑈𝑡) is derived from consumption 𝑐𝑡 and labour supply 𝑙𝑡: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑙𝑡; 𝜂) 
where𝜂 is a preference parameter. Consumption is a vector and includes a variety of health 
behaviours such as diet and physical activity. The agent discounts utility at time preference 
rate 𝜌. Wages at period 𝑡 (𝑌𝑡) are given by human capital ℎ𝑡 and productivity traits 𝜃: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑅(ℎ𝑡; 𝜃) 
Human capital ℎ𝑡 itself is produced by the human capital production function: 
ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝜑(ℎ𝑡, 𝐼𝑡; 𝜏) 
where𝜏 is a productivity parameter, 𝐼𝑡 is investment at 𝑡 and ℎ̇𝑡 denotes the rate of change of 
the human capital stock. The initial condition is given by ℎ0. Assuming perfect credit markets 
at interest rate 𝑟, given initial condition 𝐴0 and ignoring taxes, the law of motion for assets at 
period 𝑡 (𝐴𝑡) is 
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
′𝑐𝑡 + 𝑟𝐴𝑡 
where𝑃𝑡 denotes the market prices of the consumption goods (𝑐𝑡).  
The agent maximises 
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡)𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑙𝑡; 𝜂)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
 
over time horizon 𝑇 subject to the law of motion for human capital (ℎ̇𝑡) and that for assets 
(?̇?𝑡). 
So why could health (and health-related) outcomes be affected by the Cultural 
Revolution and through what channels, based on this life-cycle model? The centrepiece of the 
Cultural Revolution education policies is the nationwide expansion of primary education. 
Hence in the first place, this supply-side shock may influence individual investment in 
education 𝐼𝑡, then via the human capital production function (ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝜑(ℎ𝑡, 𝐼𝑡; 𝜏)), the outcome 
human capital ℎ𝑡 (e.g. health) may then be linked to the Cultural Revolution. Because human 
capital is an input for the production of wages 𝑌𝑡  (𝑌𝑡 = 𝑅(ℎ𝑡; 𝜃)), and both human capital ℎ𝑡 
(ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝜑(ℎ𝑡, 𝐼𝑡; 𝜏)) and wages 𝑌𝑡  (?̇?𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
′𝑐𝑡 + 𝑟𝐴𝑡) influence an agent’s available 
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resources with which she chooses consumption 𝑐𝑡 (e.g. health behaviours) and labour supply 
𝑙𝑡 to maximise her utility, this means that the Cultural Revolution may also affect two of the 
well-established health correlates – health behaviours (i.e. 𝑐𝑡) and labour supply (i.e. 𝑙𝑡) – by 
changing cohort investment in education. 
Alternatively, this life-cycle model also implies that the Cultural Revolution may 
influence health (and health-related) outcomes by shaping cohort preferences and 
productivity (the preference/productivity mechanism). That is, if more education (due to 
easier access to education) enhances human capital productivity 𝜏, then via the human capital 
production function (ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝜑(ℎ𝑡, 𝐼𝑡; 𝜏)), human capital ℎ𝑡  (e.g. health) can be alternatively 
linked to the Cultural Revolution through human capital productivity 𝜏 (instead of investment 
in education 𝐼𝑡 ). Similarly, if education shapes individual preferences ( 𝜂 ) and time-
discounting traits ( 𝜌 ) that could be determinants of his/her consumption (e.g. health 
behaviours) and labour supply, then rather than through the budget constraint (or investment 
in education), health behaviours (i.e. 𝑐𝑡) and labour supply (i.e. 𝑙𝑡) can be instead linked to 
the Cultural Revolution via the consumption (i.e. 𝜂) and time-discounting (i.e. 𝜌) preference 
parameters. 
Therefore, this study examines the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on 
individual health, health behaviours (i.e. medical care utilisation, smoking, dietary pattern 
and physical activity) and labour supply (i.e. labour force participation, occupation and 
income), after establishing its relevance for cohort educational attainment (i.e. both channels 
rely on the education impact of the Cultural Revolution). The next section lays out the 
research design used for the empirical analysis. 
 
3. Research Design 
 The Cultural Revolution education system (1968-1976) was a national intervention 
that had profound implications for the educational attainment of the affected cohorts (Pepper 
1991; Lin 1997; Song 2009). One major feature of it was the nationwide expansion of 
primary education. This study examines the long-term impact of this feature of the Cultural 
Revolution on a wide range of individual outcomes, including educational attainment 
(primary education in particular), health, health behaviours and labour supply. The dataset 
used is taken from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which is an unbalanced panel 
that provides detailed information on various outcome measures. This section explains in 
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more detail the empirical framework within which the policy parameters of interest are 
identified. 
 
3.1 Treatment and Control: The Cultural Revolution Generation 
The Cultural Revolution generation, i.e. the cohorts whose primary education may be 
affected by the revolution education policies, can be determined using year-of-birth. Kids 
normally started primary education when reaching 7-834 years old (Zhang, Liu and Yung 
2007). Since primary school length was reduced to 5 years during the Cultural Revolution 
(Andreas 2004; Deng and Treiman 1997; Hannum 1999) and enrolment to primary schools 
may be postponed for cohorts reaching primary school age in 1966-1967 (Deng and Treiman 
1997; Hannum 1999), the Cultural Revolution generation, or the treatment group, should be 
composed of the cohorts born between 195535 and 1970 (or -1-14 years old in 1968). The 
non-Cultural Revolution generation, or the control group, should be the cohorts born in 1949-
1954 (or 15-20 years old in 1968). It turns out that in the CHNS sample the Cultural 
Revolution generation indeed had around 34% (p-value: 0.000) more years of primary 
schooling and was around 45% (p-value: 0.000) more likely to have a primary school degree, 
compared to the control (Figure 2). 
This dichotomous treatment and control classification masks important variations in 
treatment intensity within the Cultural Revolution generation, i.e. years (potentially) exposed 
differed among the treated cohorts. This can be demonstrated by Figure 3, which computes 
for each treated cohort for how long they may have stayed in the revolution education system. 
Treatment intensity is calculated based on school enrolment age (7-8 years old) and school 
length during the Cultural Revolution (5 years). In Figure 3, those who were born between 
1959 and 196536 can spend a maximum of 5 years in primary schools operating under the 
revolution education agenda, implying that they were the potentially fully exposed cohorts. 
By contrast, those who were born before (the 1955-1958 cohorts) or after (the 1966-1970 
cohorts) should have spent fewer than 5 years in the revolution primary system, meaning that 
                                                        
34This is based on the Law of Compulsory Education passed by the People’s Congress in 1986. Before then, 
there was no formal legislation stipulating age eligibility for primary education. So this study assumes that the 
7-8 age eligibility imposed by the 1986 Law of Compulsory Education can also be applied to the pre-1966 and 
Cultural Revolution education systems. Age is calculated according to the formula: Age = Year – Cohort + 1 (1 
year old at time of birth). 
35It is calculated based on cohorts who were 7-10 years old in 1968 (expansion) and who were 7-8 years old in 
1977 (termination). 
36The 1966 cohort is not included because they can still be in school at the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
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they were the potentially partially exposed cohorts. In this regard, the empirical specification 
explicitly takes into account this heterogeneity in treatment exposure (below). 
 
3.2  Geographic Treatment Dispersion: rural and urban differences  
The expansion of primary education was accompanied by a series of other radical 
events that occurred during the early stages of the communist regime (Tables A1- A3). This 
means that directly comparing adulthood outcomes of the Cultural Revolution generation to 
those of the non-Cultural Revolution generation is unlikely to correctly inform the long-term 
impact of the Cultural Revolution, i.e. estimates from treatment-control comparisons can be 
well biased by unobserved cohort-specific characteristics correlated with individual 
outcomes. The previous section shows that, in addition to year-of-birth, treatment intensity 
also varied by place-of-birth (i.e. rural-urban or More Rural-More Urban). Hence, this 
analysis takes advantage of both the variation in treatment intensity by year-of-birth in terms 
of when the Cultural Revolution was introduced and the variation in treatment intensity by 
place-of-birth in terms of its relative quantitative and qualitative relevance to identify the 
policy parameter of interest. That is, in a difference-in-differences framework that uses both 
the year-of-birth and place-of-birth differentials. One advantage of this research design is that 
the effects of any unobserved cohort-level confounders can be controlled for by including a 
set of cohort fixed effects in the difference-in-differences specification. 
 Specifically, the place-of-birth differential in treatment intensity means the More 
Rural-More Urban contrast in the relevance of the Cultural Revolution in the current context. 
Although the quantitative and qualitative impact of the Cultural Revolution education 
policies also differed by urban and rural place-of-birth, this dimension of treatment intensity 
cannot be used because of the well-documented Forced Rustication Program (Whyte 1991; 
Zhou and Hou 1999; Li, Rosenzweig and Zhang 2008). The Forced Rustication Program 
(FRP) was a part of the Cultural Revolution and lasted from 1968-1979. Its intended goal was 
to relocate urban youth (mostly 16-19 years old) to the countryside and let them engage in 
manual labour and learn from the farmers; around 17 million urban youth were rusticated 
between 1967 and 1978 (Zhou and Hou 1999). Due to the then substantially inferior living 
conditions in rural areas, this program created a group of urban youth who was systematically 
different from their rural counterparts in terms of later development such as health. Further, 
Zhou and Hou (1999) reported that around 19.3% of their youth sample stayed in the 
countryside for more than 10 years, 39.3% for 5-10 years and 41.1% for at most 5 years, 
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implying that intensity of the FRP likely varied over time 37 . Therefore, to minimise 
confounding due to the FRP, this study stratifies the estimating sample by urban and rural 
place-of-birth (Section 4), meaning that the urban-rural differential in the Cultural Revolution 
intensity cannot be used. 
 To be clearer about the definitions of More Rural and More Urban. For individuals 
with rural place-of-birth (the rural sample), those with rural-village residence are classified as 
More Rural and those with rural-town residence are classified as More Urban. For individuals 
with urban place-of-birth (the urban sample), those with suburban residence are classified as 
More Rural and those with city centre residence are classified as More Urban. It should be 
noted that the More Rural and More Urban are defined using individual place-of-residence 
(instead of place-of-birth), because information on respondent More Rural and More Urban 
place-of-birth is not available from CHNS. This implies that if for the study sample place-of-
residence differs from place-of-birth, the classification of More Rural and More Urban and 
hence the resulting difference-in-differences estimates can be misleading. Given that rural-to-
urban migration has been an increasingly common phenomenon in China after the Cultural 
Revolution, from around 16 million in the 1980s to around 145 million by the end of 2009 
(Mullan et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2012; Hu 2012), this source of measurement error seems 
more likely for the current study. As a result, this analysis further restricts the estimating 
sample to either rural non-migrants (those with rural place-of-birth and rural place-of-
residence) or urban non-migrants (those with urban place-of-birth and urban place-of-
residence), since for non-migrants place-of-birth is likely to be the same as place-of-
residence. Most of the study sample can be viewed as non-migrants, 60% for the urban 
sample and 85% for the rural sample, implying that this migration restriction may not 
produce an endogenous sample of non-migrants. As robustness checks, a Heckman two-step 
procedure is also used to correct for potential non-random migration; the implied estimates 
remain virtually unchanged. 
Another source of measurement error in the More Rural and More Urban comes from 
the possibility that locations that were rural-village or suburban during the Cultural 
Revolution decade had become rural-town or city centre till the CHNS survey as a result of 
changing administrative definitions of rural-village and suburban, e.g. because of land re-
allocation for urbanisation (Mullan et al. 2011). Similarly because of data limitation, this 
                                                        
37Implementation of RP varied over the course of the Cultural Revolution. After intensive mobilisations in the 
first few years, the leadership allowed one child per family to stay in the cities after graduating from middle 
schools. 
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possibility cannot be safely ruled out. This study therefore uses and compares four alternative 
definitions of More Rural and More Urban, which differ by how individual residential places 
are defined as rural-village or suburban. The classifications of rural-village or suburban based 
on the four More Rural can be shown to be largely time-invariant, implying that the second 
source of measurement error in the More Rural variables may also be less worried about for 
this study (Section 4). The regression specification that exploits both the More Rural and 
year-of-birth variations in the relevance of the Cultural Revolution education system is given 
in the section that follows. 
 
3.3 Baseline Model: Difference-in-Differences 
Equation 1 gives the baseline specification used by the study to identify the long-term 
of the Cultural Revolution education policies: 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1(𝐹𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿2(𝑃𝐵𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿3(𝑃𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝜃1𝐹𝑐 + 𝜃2𝑃𝐵𝑐 + 𝜃3𝑃𝐴𝑐 + 𝛾𝑅
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝(1) 
where𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝 is the outcome of individual 𝑖 born in year 𝑐 living in province 𝑝 (e.g. education 
and health). Equation 1 allows for heterogeneous treatment effect: 𝐹𝑐 is equal to 1 if cohort 𝑐 
was potentially fully exposed to the Cultural Revolution education policies (full-treat); 𝑃𝐵𝑐 
and 𝑃𝐴𝑐 correspond to the potentially partially exposed cohorts, with 𝑃𝐵𝑐 equal to 1 for those 
who were older than the fully exposed cohorts (partial-before) and 𝑃𝐴𝑐 equal to 1 for those 
who were younger (partial-after). 𝑅measures More Rural and is equal to 1 if 𝑖 was More 
Rural and 0 otherwise. Thus, the coefficients of interest are 𝛿1, 𝛿2 and 𝛿3, which are in front 
of the three interaction terms 𝐹𝑐 ∗ 𝑅, 𝑃𝐵𝑐 ∗ 𝑅 and 𝑃𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑅. 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝is a vector of other observed 
covariates: A set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort 
size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 (distinct survey design) 
and two individual-level variables including a female dummy (equal to 1 if female and 0 
otherwise) and age (and its square). 𝛼is a constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝is an error term that is allowed to be 
arbitrarily correlated within and across cohorts. Equation 1 is estimated on urban or rural 
non-migrants (above). 
The parameters of interest (𝛿1, 𝛿2 and 𝛿3) are identified from within cohort variation 
in treatment intensity (i.e. the More Rural differential in policy intensity), conditional on all 
the other observables (𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝). In addition, they may credibly inform the long-term impact of 
the Cultural Revolution. The identifying assumption is that the underlying trend in the 
outcomes of the More Rural cohorts would have been parallel to that for the More Urban 
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cohorts, absent the Cultural Revolution. The cohort fixed effects (𝐹𝑐, 𝑃𝐵𝑐 and 𝑃𝐴𝑐) absorb 
any unobserved characteristics unique to each cohort group that may also be correlated with 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝 . This is important given the presence of numerous other radical events that were 
hallmarks of the early stages of the communist regime and that may also have influenced 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝. The More Rural fixed effect (𝑅) is intended to control for unobserved factors that may 
make the More Rural cohorts persistently different from their More Urban counterparts (e.g. 
health conditions between More Urban and More Rural areas). Then the province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effects by the same token should be able to capture any province and 
quarter-of-birth specific confounders that may come from e.g. the diverse economic 
conditions across provinces in China (Chow and Shen 2006; Wu 2010; Shi 2012) and school 
enrolment policies (Angrist and Krueger 1991). Age (and its square) and the gender dummy 
are used to control for any inherent and systematic life-cycle pattern and gender differences 
in 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝. 
Besides, one might also be worried about the catastrophic incident of the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF) and the economic depression that ensued from it (1958-1962). The well-
documented GLF effectively shattered China’s economy and generated the most severe 
famine in its modern history (Madsen 1991; Whyte 1991). Official statistics suggest that 
agricultural output in 1960 was 75.5 percent of that in 1958, down by another 2.4 percent in 
1961. Output of the light industry decreased by 9.8 percent in 1960, by 21.6 percent in 1961 
and by another 8.4 percent in 1962. Heavy industry output declined by 46.6 percent from 
1960-1961 and by another 22.2 percent from 1961-1962. The cumulative result (coupled with 
bad weather) was a surge in mortality rates of around 129 percent from 1957 (11.1 per 
thousand) to 1960, accompanied by a drop in birth rates of around 45 percent from 1957 (33 
per thousand) to 1961. To ameliorate this type of concern, Equation 1 includes polynomial 
terms in cohort size, which presumably should be able to reflect well the most traumatic 
effects of the GLF. The flexible cohort trend (also in Equation 1) can in addition serve to 
capture any other smooth cohort-specific effects on the outcomes. 
Furthermore, elementary schooling obtained by the study sample (the 1949-1970 
cohorts) should remain broadly insulated from later educational interventions initiated after 
the Cultural Revolution (Law and Pan 2009; Zhang and Zhao 2006; Zhao and Qiu 2012). 
These later interventions included the 1980 reform that once more attempted to universalise 
primary education. Then in 1986 the Law of Compulsory Education was passed, which made 
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nine-year primary and junior middle schooling38 mandatory for age eligible kids (739-8 years 
old by each new school year40). But the youngest cohort in the sample, the 1970 cohort, was 
already 11 years old by the time of the first reform, and Andreas (2004) found that these later 
efforts were slow getting started and made little headway for more than a decade in most 
parts of China. 
Therefore, the difference-in-differences estimates of 𝛿1, 𝛿2 and 𝛿3 may be viewed as 
credible, since they are identified from within cohort variation in treatment intensity. But 
admittedly, the identifying assumption underlying difference-in-differences is strong. It 
requires that changes in the potential outcomes of the More Rural cohorts would have been 
the same as those for the More Urban cohorts, without the Cultural Revolution. In addition, 
the assumption of a relative qualitative impact of the Cultural Revolution on the More Rural 
kids is untestable without more officially documented evidence41. Hence, this analysis also 
performs a series of robustness checks to further cross-validate the main results (Section 7). 
For example, the feasibility of assuming the comparability of the More Rural and More 
Urban cohorts is verified by making use of a regression discontinuity sample created by the 
shortening of school length during the Cultural Revolution. The overall finding seems to 
suggest that the difference-in-differences identification approach may be valid and that the 
estimated policy impact associated with it may be viewed as credible evidence on the long-
term impact of the Cultural Revolution education policies. The next section briefly describes 
the sample data, before showing the baseline results. 
 
4. Data: China Health and Nutrition Survey 
The study sample is constructed from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). CHNS 
is an unbalanced panel which was designed to examine the effects of health, nutrition and 
family planning programs implemented by central and local governments in China. It 
contains rich health and nutrition information for the Chinese population during a period of 
rapid economic transition (1989-2011)42. This study uses waves from 2000-2009, because the 
                                                        
38Basic education: 6 years of primary schooling and 3 years of junior secondary schooling. 
39Age is calculated using the formula: Age = Year – Cohort + 1. So the age eligibility of 7-8 years old does not 
contradict the 6-7 age threshold specified by other studies (e.g. Zhang and Zhao 2006). 
40The new school year typically began in August to September. 
41A coarse guess is that results for primary education may be more reliable, because the standard of secondary 
education generally declined and the rustication programs were more relevant for teacher compositions at 
primary schools (i.e. middle school graduates).  
42The first round of the survey was conducted in 1989; eight subsequent rounds were carried out in 1991, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. From 2000 onward, a multistage random cluster process was used to 
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latest round does not contain the key health information of interest here (weight and height). 
Second, the study sample is composed of individuals born in 1949-1970, which is based on 
the classification of the treated and control cohorts (Section 3). Third, missing values in 
education, Hukou (below), gender and date-of-birth are replaced by their corresponding 
values in the most adjacent wave in which an individual is observed43. This can be done 
because gender and date-of-birth do not change over time, the study sample had already 
passed normal school age by 2000 (31-52 years old) and Hukou status is very difficult to be 
changed44 in China (below). Rectangularising the data matrix enables one to improve the 
efficiency of the regression estimates by pooling all the waves together while abstracting 
from potential problems caused by panel attrition. The final study sample has a total of 
25,132 observations (around 6,283 per wave). Table 2 presents some summary statistics of 
the key variables of relevance in this analysis. 
 
4.1 Education 
The educational variables can be either years of completed schooling or degree ever 
obtained. They are constructed from answers to the question “how many years of formal 
schooling have you completed in a regular school” (all the primary schools are regular45). 
The answers include no education, some primary education (1-6 years), some secondary 
education (junior: 1-3 years; senior46: 1-3 years) and some college education (1-6 years or 
more). As this analysis is interested in individual attainment of primary education, years of 
schooling are years of completed primary schooling (0-6 years47) and degree ever obtained 
pertains to a binary indicator for whether an individual had a primary school degree (equal to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
draw sampling units from nine provinces (Liao Ning, HeiLongjiang, Jiang Su, Shan Dong, He Nan, Hu Bei, Hu 
Nan, Guang Xi and Gui Zhou), which vary substantially in geography, economic development and public 
resources. 
43For example, for individuals with missing education in 2006, if they can be observed in one or more waves 
before 2006, missing education is replaced by non-missing education in wave 2004 for those appearing in 2004 
and missing education is replaced by non-missing education in wave 2000 for those appearing in 2000; if 
instead they can be observed only after wave 2006 (i.e. in 2009), missing education is replaced by non-missing 
education in wave 2009 for those appearing in 2009. 
44Around 9 percent of the individuals changed Hukou status from 2000-2009, so they were dropped out of the 
study sample. 
45Because statistics provided by the Ministry of Education do not distinguish between types of primary schools, 
unlike secondary schools which can be either academic or vocational, it is assumed here that the regular primary 
schools in the CHNS questionnaire correspond to all the primary schools available to school-aged kids over the 
Cultural Revolution decade. 
46Years spent in technical middle schools are regarded as being equivalent to time spent in senior middle 
schools, since students also go to technical middle schools after graduating from low middle schools. 
47Years of primary schooling for those with secondary and/or college education (and above) were coded as 6 
years (maximum). 
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1 if 548-6 years of primary schooling). The rural sample spent on average around 5 years in 
primary schools and the majority of them had a primary school degree (78 percent). The 
urban sample were more educated (as expected), with an average of around 6 years of 
primary schooling and 95 percent having a primary school degree. 
 
4.2 Health 
Three types of health variables are used and compared: They are underweight and 
overweight status, self-reported health and diagnosed illness symptoms. Underweight and 
overweight are defined using individual Body Mass Index (BMI)49, which is equal to weight 
in kilograms (𝑘𝑔 ) divided by height in meters squared ( 𝑚2 ). Weight and height were 
measured by professional health workers during the CHNS survey. BMI has been widely 
used as a population fitness indicator (Wildman et al. 2005; Caulfield et al. 2004; Chavas 
2013). This analysis classifies an individual as underweight if his/her BMI was below 18.5 
𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 and him/her overweight50 if his/her BMI was above 25 𝑘𝑔/𝑚2 (inclusive). Around 4 
percent of the rural sample were underweight, which was roughly 1 percentage point higher 
than in the urban sample. Overweight was more prevalent in urban than in rural areas, i.e. 34 
percent versus 26 percent.  
Self-reported health is a categorical variable and can be excellent, good, fair or poor. 
This analysis uses self-reported poor or fair health as an indicator for individual subjective 
perception of current health (Currie 2009): It is equal to 1 for fair or poor responses and 0 
otherwise. Rural and urban individuals were equally likely to report a poor or fair health, 
around 34 percent of each subsample.  
Individual objective health is measured by two binary indicators for diagnosed high 
blood pressure and diabetes (Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios 2006). They are constructed from 
answers to the question “has a doctor ever told you that you suffer from high blood 
pressure/diabetes” and equal to 1 if an affirmative answer was given and 0 otherwise. Around 
9 percent of the urban sample and 5 percent of the rural sample had hypertension. Prevalence 
of diabetes was less common, 2 percent for those with an urban Hukou and 1 percent for 
those with a rural Hukou. 
 
                                                        
48Because the Cultural Revolution condensed total years of basic education from 12 years (6 primary; 6 
secondary) in the old system to 10 years (5 primary; 5 secondary). 
49BMI of pregnant women was recoded as missing. 
50This definition of overweight includes the case of obesity, that is, 𝐵𝑀𝐼 ≥ 30. Since only around 3 percent of 
the study sample is obese. 
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4.3 Health Behaviours 
The health behaviour variables cover aspects such as medical care utilisation (Currie 
and Thomas 1997), current smoking status (Currie and Moretti 2003), dietary pattern (Chavas 
2013) and physical activity (Adams 2002). Medical care utilisation refers to either medical 
insurance ownership or preventive care utilisation. Both are dummy variables: The former is 
equal to 1 if the respondent was medically insured at the time of the survey, and the latter 
switches on if the interviewee made use of some preventive services during the four weeks 
before the interview. The urbanites were around 18 percentage points more likely to have a 
medical insurance (around 60 percent of the total); they were also more likely to use 
preventive care, i.e. 4 percent versus 2 percent.  
Current smoking status is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent was smoking 
at the time of the survey and 0 otherwise. Rural people were marginally more likely to smoke 
than urban people, as suggested by their respective sample means of around 31 percent and 
29 percent.  
For ease of interpretation, individual diet habit is measured by a dummy variable 
indicating whether his/her daily percentage fat intake exceeded the officially recommended 
guideline, which is 25 percent according to the published 2004 Chinese Food Composition 
Table. Percentage fat intake is computed from three nutritional intake variables available 
from CHNS, i.e. daily fat, protein and carbohydrate intakes (in gram). In particular, each 
nutritional intake variable in gram is first converted to its corresponding caloric units. The 
conversion factors are 9 kcal/g for fat intake and 4 kcal/g for protein and carbohydrate 
intakes. Daily percentage fat intake is then daily fat intake (in kcal) divided by daily total 
calorie intake (in kcal) (which is the sum of all the three nutritional intakes). Around 79 
percent of the urban sample and 53 percent of the rural sample consumed a fatty diet.  
The last consumption variable is physical activity. All the adults were asked if they 
participated in some active physical activities at least once per month, with the activities 
including martial arts, gymnastics (dancing or acrobatics), jogging (swimming), ball games 
(e.g. badminton and basketball) and any other exercises not named. Physical activity is then 
defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was an activity participator and 0 
otherwise. Only 2 percent of the rural sample took additional exercises after work while this 
number was 19 percent for the urban sample. 
 
4.4 Labour Supply 
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Labour supply is measured by current working status, occupation and income 
(Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011). Labour force participation is denoted by a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if an individual reported as being presently working and 0 otherwise. Around 82 
percent of the rural individuals and 66 percent of the urban individuals were working at the 
time of the interview. 
To devise a more objective classification of occupations, this analysis uses the 
intensity of on-the-job activity as a criterion. Presumably, the more educated an individual, 
the more likely he/she will have a less physically demanding job. An occupation can be either 
light (light activity), moderate (moderate activity) or heavy (heavy activity). Each is 
determined by tabulating the respondents’ primary occupations (e.g. doctor, officer and 
farmer) against their work intensities. Individual work intensity was assigned by CHNS field 
workers (who made the assignment after hearing about the interviewee’s occupation) and can 
be either light51, moderate or heavy. An occupation is classified as light if the majority of the 
study sample with that position fell into the light work intensity category. For example, 91 
percent of the senior professionals belonged to the light work intensity category, so the 
occupation of senior professionals is defined as light. Over half of the rural sample had a 
heavy occupation, on the contrary, the majority of the urban sample worked in light/moderate 
positions. 
Three income variables are examined: They are log yearly earnings (multiplied by 
100), log non-wage income (multiplied by 100) and log total individual income (multiplied 
by 100). Log earnings is the logarithm of salaries one earned in the previous year including 
all the on-the-job bonuses and subsidies. Incomes from other non-agricultural (self-run 
business and pension) and agricultural (farming, fishing, gardening and raising livestock) 
sources in the previous year are called non-wage income. Log total individual income is the 
logarithm of the sum of individual earnings and non-wage income. Average income (in 2009 
Yuan) was around 9,788.7 Yuan (12.763 log points) in the rural sample and around 17,246.04 
Yuan (13.961 log points) in the urban sample. As expected, earnings accounted for a larger 
share of total income for the urbanites; the opposite was true for people in the countryside. 
 
4.5 Other IndividualCovariates 
                                                        
51The classification in the questionnaire is in fact more elaborate: Work intensity falls into one of the five 
categories, i.e. very light, light, moderate, heavy or very heavy. Without loss of information, this study does not 
distinguish between very light (very heavy) and light (heavy) occupations. 
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The other individual covariates are Hukou, gender and age. Among them, the most 
important is individual urban-rural Hukou status (household registration type). Because of the 
Forced Rustication Program (FRP), it is necessary to divide the estimating sample by urban-
rural place-of-birth (Section 3). Place-of-birth is highly correlated with place-of-education 
and is arguably more exogenous. The problem is that CHNS did not ask the respondents 
about their place-of-birth. This study therefore uses individual current urban-rural Hukou 
status as a proxy for his/her urban-rural place-of-birth. The institutional feature of the 
Chinese household registration system (hence Hukou status) ensures that this can be done. 
The reason is as follows. 
The Hukou system was introduced in China in the late 1950s in order to restrict rural 
to urban migration, still in place today (Ito 2008; Wang and Moffatt 2008). Hukou status can 
be viewed primarily as an ascribed attribute and is very difficult to be changed. At its 
inception, everyone was registered in the administrative district where he/she resided and was 
attached either an urban or rural Hukou (i.e. urban residents with urban Hukou and rural 
residents with rural Hukou). Later, children’s Hukou status is determined at birth by their 
mothers’ Hukou (Chan 2010). This system has had its intended effects. In the pre-economic 
reform era (i.e. before 1979), almost everyone lived where he/she was registered. This can be 
explained by the ration system that was closely associated with Hukou status. Rural adults 
must participate in agricultural production in order to receive food rations for their 
households. Urban adults were officially allocated to specific work units which provided 
housing, food and other social services to their employees. These services were hardly 
available from the market. Because employment quotas in all the urban work units were 
tightly controlled by the government, rural migrants had little chance of finding a job in the 
cities, meaning that without work unit rations it could be very difficult for them to live in the 
cities (Wu and Treiman 2004). These suggest that Hukou status of the sample cohorts (the 
1949-1970 cohorts) during their teens should be an accurate measure of their place-of-birth. 
In addition, current Hukou status should approximate well past Hukou status. The 
reason is that Hukou conversion from rural to urban is extremely tightly controlled and 
permitted only under very limited conditions (Wu and Treiman 2004; 2007); on the other 
hand, there has been essentially no voluntary mobility in the opposite direction, given the 
huge advantages associated with an urban Hukou, i.e. higher socioeconomic status, better 
economic opportunities and access to more generous state provided public welfares (Ito 2008; 
Ngok 2012). Typical channels for obtaining an urban Hukou are higher education (i.e. 
vocational/college degree), communist Party membership and military experience in the 
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People’s Liberation Army, but the odds of a final conversion is still low. Wu and Treiman 
(2004; 2007) reported that by 1996 only around 11 percent of the rural origin population had 
successfully obtained an urban Hukou. These suggest that current Hukou should also be a 
good proxy for past Hukou and hence individual place-of-birth. 
In the sample, rural cohorts made up of around 56 percent of the total observations. 
Females constituted around 52 percent of the rural sample and 51 percent of the urban 
sample. Mean age was 46 in both groups. 
 
4.6 More Rural and More Urban Sample 
This analysis uses and compares four alternative definitions of More Rural and More 
Urban, three at the community level and one at the individual level (Section 3). For 
individuals with rural place-of-birth (rural sample), those with rural-village residence are 
classified as More Rural and those with rural-town residence are classified as More Urban. 
For individuals with urban place-of-birth (urban sample), those with suburban residence are 
designated as More Rural and those with city centre residence are designated as More Urban. 
The four definitions of More Rural and More Urban differ by how they determine rural-
village, rural-town, suburban and city centre. 
Specifically, a community is classified as rural-village (or suburban) if it was more 
likely to have farmland within its boundary52 , or if it was more likely to be officially 
designated53 as rural–village (or suburban)54 or if it was more likely to have above median 
fraction of agricultural labour force 55  (i.e. the median of the wave-urban/rural-specific 
distribution). Alternatively, a community is defined as rural-town (or city centre) if it was less 
likely to have farmland within its boundary, or if it was more likely to be officially 
designated as rural-town (or city centre) or if it was less likely to have above median fraction 
of agricultural workforce. For example, in terms of the presence of farmland, a community is 
rural-village if in most periods from 1989-2009 (waves in CHNS relevant for this study) it 
had farmland within its boundary; it is rural-town if in most periods from 1989-2009 it did 
                                                        
52The corresponding survey question is “Is there farmland in this village or neighbourhood”. 
53Types of designations include 1 city neighbourhood, 2 suburban neighbourhood, 3 town neighbourhood and 4 
rural village. 
54The corresponding survey question is “To which administrative district did this community belong in the 
previous survey”. It should be noted that the survey question was in fact “which administrative district did this 
community belong to in 1989” in the 1997 survey. Hence viewed from this point the second More Rural 
definition may be less reliable. 
55The corresponding survey question is “What percentage of the workforce in this village or neighbourhood is 
engaged mainly in agricultural activity”. 
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not have farmland within its boundary. The individual-level More Rural and More Urban is 
based on individual reported place-of-residence. For example, if a respondent reported as 
living in a rural-village at the time of the survey, he/she is classified as More Rural; if the 
respondent instead reported as living in a rural-town at the time of the survey, he/she is 
classified as More Urban. The majority of the rural sample was More Rural (90.4 percent), 
and slightly over 14 percent of the urban sample was More Rural. 
 As noted in the previous section, the More Rural and More Urban can be mistakenly 
measured if individuals moved after the Cultural Revolution or if official designations of 
rural-village or suburban changed over time. Concerns over the former can be somehow 
mitigated by performing analysis only on non-migrants. For the latter, without data, it is not 
possible for this study to check if rural-villages stayed as rural-villages, or suburban areas 
stayed as suburban areas, from during the Cultural Revolution to the time of the survey. But 
if individuals who were More Rural (or More Urban) at the beginning of the survey (1989) 
remained More Rural (or More Urban) till the end of the sample period (2009), it is likely 
that More Rural (or More Urban) was largely time-invariant. Or in other words, it may be less 
worried about that errors in the More Rural and More Urban variables due to changing 
government designations can produce misleading results. This is likely to be the case, 
according to four More Rural-More Urban transition matrices computed for all the four More 
Rural (Table 3). For example, for presence of farmland 82.6 percent of the More Rural 
individuals in 1989 stayed More Rural until 2009; almost the same can be said for the other 
three More Rural classifications. 
 All the variables defined in this section are included in the empirical analysis. Results 
based on them are presented in the following sections. 
 
5. Educational Outcomes of the Cultural Revolution 
5.1. Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
Table 4 first reports estimates of the policy impact of expanding primary education, 
for rural non-migrants (Columns 1-2) and urban non-migrants (Columns 3-4) respectively. 
The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator 
for whether or not an individual had a primary school degree. Each column corresponds to a 
regression based on the specification in Equation 1, and controls for a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a 
binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two individual characteristics that are 
age (and its square) and a female dummy (equal to 1 if female). The panels differ by how 
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More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel 
B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
It can be observed that the coefficients of interest differ significantly across the panels 
for rural non-migrants (Columns 1-2 of Table 4), but they do not do so in the urban sample 
(Columns 3-4). Because the More Rural’s are based on place-of-residence (rather than place-
of-birth), this suggests that potential endogeneity of the More Rural variable may be more 
problematic for the rural cohorts than for the urban cohorts. Given that presence of farmland 
is arguably more exogenous than e.g. agricultural workforce, More Rural is defined using 
community farmland (only) for the rural sample. Since the estimates are statistically and 
economically similar across the panels in Columns 3 and 4, the More Rural classification for 
the urban sample is made using all the four criteria. 
Years of primary schooling are significantly and positively associated with the 
interaction terms for the full-treat Cultural Revolution generation (only) in the rural sample, 
but the coefficients of interest are significant and positive for all types of the Cultural 
Revolution generation in the urban sample. There was a relative increase in years of primary 
schooling of around 0.543 years for the More Rural 𝐹𝑐 in the rural sample, compared to their 
More Urban counterparts. In the urban sample, the More Rural Cultural Revolution 
generation had around 0.444-1.152 more years of primary schooling than their More Urban 
counterparts. Based on sample means, these represent around 8-22% increases in the 
attainment of primary education. Since among those with a rural Hukou the difference-in-
differences coefficients are significant only for the full-treat cohorts and for those with an 
urban Hukou the coefficients turn out to be the largest for the youngest treatment group 
throughout, this suggests that it is important to allow for heterogeneous treatment effect. 
Overall, these results imply that the expansion of primary education succeeded in raising 
years of primary schooling obtained by the Cultural Revolution generation. 
Replacing the dependent variable by primary school degree ever obtained does not 
change the estimated results much. The probability of obtaining a primary school degree is 
significantly and positively correlated with the interaction term for the full-treat cohorts 
(only) in the rural sample but all types of the Cultural Revolution generation in the urban 
sample are estimated to have a significantly higher chance of obtaining a primary school 
degree. The magnitude of this relative advantage is around 9.9 percentage points for the rural 
cohorts and ranges from 6.9-28.1 percentage points for the urban cohorts. Based on sample 
means, these correspond to around 8-33% rises in primary education attainment. Similarly, 
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because for the rural non-migrant cohorts the coefficients are significantly positive only for 
the full-treat group and the largest effect is observed for the youngest Cultural Revolution 
generation, this confirms previous findings that the impact of the primary education policies 
varied among the Cultural Revolution generation. Combined, these results suggest that the 
treated cohorts tended to obtain more primary schooling because of their exposure to the 
revolution system. Moreover, the expansion of primary education seems to have 
disproportionately benefited the rural cohorts who before the Cultural Revolution had more 
limited access to schooling. [Not sure] 
 
5.2. The Regression Discontinuity Sample 
The common trend assumption required for causal interpretation of the difference-in-
differences coefficients (𝛿1, 𝛿2 and 𝛿3) is strong, i.e. any gap between the More Rural and 
More Urban cohorts would have remained the same had there not been the intervening years 
of the Cultural Revolution. The challenge is that there is no way to verify whether the More 
Rural and More Urban cohorts are indeed comparable. But intuition suggests that if one can 
have a more comparable subsample of More Rural and More Urban cohorts in hand (or 
cohorts more reliably claimed to be so), and if similar results can be obtained by applying 
difference-in-differences to this ideal subsample, causal interpretation of the benchmark 
estimates can be more likely. Guided by this, this analysis exploits one institutional feature of 
the Cultural Revolution education policies that created discontinuities in cohort primary 
educational attainment. The idea is that since the discontinuity sample is by construction 
composed of two neighbouring cohorts, who may be more similar along most of the other 
dimensions except for their differential exposure to the Cultural Revolution system, it is the 
subsample of more comparable cohorts one is aiming for in the current context. It then 
follows that it can be used for the purpose of internal validity checks. 
To be more specific, the discontinuity in cohort educational attainment comes from 
the shortening of primary school length at the onset of the Cultural Revolution. This 
reduction in school length is an intrinsic part of the revolution education agenda, i.e. it would 
be much easier to universalise basic education if term length can be made shorter (Andreas 
2004; Deng and Treiman 1997; Wu 2008). In particular, the primary cycle was reduced from 
6 to 5 years. This implicates that time spent in primary schools by the cohort who was in the 
5th grade (the 1956 cohort56) when the Cultural Revolution broke out should be necessarily 
                                                        
56This is obtained by assuming that kids started schooling when reaching 7 years old. 
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shorter than time spent by the cohort who had already passed onto the 6th grade (the 1955 
cohort). Indeed, Figure 5 (local linear nonparametric estimates) makes clear that in the CHNS 
sample the 1955 cohort (6th graders) had around 2 more months of primary schooling than the 
1956 cohort (5th graders). 
Then the first set of robustness checks is based on the discontinuity sample formed by 
the 1955 and 1956 cohorts. The empirical specification used in particular for this purpose is 
given in Equation 257 below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝜑𝑇𝑐 + 𝛾𝑅 + 𝑓(𝜏𝑞𝑐; 𝜃) + 𝑋𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝(2) 
where𝑌𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝 is the outcome of individual 𝑖 born in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑐 in province 𝑝. Treatment 
status is denoted by 𝑇𝑐, which is equal to 1 if 𝑖 was born in 1955 and equal to 0 if 𝑖 was born 
in 1956. 𝑅is the More Rural indicator equal to 1 if 𝑖 was More Rural and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛿, the one that is in front of the interaction term 𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝑅. 𝑓(𝜏𝑞𝑐; 𝜃)is a 
polynomial function in quarter-year-of-birth. 𝑋𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝is a vector of other observable controls, 
including a set of province fixed effects, an indicator for sample wave 2000 and two 
individual level characteristics (i.e. gender, age and its square). 𝛼is a constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝is an error 
term which is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated within and across cohorts. Equation 2 is 
estimated on urban and rural samples (divided by Hukou). If 𝛿 does not differ significantly 
from its corresponding counterpart in Equation 1 (i.e. 𝛿2), it is more likely that the difference-
in-differences estimates can be interpreted as causal. 
Table 5 58  first establishes the existence of discontinuities in cohort educational 
attainment. Results for the rural sample are in Columns 1-2 and those for the urban sample 
are in Columns 3-4. The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or 
a binary indicator for whether an individual had a primary school degree. Each column 
corresponds to a regression similar to Equation 2, without the interaction term and the More 
Rural variable59. As might be expected, years of primary education are significantly and 
                                                        
57Identification of Equation 7 requires that the underlying distribution of 𝑌𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝  be continuous in 𝜏𝑞𝑐  at each 
discontinuity point (Hahn et al. 2001; Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee 2008; Angrist and Lavy 1999). Or 
equivalently, any smooth quarter-year-of-birth effects have been adequately controlled for by the flexible cohort 
trends 𝑓(𝜏𝑞𝑐; 𝜃) after conditioning on all the observed covariates (𝑋𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝), and 𝛿 measures the magnitude of the 
relative discontinuity in 𝑌𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝 that can be solely attributed to the Cultural Revolution education policies and the 
More Rural stats. Since this requirement is much weaker than the common trend assumption, it is more likely to 
be valid within current context. 
58The other right-hand-side controls include a set of province fixed effects, an indicator for sample wave 2000 
and two individual covariates (gender and age and its square). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
59The empirical specification is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝜑𝑇𝑐 + 𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑐; 𝜃) + 𝑋𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑝 
The notations are defined in the same way as those in Equation 7 in the main text. 
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positively associated with the treatment indicator. The cohort who is expected to have stayed 
in school longer had around 0.492-0.557 more years of primary schooling (9-11%). 
Replacing the dependent variable by primary school degree does not change the estimated 
results. The cohort with longer term length was significantly more likely to have a primary 
school degree, by around 9.9-18.3 percentage points (12-21%). Hence, Table 5 confirms the 
existence of a discontinuity in cohort educational attainment.  
Turn to the placebo test. Since the More Rural and More Urban cohorts that comprise 
the regression discontinuity sample are likely more comparable, the common trend 
assumption underlying difference-in-differences is more likely to be met. Then if results 
obtained from the discontinuity sample are similar to the baseline, more credibility can also 
be given to the latter. Results are presented in Table 660, for the rural (Columns 1-2) and 
urban (Columns 3-4) samples, respectively. The dependent variable is either years of 
completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual had a primary 
school degree. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression using Equation 2. To figure 
out which More Rural is more valid for this present exercise, as usual results based on all the 
four More Rural definitions are presented. It turns out that while the coefficients of interest in 
Columns 1-2 when More Rural is defined by farmland (Panel A), agricultural workforce 
(Panel C) and individual residence (Panel D) cannot be statistically distinguished from each 
other, those in Columns 3-4 differ significantly across the panels. Therefore, potential 
endogeneity of More Rural (based on place-of-residence) for now may be more problematic 
for the urban cohorts than for the rural cohorts. Then for the same reason as explained before, 
this analysis uses community farmland to determine the treatment group for the urban 
sample, and uses and compares all the four More Rural for the rural sample. 
Satisfactorily, the coefficients of interest in Table 6 when the dependent variable is 
years of primary schooling do not differ significantly from their baseline counterparts in 
Table 4 (the interaction between the indicator for the oldest Cultural Revolution generation 
and More Rural). For example, in Panel C of Column 1 (agricultural workforce) the 
difference-in-differences coefficient similarly suggests that there was a relative decrease in 
years of primary schooling obtained by the More Rural cohorts in the rural sample by around 
0.484 years (9%). Likewise in the urban sample (Column 3), the More Rural cohorts 
                                                        
60Each column controls for a flexible polynomial trend in quarter-year-of-birth, a set of province fixed effects, a 
binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual covariates (gender and age and its square). The panels 
differ by how More Rural is decided, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, 
agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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(farmland) are estimated to have experienced a relative increase in their attainment of 
primary education by around 0.685 years (13%), which is comparable (statistically and 
economically) to the corresponding baseline in Panel A (farmland) and Panel C (agricultural 
workforce) of Table 4. The other estimates in front of the More Rural interactions do differ 
statistically from their benchmark, but not economically. In terms of magnitude, they imply a 
disproportionate decline in years of primary schooling completed by the rural cohorts of 
around 0.788-0.8 years (15%).  
Almost the same can be said when the dependent variable is replaced by primary 
school degree. For example, in Panel C of Table 6 the treated rural cohorts (agricultural 
workforce) appear to be around 13.2 percentage points (15%) less likely to have a primary 
school degree. Also, similar to what is suggested by their counterparts in Panel A (farmland), 
Panel B (administrative district) and Panel C (agricultural workforce) of Table 4, estimates in 
Column 4 of Table 6 suggest that the treated urban cohorts (farmland) had a higher chance of 
completing primary schooling, by around 12.9 percentage points (15%). The other difference-
in-differences coefficients in Table 6 are also similar to their relevant baseline in Table 4, but 
only economically. Combined, they imply that the More Rural cohorts with a rural Hukou 
were around 16.8-23.1 percentage points (20-27%) less likely to have a primary school 
degree.  
To sum up, since the More Rural and More Urban cohorts that comprise the 
regression discontinuity sample are more comparable than those in the larger (baseline) 
sample, they are more likely to meet the common trend assumption as required by difference-
in-differences. Then the similarity between the results in Table 6 and those in Table 4 as 
revealed in this section suggests that potential outcomes of the More Rural cohorts in the 
larger sample may also have evolved in a parallel way to those of their More Urban 
counterparts, implying that the baseline difference-in-differences estimates can be regarded 
as credible. 
 
5.3. Correcting for Non-random Migration 
The Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis is applied to subsamples of non-
migrants, i.e. those with rural place-of-birth (Hukou) and rural place-of-residence or those 
with urban place-of-birth (Hukou) and urban place-of-residence. While the majority of the 
initial urban and rural cohorts can be regarded as non-migrants by this definition, some 
individuals in the study sample indeed moved over the sample period (rural: 15%; urban: 
40%). This makes one remain worried about the possibility of endogenous migration 
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contaminating the estimated policy parameters of interest. This subsection then looks more 
carefully about the feasibility of restricting the estimating sample to those who had not 
migrated by the time of the survey. In particular, it provides more convincing evidence that 
non-random selection of migration (and hence the illegitimacy of the non-migrant restriction) 
may be less of a problem for the current study. The implication is that the long-term impact 
of the Cultural Revolution education policies is less likely to be misinterpreted based on 
results obtained from the baseline empirical framework. 
To examine to what extent the previous policy estimates may be biased by non-
random selection of rural-to-urban migration, a Heckman two-step procedure is used: 
Equation 1 is estimated jointly with a selection equation that explicitly models individual 
decision to migrate, which can be better explained by Equation 3 below: 
𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝑍
′𝜑 + 𝛿1
𝑠(𝐹𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿2
𝑠(𝑃𝐵𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿3
𝑠(𝑃𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝜃1
𝑠𝐹𝑐 + 𝜃2
𝑠𝑃𝐵𝑐 + 𝜃3
𝑠𝑃𝐴𝑐
+ 𝛾𝑠𝑅 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝(3) 
where𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑝 is a selection indicator: It is equal to 1 if individual 𝑖 born in cohort 𝑐 living in 
province 𝑝 was a non-migrant; it is equal to 0 otherwise. For example, for those with a rural 
Hukou𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑝  switches on if 𝑖  lived in rural areas but switches off if 𝑖  lived in urban areas 
(Section 3). The exclusion restriction is imposed by the vector of instruments 𝑍  (details 
below). The other right-hand-side variables are the same as those in Equation 1. 𝛼 is a 
constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝 is an error term that is allowed to be arbitrary correlated within and across 
cohorts. Equations 1 and 3 are jointly estimated on samples of rural and urban cohorts 
respectively (divided by Hukou). The idea is that if the policy impact (𝛿1 , 𝛿2  and 𝛿3  in 
Equation 1) inferred from this procedure does not differ significantly from that suggested by 
estimating Equation 1 on non-migrants alone, then concerns over migration biasing 𝛿1, 𝛿2 
and 𝛿3 can be somehow mitigated. In other words, the impact results obtained so far are 
likely to be reliable.  
Admittedly, this line of argument is applicable only if one has good instruments for 
𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑝 , i.e. the 𝑍  vector. It has been found that the observed surge in the rural-to-urban 
migration 61  in China can be explained by among other factors 62  improved efficiency in 
                                                        
61According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, rural out-migrant workers are defined as individuals 
who have a rural Hukou but have worked outside their place-of-birth for at least 6 months. 
62Other factors also can explain the massive rural-to-urban migration since 1978, such as the development of a 
market-oriented economy, the establishment of special economic zones, the expansion of the non-state sector 
and the loosening of urban employment policies that created strong demand for migrant labour in the urban 
sector. In addition, decades of rural-urban segregation and uneven economic growth led to a large income gap 
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agricultural production that has generated surplus labour in the rural sector (Lu et al. 2013). 
This means that variables that can affect agricultural efficiency or labour supply are 
potentially good instruments for 𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑝: They should be correlated with individual decisions to 
migrate while being uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation (i.e. 
predetermined). Examples of these variables can be those reflective of the institutional 
changes in the ownership of farmland (i.e. the Household Responsibility System63), changes 
in the government procurement prices of agricultural products or those able to gauge the 
impact of a series of market reforms (initiated since 1979) on agricultural production (e.g. 
market prices of outputs and inputs). Built upon Lin (1992), this analysis uses and compares 
three sets of instruments linked to the supply-side of the agricultural labour market. The first 
set includes five policy variables: They are the prevalence of the Household Responsibility 
System (i.e. the prevalence of private or contracted farmland ownership), an index for the 
government procurement prices of agricultural products (GP)64 , an index for the market 
prices of agricultural products (MP)65, percentage of sown areas used for grain crops66 and 
Multiple Cropping Index. The last two measures (i.e. percentage of sown areas used for grain 
crops and Multiple Cropping Index) reflect the degree of central planning in agricultural 
production. The second set of instruments contains, in addition to those in the first one, 
several other summary indexes for agricultural inputs, including labour (total and for the 
cropping sector in particular), land (cultivated land), capital (horsepower of tractors and draft 
animals) and chemical fertiliser (gross volume of fertiliser used). The gross value of crop 
output is the last instrumental variable used (details in Lin 1992). Data on these various 
                                                                                                                                                                            
between urban and rural areas, which provided a stimulus for people to migrate to coastal and eastern China (Lu 
et al. 2013). 
63The Household Responsibility System is about the ownership of farmland. In particular, it contracts farmland 
to individual households, as opposed to its predecessor, the commune system, that contracted farmland to rural 
collective units (i.e. the agricultural production team). Each collective unit consisted of around 20-30 
neighbouring households. The Household Responsibility System was officially approved in 1981, but as early as 
1978, it was already implemented in some rural areas in China (this led to the fact that in 1981 around 45 
percent of agricultural production teams, the production unit in the old system, had already been converted to 
the Household Responsibility System). 
64Literally, in Lin (1992), the GP should be the index of above-quota prices relative to manufactured input 
prices. But since it is not clear what the exact definitions of manufactured input prices are and since this variable 
is intended to capture the impact of changes in government procurement prices of agricultural products on 
agricultural growth in the original paper, it is simply called the index for government procurement prices of 
agricultural products in this study. 
65Literally, in Lin (1992), the MP should be the index of market prices relative to manufactured input prices. 
But since it is not clear what the exact definitions of manufactured input prices are and since this variable is 
intended to capture the impact of changes in the market prices of agricultural products on agricultural growth in 
the original paper, it is simply called the index for the market prices of agricultural products in this study. 
66Lin (1992) in fact used percentage of sown areas used for non-grain crops. But since data on sown areas used 
for grain crops are directly available and there is little difference in using this measure instead, this analysis 
chooses the grain crop measure. 
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instruments are available in Lin (1992) for the period of 1970-1987, and their values in the 
year when a particular cohort reached 18 years old (i.e. should have graduated from middle 
schools and able to migrate; but primarily due to data availability) are assigned to the 
sampling cohorts67. 
The policy and input variables are significantly correlated with the decision to migrate 
among the study sample, while the rank condition is less likely to be satisfied by the output 
instrument. The first-stage results are presented in Table 7, for rural (Columns 1-3) and urban 
cohorts (Columns 4-6) respectively68. In Columns 1 and 4, the five policy instruments (i.e. 
prevalence of private farmland ownership, government procurement and market prices of 
agricultural product, percentage of sown areas used for grain crops and the Multiple Cropping 
Index) are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. Adding the various input indexes to this 
policy set (i.e. labour, land, capital and chemical fertiliser) further enhances the significance 
level of the instruments (Columns 2 and 5). On the contrary, the output index (i.e. gross value 
of crop output) cannot be distinguished from zero at conventional levels for the rural sample 
(Column 3) and it is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level for the urban sample 
(Column 6). These imply that results obtained from the first two sets of exclusion restrictions 
may be more reliable, while for completeness those estimated from the output instrument (i.e. 
the last set) are also presented. 
The second-stage estimates are next shown, first for the rural sample in Table 869. 
While the inverse Mill’s ratio does appear to be statistically significant at conventional levels, 
the coefficients of interest in Table 8 cannot be distinguished from their less-refined 
counterparts in Table 4, regardless of the set of the instrumental variables used. This suggests 
that while rural-to-urban migration may indeed be non-random, this does not appear to bias 
the estimated policy impact significantly for the current study. Then as before, years of 
primary education are significantly and positively associated with the interaction for the full-
                                                        
67Because data on the instrumental variables in years from 1966-1969 (corresponding to the 1949-1952 cohorts) 
are missing, hence, their values are assumed to the respective 1970 values. 
68The dependent variable is a binary indicator for non-migrant status: It is equal to 1 for those who had not 
moved by the time of the survey and equal to 0 otherwise. Each column is obtained from a probit regression 
using Equation 8. The other right-hand-side variables are a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, 
polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two 
individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
69The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual had 
a primary school degree. The columns differ by the set of instrumental variables used, with the policy set in 
Columns 1-2, the policy and input set in Columns 3-4 and the output set in Columns 5-6. Each column is 
obtained from jointly estimating Equations 6 and 8. The other observable controls include a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for 
sample wave 2000 and two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
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treat Cultural Revolution generation (only). The implied relative increase in the attainment of 
primary education by the full-treat More Rural is estimated to be around 0.42-0.452 years (8-
9%). The full-treat More Rural also tended to have a significantly higher chance of 
graduating from primary schools, by around 7.1 percentage points (8%).  
Almost the same can be said for the urban cohorts. In Table 970, the estimates in front 
of the various interaction terms do not differ significantly from those in Table 4, no matter 
which set of instrumental variables is used. And the inverse Mill’s ratio is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. These suggest that restricting the estimating sample to non-
migrants may not produce misleading estimates for the long-term impact of the Cultural 
Revolution. In Table 9, years of completed primary schooling are significantly and positively 
associated with the difference-in-differences variables for all types of the treated cohorts. For 
example, the full-treat More Rural had around 0.602-1.221 (11-23%) more years of primary 
schooling than the full-treat More Urban. The relative increase in the attainment of primary 
education seems to be around 0.394-0.946 years (7-18%) for the partial-before More Rural. 
The youngest Cultural Revolution generation is the most benefited group: The estimates are 
between 0.749 and 1.266 years (14-24%). When the dependent variable is primary school 
degree, all the coefficients of interest are once more invariably significant and positive. The 
full-treat More Rural was around 9.3-25.9 percentage points (11-30%) more likely to have a 
primary school degree. The corresponding relative increase for the partial-before More Rural 
is estimated to be on the order of 6.9 to 22.7 percentage points (8-27%). The largest estimates 
of interest are similarly found for the youngest Cultural Revolution generation, ranging from 
14 to 29.6 percentage points (16-35%). 
 
5.4. Controlling for Pre-existing Difference in Education Attainment 
A closer look at the time-series pattern in primary educational attainment shown in 
Figure 1 leads one to find that, even before the Cultural Revolution, there was an upward 
trend in both primary graduation and enrolment: From 1949-1966, the two indicators of the 
prevalence of primary education rose by around 324% and 1294%, respectively. This can be 
                                                        
70The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual had 
a primary school degree. The columns differ by the set of instrumental variables used, with the policy set in 
Columns 1-2, the policy and input set in Columns 3-4 and the output set in Columns 5-6. Each column is 
obtained from jointly estimating Equations 6 and 8. The other observable controls include a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for 
sample wave 2000 and two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how 
More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural 
workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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problematic, because it may be suggesting that cohorts differ systematically in their demand 
for education, which is correlated with education supply, then all the estimates presented so 
far are almost certainly biased. One relatively straightforward way to gauge the severity of 
this problem is to control for cohort pre-trend in educational attainment in the empirical 
specification. If the resulting estimates do not change substantially, then it may be inferred 
that the difference-in-differences coefficients are not wrongly attributing the effect of 
unobserved cohort tastes for education to the impact of the Cultural Revolution education 
policies. This exercise is carried out in the present subsection. 
The results for rural non-migrants are first presented in Table 10A71. The dependent 
variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression using 
Equation 1, and controls for (in addition to the original set) cohort pre-treatment difference in 
educational attainment, which is measured by average enrolment in primary schools in 
Columns 1 and 3 and average enrolment in all the academic institutions (i.e. from primary to 
college) in Columns 2 and 4. Average enrolment is defined as the arithmetic mean of 
enrolment rates in the six years before a particular cohort reached age 7 (i.e. started 
schooling) 72 . More Rural is defined using community farmland. In Table 10A, the 
coefficients in front of the various interactions with More Rural do not differ significantly 
from their counterparts in Table 4 (i.e. baseline results), implying that the baseline estimates 
may not have been contaminated by any pre-existing cohort difference in demand for 
education. As a result, in Column 1 the rural-village cohorts are estimated to obtain around 
0.524 more years (10%) of primary schooling, compared to the rural-town cohorts. Further 
adding controls for secondary and college enrolment (in addition to primary) in Column 2 
leaves the obtained estimates virtually unchanged: The relative increase in educational 
attainment is around 0.521 years (10%). Likewise, in both Columns 3 and 4 the More Rural 
cohorts were around 9.5 percentage points (11%) more likely to have a primary school 
degree. 
The results for urban non-migrants are next shown in Table 10B. The table is 
structured in the same way as that for the rural sample; the only difference is that the panels 
differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel 
B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Once more, the 
                                                        
71All the other right-hand-side controls are the same as those in Table 5. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
72It is assumed that cohorts started schooling at age 7. 
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coefficients in front of the interaction terms cannot be distinguished from their corresponding 
counterparts in Table 4. This confirms previous finding that the sampling cohorts do not 
differ systematically in their demand for education, and hence the benchmark results are not 
biased in this respect. For example, in Column 1, when the dependent variable is years of 
completed primary schooling, the coefficients of interest are between 0.444 and 1.153 years 
(8-22%), implying that the treated cohorts tended to have more primary education. The 
coefficients of interest remain almost the same in Column 2, which controls additionally for 
high school and college enrolment: The relative increase in academic performance ranges 
from 0.446 to 1.157 years (8-22%). Similarly for school completion, the More Rural cohorts 
were around 7-28.3 (8-33%) and around 7-28.4 (8-33%) percentage points more likely to 
graduate from primary schools, according to estimates reported in Columns 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
 
5.5. Excluding the Disrupted Cohorts 
Since the treatment group includes those who were in school at the beginning (i.e. the 
1955-1960 cohorts) and the end (i.e. the 1966-1970 cohorts) of the Cultural Revolution, it is 
therefore possible that the benchmark estimates are picking up the influences of some events 
other than the education policies that occurred during the especially turbulent years of the 
Cultural Revolution (i.e. at the beginning and at the end). For this reason, this analysis next 
restricts the treatment group to those who started and completed primary education within the 
revolution decade (the 1961-1965 cohorts); this effectively retains the full-treat cohorts in the 
initial estimating sample (the 1959-1965 cohorts). The idea is that, for this group of 
individuals, disruptions that occurred either before or after they were at primary school age 
may have less impact on their primary education, implying that any changes in their primary 
education may more likely entirely come from the primary education policies. Alternatively, 
if the policy impact inferred from this smaller treatment group does not stand in contrast with 
that obtained from the larger sample, one can be less sceptical about the main results along 
the lines described above. 
Corresponding results are presented in Table 1173, for rural non-migrants (Columns 1-
2) and urban non-migrants (Columns 3-4), respectively. The treatment group is now the 
                                                        
73The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and 
controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort 
trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its 
square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel 
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1961-1965 cohorts and the control group remains unchanged (the 1949-1954 cohorts). As 
might be expected, the coefficients of interest cannot be statistically distinguished from those 
in Table 4, either in terms of years of schooling or in terms of school completion. This 
suggests that the increased attainment of primary education found for the treated cohorts may 
not be caused by events other than the Cultural Revolution education policies. Regarding the 
magnitude of this new set of estimates, the More Rural cohorts spent around 0.459 more 
years (9%) in primary schools than the More Urban cohorts, for those with a rural Hukou; the 
corresponding number for those with an urban Hukou is around 0.581-0.94 years (11-18%). 
Come to primary school degree. The treatment group was more likely to graduate from 
primary schools: The coefficients in front of the interaction terms are around 0.076 (9%) in 
Column 2 and 0.119-0.228 (14-27%) in Column 4. 
 
5.6. Omitted Cohort Attributes 
Since the sampling cohorts were born and grew up during the early years of the 
communist regime, it is likely that one cohort may be systematically different from another 
due to e.g. a particular economic policy that was trialled out first but later shortly abolished. 
This means that the policy estimates of interest can still be biased (downward or upward) by 
the presence of omitted cohort-specific characteristics even when cohort-group fixed effects 
have already been controlled for. The various historical events tabulated in Tables A1-A3 
seems make this line of thinking more legitimate. There is one way to further detect the 
relevance of this problem to the current context. That is, one can apply a similar difference-
in-differences analysis to the control group and check if a significant education-policy 
relationship can be found where it is not expected, in order to say something about the 
possibility of unobserved cohort differences biasing the baseline results discussed so far: If a 
significant relationship comes out, then one needs to be more worried about confounding due 
to other cohort-specific characteristics that have not yet been taken into account; on the other 
hand, if no significant estimates show up, then it means that the cohort-group fixed effects are 
likely doing a good job. 
The results are presented in Table 1274, for rural non-migrants (Columns 1-2) and 
urban non-migrants (Columns 3-4), respectively. Now the estimating sample is restricted to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel B. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
74In the two tables, the dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator 
for whether an individual had a primary school degree. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using 
Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, 
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those born between 1949 and 1954, i.e. those whose primary education should not have been 
affected by the Cultural Revolution (or the control group in the original study sample). To 
carry out a difference-in-differences analysis similar to the benchmark framework, a 
superfluous treatment status is duly defined: It switches on for the younger cohorts (born in 
1952-1954) and switches off for the older ones (born in 1949-1951).  
Beginning with the rural cohorts. Among those for whom no significant estimates for 
the attainment of primary education are expected (i.e. the 1949-1954 cohorts), neither years 
of completed primary schooling nor the probability of having a primary school degree is 
significantly correlated with the interaction between More Rural and treatment. Similarly for 
the urban cohorts, years of primary schooling are not estimated to be significantly correlated 
with the interaction between treatment and More Rural in Panel B (administrative district), 
Panel C (agricultural workforce) and Panel D (individual residence), and the coefficients of 
interest when the dependent variable is replaced by primary school degree cannot be 
statistically distinguished from zero in Panel B (administrative district) and Panel D 
(individual residence). While a significant correlation between primary education attainment 
and treatment (for the control) would certainly lead one to worry about unobserved cohort-
level confounding, these insignificant relationships may be viewed as suggestive evidence for 
the reliability of the baseline difference-in-differences.  
Yet, in the urban sample, those who were treated do appear to have spent more time in 
primary schools and have had a higher probability of having a primary school degree, when 
More Rural is defined by either farmland (Panel A of Column 3) or agricultural workforce 
(Panel C of Column 4). This may be explained by the fact that before the Cultural Revolution 
education policies disproportionately favoured urban students (Deng and Treiman 1997; 
Hannum 1999; Lu and Treiman 2008) and that primary education had already went through 
three phases of expansion (Table A1); the younger urban cohorts (the treated) may be the 
more benefited group in terms of educational attainment in the pre-revolution system. In this 
regard, the baseline results obtained from the rural sample may be more credible than those 
estimated from those with an urban Hukou. 
 
6. The Long-term Impact of the Cultural Revolution 
6.1 Health and the Cultural Revolution 
                                                                                                                                                                            
a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two individual covariates (gender 
and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland in Table 12A, and it is determined 
using all the four classifications in Table 12B. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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The results for the health impact of the Cultural Revolution are first shown, in Table 
13 for rural non-migrants and in Table 14 for urban non-migrants75. The dependent variables 
are a set of binary indicators for underweight and overweight (defined using BMI), self-
reported poor health as well as diagnosed high blood pressure and diabetes. Each column 
corresponds to a regression based on Equation 1. More Rural is defined using community 
farmland in Table 13 and Table 14 uses and compares all the four More Rural. 
Beginning with rural non-migrants (Table 13). The probability of being underweight 
is significantly and negatively associated with all the interactions between treatment and 
More Rural, implying that both the full-treat and partial-treat More Rural were around 4.5-5.6 
percentage points (123-153%76) less likely to be underweight, compared to their More Urban 
counterparts. In addition, the full-treat More Rural also turns out to be significantly less likely 
to be overweight, by around 14.5 percentage points (50%). By contrast, when health is 
measured by diagnosed high blood pressure, the treated cohorts seem to have worse health 
than their not-treated counterparts. The probability of high blood pressure was significantly 
higher among the full-treat and partial-after More Rural, by around 6.9 (107%) and 7.6 
(117%) percentage points, respectively. Therefore, the expansion of primary education may 
have produced a mixed health impact within the Cultural Revolution generation with rural 
place-of-birth. And the full-treat More Rural, while appearing to be the most benefited group 
in terms of education, appears to have had little health advantage compared to the other More 
Rural. 
Results remain broadly unchanged for those born in urban areas, as shown in Table 
14. On the one hand, the expansion of primary education over the Cultural Revolution seems 
to have induced all the More Rural cohorts to be significantly less likely to report poor health. 
In Column 3, the probability of reporting poor health was around 19 percentage points lower 
(55%) among the full-treat, 12 percentage points lower (35%) among the partial-before and 
11.3-23.5 percentage points lower (33-68%) among the partial-after. Meanwhile, 
underweight appears to be less common among the partial-before More Rural: There was a 
relative decline in the incidence of underweight among this group of the Cultural Revolution 
generation by around 1.7-2.4 percentage points (46-66%). On the other, the coefficients of 
                                                        
75The two tables control for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, 
a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual-level controls (gender and 
age and its square). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
76The large percent increase in the probability of underweight is caused by near zero prevalence of underweight 
in the study sample. This suggests that it may be problematic to use OLS to infer the health impact of the 
Cultural Revolution. But more careful thinking has to be left for future work. 
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interest when health is measured by overweight are constantly significant and positive, 
implying that all the More Rural cohorts had a higher probability of being overweight. The 
magnitude of this relative health disadvantage ranges from 8 to 15.5 percentage points (27-
53%). And unlike the partial-before More Rural, the partial-after More Rural was also around 
5.6 percentage points (153%) more likely to be underweight. Hence, the urban cohorts seem 
not have benefited from easier access to primary education made possible by the Cultural 
Revolution in terms of health either. Also similar to the rural sample, the most benefited 
group in terms of education in the urban sample (the partial-after More Rural) is not 
estimated to have more positive health results than the other two less benefited groups. 
 
6.2 Health Behaviours and the Cultural Revolution 
 The policy impact on health behaviours is next examined. Results for rural non-
migrants are in Table 13 and those for urban non-migrants are in Table 1577. The dependent 
variables include measures for medical care utilisation (medical insurance and preventive 
care), smoking status, dietary pattern and physical activity. Each column corresponds to a 
regression based on Equation 1. More Rural is defined using community farmland in Table 
13, while Table 15 uses and contrasts all the More Rural classifications. 
 In Table 13, the partial-before More Rural with rural place-of-birth is estimated to be 
around 10.3 percentage points (21%) more likely to be medically insured. This group of 
individuals along with the full-treat More Rural also seem less likely to smoke, by around 
13.3 (43%) and 12.2 (40%) percentage points, respectively. Based on these, it may be 
inferred that the expansion of primary education during the Cultural Revolution has induced 
the rural cohorts to adopt healthier consumption behaviours. Though unexpectedly, this 
positive policy impact seems to be concentrated on the partial-before cohorts (rather than the 
full-treat who had the largest increase in primary education). 
The coefficients of interest are more significant for the urban sample and the 
interpretation of the consumption-policy relationship remains qualitatively unchanged (Table 
15). For example, medical insurance ownership is estimated to be significantly more common 
among all the More Rural. The corresponding relative increase in the probability of being 
medically insured was around 12.1-25 percentage points (25-51%) among the full-treat, 7.3-
28.9 percentage points (15-59%) for the partial-before and 12.8-19.1 percentage points (26-
                                                        
77The two tables control for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, 
a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual covariates (gender and age 
and its square). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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39%) for the partial-after. The probability of smoking was lower within the partial-after More 
Rural, by around 9.6 percentage points (31%). While the full-treat More Rural turns out to 
have a higher tendency to consume a fatty diet, by 7.7 percentage points (12%), this treatment 
group at the same participated more actively in physical activities, by 11.9 percentage points 
(137%). The partial-after More Rural was also more likely to take physical activities, with the 
corresponding coefficient estimated to be on the same order as that for the full-treat More 
Rural. Hence, for the urban cohorts as well, the more treated, the healthier the health 
behaviours. Since the coefficients of interest are more significant for the partial-after More 
Rural, it also seems that the most treated (in terms of education outcome), the healthiest the 
health behaviours. 
 
6.3 Labour Supply and the Cultural Revolution 
 The last set of outcomes examined is individual labour supply. Estimates are shown 
for rural non-migrants in Table 13 and those for urban non-migrants are in Table 1678. The 
dependent variables include measures for current working status, income (log wage, log non-
wage and log total income) and types of occupation (light and moderate). Each column 
corresponds to a regression based on Equation 1. As usual, More Rural means presence of 
farmland in Table 13 and the panels differ by how More Rural is defined in Table 16. 
 The probability of working and the income variables do not turn out to be 
significantly associated with the More Rural interactions for those with rural place-of-birth, 
implying that the expansion of primary education may not have altered the rural cohorts’ 
decisions to participate in the labour market or their labour market productivity (Table 13). 
Also within the rural sample, the partial-before cohorts with More Rural residence seem 12 
percentage points (48%) less likely to work in a light (on-the-job activity) occupation, but 
they were around 2.8 percentage points (40%) more likely to work in a moderate (on-the-job 
activity) occupation. Overall, since the difference-in-differences coefficients for working 
status and income cannot be said statistically significant at conventional levels, the revolution 
education policies appear to have had little impact on the labour market performance of the 
rural Cultural Revolution generation. 
 What is told by Table 16 for the urban sample is slightly different and more 
significant. The coefficients of interest corresponding to the partial-after More Rural are 
                                                        
78The two tables control for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, 
a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates 
(gender and age and its square). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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estimated to be statistically significant at conventional levels for all the measures of labour 
market performance. For example, the probability of working for this group of individuals 
was significantly higher, by around 14.8 percentage points (19%). Total income is estimated 
to be significantly and positively correlated with the treatment interactions in all the panels of 
Column 4, implying that incomes earned by the partial-after More Rural may be around 34.2-
120.5% higher than those earned by their More Urban counterparts. Results are significant 
and negative in Column 5 but are significant and positive in Column 6, suggesting that the 
partial-after More Rural may be around 11.6-22.4 percentage points (47-90%) less likely to 
have a light (on-the-job activity) occupation while being around 9.4-24 percentage points 
(134-341%) more likely to have a moderate (on-the-job activity) occupation. For the other 
types of the More Rural, the full-treat seems to have a higher probability of working, by 7.5 
percentage points (10%), (albeit) with relatively lower wages (34.7%), compared to the full-
treat More Urban. The partial-before More Rural appears more likely than the partial-before 
More Urban to work in a moderate (on-the-job activity) occupation, by 11.6 percentage 
points (165%), though similarly with lower wages (25.8%). These results then suggest that 
while the expansion of primary education may have produced a mixed impact on the labour 
market performance of the full-treat and partial-before More Rural, it may have induced the 
partial-after More Rural born in urban areas to work more actively and have a higher income. 
 
7. Exploring the Mechanisms 
7.1 The Preference Mechanism 
The life-cycle model suggests that the expansion of primary education may affect 
health outcomes by shaping individual health-related preferences (Section 2). There are 
several preference variables from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) that capture 
respondents’ tastes for food and physical activities and their perceptions of lifetime priorities. 
Because individuals’ tastes for food and physical activities are predictive of their health 
behaviours (e.g. diet and exercising) and health, if they turn out to be significantly affected by 
the Cultural Revolution, then preferences may be one potential health mediator through 
which the Cultural Revolution affected cohort health and health behaviours. Likewise, 
perceptions of lifetime priorities may shape health-related preferences (e.g. time-discounting 
and attachment to the labour market) and hence health outcomes. For example, an individual 
who views having a healthy diet as one lifetime priority may be more patient and hence more 
likely to consume a healthy diet and less likely to be overweight. A respondent who views 
having a good income as important may have a higher attachment to the labour market and 
 
 
108 
work more actively. Then if the Cultural Revolution turns out to have a significant impact on 
lifetime priorities, which may in turn influence health-related preferences and then health, it 
may be similarly assumed that there exists a preference channel that links the Cultural 
Revolution to health. This section estimates the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the 
preference variables from CHNS, as an attempt to shed some light on this preference 
mechanism. 
To be more specific, based on CHNS questionnaires, five binary indicators are used to 
denote individual preferences79 for food, including fast foods, salty snacks, fruits, vegetables 
and soft drinks. For example, the binary indicator for fast foods is equal to 1 if a respondent 
reported as liking fast foods and equal to 0 otherwise. Likewise, individual tastes for physical 
activities80 are approximated by a set of dummy variables indicating whether or not he/she 
was fond of a particular kind of leisure activity, including walking, sports, body-shaping, 
watching TV, playing computer and reading. The dummy variables switch on if an 
affirmative answer was given and switch off otherwise. The priorities81 asked by CHNS are 
having a good income, being physically active, eating a healthy diet, having kids being 
physically active and having kids eating a healthy diet. Individual perceptions of these 
priorities are then measured by five binary variables equal to 1 if he/she perceived a certain 
priority as important and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Estimates are first presented for rural non-migrants (Table 1782).  To account for the 
possibility that the More Rural and More Urban cohorts may differ systematically in their 
subjective preferences and lifetime priorities (even without the Cultural Revolution), each 
column controls for (in addition to the original control set) a More Rural-specific quadratic 
                                                        
79The survey question is “How much do you like this food, dislike very much, dislike somewhat, neutral, like 
somewhat, like very much or does not eat this food at all”. The neutral category was not included in the 2004 
round of the China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
80The survey question is “How much do you like to participate in this activity, dislike very much, dislike 
somewhat, neutral, like somewhat, like very much or does not participate at all”. The neutral category was not 
included in the 2004 round of the China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
81The survey question is “How important is this priority in your life, not important at all, not very important, 
important, very important, the most important or don’t know”. 
82The dependent variables include individual preferences for foods (fast food, salty snacks, fruits, vegetables 
and soft drinks) and physical activities (walking, sports, body-shaping, watching TV, playing computer and 
reading) as well as lifetime priorities (having a good income, being physically active, eating a healthy diet, 
having kids being physically active and having kids eating a healthy diet). Each column is obtained from an 
OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, 
polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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trend in individual age (thus allowing any age-specific preference differences between More 
Rural and More Urban)83. 
The probabilities of liking fast foods, salty snacks and soft drinks are significantly and 
positively associated with the More Rural interactions for the treatment groups. Across all the 
More Rural, the likelihood of preferring less healthy foods was around 11-26 percentage 
points (96-228%) higher by fast foods, 8.5-23 percentage points (45-123%) higher by salty 
snacks and 34.1-74.9 percentage points (101-223%) higher by soft drinks. By contrast, the 
full-treat and partial-after More Rural also tended to be more fond of vegetables and fruits: 
The corresponding coefficients are on the order of 5.8-10.5 percentage points (6-11%) for 
vegetables and 12.6-17 percentage points (14-18%) for fruits.  
In terms of preferences for physical activities. The treated cohorts appear more 
inclined to like both active and sedentary activities: The coefficients of interest for all activity 
preference variables are significant and positive at conventional levels. For example, all the 
More Rural cohorts were around 12.4-52.7 percentage points (65-276%) more likely to be 
fond of sports; the full-treat and partial-after More Rural were also more likely to prefer 
walking and body-shaping, by 55.6-69 percentage points (150-187%) and 46.6-65.3 
percentage points (202-284%), respectively. On the other hand, all the treated More Rural 
had a higher chance of (liking) playing computer: The corresponding coefficients are 
significant and positive and are between 0.083 and 0.379 (59-267%). The full-treat and 
partial-after More Rural in addition had a significantly higher probability of preferring 
watching TV and reading: The magnitude of the estimates is about 0.142-0.257 (16-29%) for 
watching TV and around 0.165-0.332 (42-85%) for reading.  
Then for lifetime priorities. The coefficients for being physically active, eating a 
healthy diet and having kids eating a healthy diet are significantly positive, implying that the 
full-treat More Rural was around 11.9 percentage points (14%) and 6.8 percentage points 
(7%) more likely to view being physically active and having kids eating healthily as 
important. Similarly, the partial-after More Rural turns out to place a higher value on all the 
three priorities: The estimated coefficients are around 0.222 (26%) for physical activity, 
0.148 (16%) for diet and 0.085 (9%) for kids eating a healthy diet.  
To interpret these results. In the previous section, all the treated cohorts are estimated 
to have a significantly lower probability of being underweight while being significantly more 
likely to have high blood pressure. This seems able to be explained by their induced 
                                                        
83As a result, the quadratic trend in individual age (i.e. not interacted with the More Rural indicator) is omitted 
from the empirical specification. 
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preferences (by the Cultural Revolution) for less healthful foods (i.e. fast foods, salty snacks 
and soft drinks) and sedentary activities (i.e. watching TV, playing computer and reading). 
The relative decline in underweight among the partial-after More Rural (in particular) may 
also be viewed as coming from the possibility that the Cultural Revolution has led them to 
perceive eating a healthy diet as important. Likewise, the lower prevalence of overweight 
among the full-treat More Rural is consistent with the higher tendency for this treatment 
group to eat more healthful foods (i.e. fruits and vegetables), engage in more active activities 
(i.e. walking, sports and body-shaping) and rank being physically active as a lifetime priority. 
Lastly, the insignificant relationship between the income priority and treatment mirrors the 
insignificant relationships between labour supply and treatment as found for the rural sample 
in the previous section. Hence, the theoretical postulation of the existence of a preference 
mechanism running from the Cultural Revolution to preferences and then to health outcomes 
seems to be supported by the rural sample. 
The results for urban non-migrants are next shown (Tables 18-2084). As in Table 17, 
to deal with potential confounding due to the presence of unobserved and systematic 
differences in preferences (e.g. for food intake) between the More Rural and More Urban 
cohorts, a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in age is included in each column85. 
Beginning with food preferences. The More Rural cohorts had a higher probability of 
liking fruits, but they also tended to be more likely to be fond of soft drinks: The coefficients 
of interest for the two food preference indicators are significantly positive. In particular, the 
relative increase in the preference for fruits was around 8.2-24.2 percentage points (9-26%), 
and that for soft drinks (for full-treat and partial-after More Rural) was around 22.6-34.4 
percentage points (67-102%). The partial-after More Rural may have a healthier eating habit 
than the full-treat and partial-before More Rural. While the partial-after More Rural had a 
lower probability of liking fast foods and higher probability of liking vegetables, by 22.5-36.9 
percentage points (197-323%) and 9-13.7 percentage points (9-14%), respectively, the full-
treat More Rural was around 12.8 percentage points (112%) more likely to prefer fast foods 
                                                        
84The dependent variables include individual preferences for foods (fast food, salty snacks, fruits, vegetables 
and soft drinks) and physical activities (walking, sports, body-shaping, watching TV, playing computer and 
reading) as well as lifetime priorities (having a good income, being physically active, eating a healthy diet, 
having kids being physically active and having kids eating a healthy diet). Each column is obtained from an 
OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, 
polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with 
community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and 
individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
85Similarly, as a result, a quadratic trend in individual age (i.e. that not interacted with the More Rural indicator) 
is dropped out of the control set. 
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and the partial-before More Rural was around 3 percentage points (3%) less likely to be fond 
of vegetables.  
The results for preferences for physical activities in Tables 18-20 are similar to those 
in Table 17, implying that the More Rural cohorts with urban place-of-birth as well had a 
significantly higher probability of liking both active and sedentary activities, compared to 
their More Urban counterparts. For example, on the one hand, all the More Rural was 
significantly more likely to like walking, doing sports and body-shaping, by 26.7-98 
percentage points (72-265%), 19.1-87.1 percentage points (100-456%) and 18.3-104.1 
percentage points (79-452%), respectively. On the other hand, the More Rural cohorts (either 
full-treat or partial-treat) were significantly more likely to play computer, by 9.9-80.9 
percentage points (70-570%). The partial-after More Rural had a higher probability of 
(liking) watching TV, by 35.2 percentage points (39%). And the full-treat More Rural had a 
higher probability of (liking) reading, by 14.6 percentage points (37%). 
Lastly for lifetime priorities. The coefficients in front of the various interactions are 
broadly insignificant at conventional levels, implying that the Cultural Revolution may have 
had little impact on the urban cohorts’ lifetime priorities. Though the partial-after More Rural 
appears to have a significantly higher probability of viewing being physically active as 
important, by 28.4 percentage points (34%). And this group of individuals and the full-treat 
More Rural may also attach significantly more weight to eating a healthy diet (themselves) 
and having their kids being physically active, by 5.6-8.3 percentage points (6-9%) for the 
former and by 6-6.3 percentage points (6-7%) for the latter. 
Similar to the rural sample, these various reduced-form relationships between 
preferences and the Cultural Revolution found for the urban sample can be used to explain 
the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on the urban cohorts’ health outcomes. For 
example, the significantly lower prevalence of self-reported poor health within the partial-
after More Rural may be explained by their induced (by the Cultural Revolution) lower 
tendency to be fond of fast foods and higher tendency to be fond of fruits and vegetables. The 
uncovered preferences for fast foods and soft drinks among the full-treat More Rural seem 
able to account for the higher prevalence of overweight and fatty diets among this group of 
individuals. A distaste for vegetables among the partial-before More Rural may be used to 
justify their higher likelihood of being of abnormal weight (underweight and overweight). 
The estimated higher tendency for full-treat and partial-after More Rural to take exercises in 
spare time likely comes from their higher probability of liking active physical activities (i.e. 
walking, sports and body-shaping). Then for the partial-after cohorts with More Rural 
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residence, their revealed higher prevalence of underweight, lower incidence of self-reported 
poor health and higher probability of taking exercises may be due to the possibility that the 
Cultural Revolution made them put more weight on being physically active and eating a 
healthy diet. Overall, one interpretation of these results is that the preference channel as 
assumed by the life-cycle model may exist for those with urban place-of-birth as well and 
work in the expected direction. 
 
7.2 The Investment Mechanism: Returns to Education 
In addition to the preference mechanism, it is also possible that the Cultural 
Revolution affected health outcomes by altering investment in education (Section 2). More 
specifically, two questions are of interest regarding this investment mechanism: One is that 
whether the Cultural Revolution encouraged the affected cohorts to spend more on education 
and the other is that whether more education led to improved health outcomes. Without data 
on education expenditure, the first link cannot be investigated. Yet the various measures of 
health outcomes in China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) allow this analysis to obtain 
some estimates on the returns to education – the education impact on health, health 
behaviours and labour supply. Which is what this section plans to do. 
In practice, education can be (linearly) linked to individual outcomes using Equation 
4: 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼
𝑜 + 𝛿𝑜𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑝 + 𝜃1
𝑜𝐹𝑐 + 𝜃2
𝑜𝑃𝐵𝑐 + 𝜃3
𝑜𝑃𝐴𝑐 + 𝛾
𝑜𝑅 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝
𝑜 (4) 
where𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑝  is the attainment of primary education by individual 𝑖  born in year 𝑐  living in 
province𝑝. 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑝 is an outcome measure (e.g. health). The parameter of interest is thus 𝛿
𝑜 , 
which can be interpreted as returns to education. The other right-hand-side variables are the 
same as those in Equation 1. 𝛼𝑜 is a constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝
𝑜 is an error term. But it has been long 
established that 𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑝 is almost certainly correlated with 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝
𝑜 , meaning that OLS estimates of 
𝛿𝑜 is unlikely to correctly inform the education-outcome relationship (Card 2001). Therefore, 
the interaction terms between More Rural and treatment (full-treat, partial-before and partial-
after) are used to instrument for 𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑝, with the first-stage being in the form of Equation 5: 
𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼
𝑓 + 𝛿1
𝑓(𝐹𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿2
𝑓(𝑃𝐵𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝛿3
𝑓(𝑃𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑅) + 𝜃1
𝑓𝐹𝑐 + 𝜃2
𝑓𝑃𝐵𝑐 + 𝜃3
𝑓𝑃𝐴𝑐 + 𝛾
𝑓𝑅
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ 𝛽𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝
𝑓 (5) 
where 𝐹𝑐  is a binary indicator that is equal to 1 for the full-treat Cultural Revolution 
generation and equal to 0 otherwise. The other two dummy variables 𝑃𝐵𝑐 and 𝑃𝐴𝑐correspond 
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to the partial-before and partial-after cohorts, respectively. 𝑅is equal to 1 if 𝑖 was More Rural 
and 0 otherwise. 𝛼𝑓is a constant. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝
𝑓
is an error term. Equations 4 and 5 are jointly estimated 
on urban or rural non-migrants. Instrumental Variables (IV) results are shown in the 
following sections, for health, health behaviours and labour supply, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
7.2.1 Health Returns to Education 
The results for the health returns to education are first presented, in Table 2186 for 
rural non-migrants and in Table 2287 for urban non-migrants. Years of primary education are 
significantly and positively associated with the probability of being underweight, implying 
that those with one more year of primary schooling (more educated) had a higher likelihood 
of being underweight, by 4.4 percentage points (120%). The coefficients for overweight are 
significant and mixed, suggesting that the probability of being overweight was lower for the 
more educated rural cohorts, by 16.3 percentage points (56%), but higher for the more 
educated urban cohorts, by 8.9 percentage points (31%). The results for self-reported health 
point to significant health returns to education, while those for diagnosed high blood pressure 
point to the opposite. For example, the more educated was around 30.7 percentage points 
(89%) less likely to report poor health, but they had a higher incidence of high blood 
pressure, by 6.7 percentage points (103%). These suggest that, like the reduced-form 
relationships (Tables 13-14), more education seems not necessarily lead to improved health 
in the study sample. Results are the same when the education variable is replaced by primary 
school degree (instead of years of completed primary schooling). (Due to space limit they are 
not presented in detail but are available on request.) 
 
8.2.2 Lifestyle Returns to Education  
                                                        
86 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
87 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community 
farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual 
residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Focusing next on the estimates for the returns to education in terms of individual 
health behaviours. The results for rural non-migrants are in Table 2188 and those for urban 
non-migrants are in Table 2389.  
The probability of being medically insured is significantly and positively associated 
with years of primary education, implying that the cohorts with one more year of primary 
schooling (more educated) were around 9.6-23.6 percentage points (20-49%) more likely to 
have medical insurance. The coefficient of interest is significant and negative for smoking, 
suggesting that the more educated was around 10.1 percentage points (33%) less likely to 
smoke. The probability of taking physical activities is also estimated to be higher for the 
more educated, by 8.9-14.4 percentage points (103-166%). Therefore, similar to their 
reduced-form counterparts (Tables 13 and 15), results in Tables 21 and 23 tend to suggest 
that the cohorts who were induced by the Cultural Revolution to obtain more years of 
primary schooling were also more likely to adopt healthier consumption behaviours. Results 
remain unchanged when education is measured by primary school degree (Due to space limit 
they are not shown). 
 
7.2.3 Labour Market Returns to Education 
The last set of results that exploits the investment mechanism is about labour market 
returns to education, shown in Table 2190 for rural non-migrants and in Table 2491 for urban 
non-migrants.  
                                                        
88 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
89 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community 
farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual 
residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
90 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
91 The education variable is years of completed primary schooling. Each column is obtained by jointly 
estimating Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 together with two 
individual characteristics (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community 
farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual 
residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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The probability of working is significantly and positively associated with the 
education variable. Hence, the cohorts with one more year of primary schooling (more 
educated) were around 16.6 percentage points (22%) more likely to be working at the time of 
the survey. While the education coefficients for wages are mixed, those for total income are 
significant and positive, suggesting that one more year of primary schooling was associated 
with an around 38.1-116.8% increase in total income of the study sample. The more educated 
is also estimated to have a higher probability of working in a moderate (on-the-job activity) 
occupation, by 5.9-19.4 percentage points (84-276%). These results then suggest that there 
may be significant labour market returns to primary education, though the direct impact of 
education policies (i.e. the Cultural Revolution) on labour supply is less clear (Tables 13 and 
16). Once more, the same can be said when the education variable is replaced by primary 
school degree (due to space limit results are not shown). 
 
8. Conclusion 
Health is one of the most important human capitals for economic development. While 
education interventions have long been perceived as a cost-effective way to improve health, 
findings so far in the existing literature on education’s causal effect on health effectiveness 
have been mixed. This study provides more estimates of the health impact of education 
policies by exploiting a nationwide education campaign in China – the Cultural Revolution. 
One major feature of the Cultural Revolution was the nationwide expansion of primary 
education. Indeed, the results on the education impact of the Cultural Revolution show that it 
significantly increased primary education obtained among the treated More Rural  cohorts. In 
particular, the full-treat and partial-after More Rural seem have benefited more from the 
expansion of primary education than the partial-before More Rural, in terms of education 
attainment. 
Yet the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on cohort health is more mixed. 
While the Cultural Revolution seems to have significantly reduced underweight and self-
reported poor health among the treated More Rural, it seems have significantly increased the 
incidence of high blood pressure. Results for overweight are also inconclusive with flipping 
signs in front of the coefficients of interest. Further exploring how the Cultural Revolution 
may have affected two health correlates – health behaviours and labour supply – leads to 
estimates suggesting that the treated More Rural was more likely to have medical insurance, 
less likely to smoke and more likely to take physical activities. The partial-after More Rural 
also turns out to work more actively and have a higher income. Hence, though with little 
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health impact, the Cultural Revolution seems to have induced the treated cohorts to behave 
more healthfully and work more actively. 
A (maybe) more interesting aspect of this study is that it exploits the pathways through 
which the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution may operate. And it finds that the 
Cultural Revolution significantly affected cohort health-related preferences, and the 
preference results seem able to explain those obtained for its long-term health impact. 
Furthermore, more primary schooling (induced by the Cultural Revolution) seems to have 
increased medical insurance ownership, reduced smoking, increased exercising, led to higher 
probability of working and increased income, within the study sample. It therefore seems that 
the long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution may come from its influence on cohort 
preferences and the positive correlation between education and health outcomes. 
 It is not clear why the Cultural Revolution produced a mixed impact on health, while 
appearing to have increased education attainment and generated more healthful behaviours 
within the treatment group. One contemplation is that increases in education at a relatively 
elementary level (i.e. primary and not education at higher levels) may not be sufficient to lead 
to substantial health improvement, or that the well discussed decline in education quality 
during the Cultural Revolution may have more profound implications for health than for the 
other (more) behavioural outcomes. Another is that the impact estimates obtained by this 
study are only correlational and not causal, given that the Cultural Revolution is also featured 
by numerous other radical events which may also have affected the health of the Cultural 
Revolution generation. To provide more definitive evidence on the health impact of the 
Cultural Revolution and for policy implications (i.e. whether health interventions92 other than 
education policies may be more productive), a more careful examination is warranted, which 
will be left for future research. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
92For example, those targeted at labour supply (Mukhopadhyay, Song and Zhou 2011) or health behaviours (Shi 
2012). 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Quantity of primary education, official statistics 
Figure 1A: Enrolment rate of school-aged kids Figure 1B: Enrolment and graduation 
 
Notes: Data are obtained from National Education Commission, “Achievement of Education in China: Statistics, 
1949-1983” (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1984). The two dashed lines mark the period in which the 
Cultural Revolution education system was in existence, i.e. from 1968-1976. 
 
Figure 2: Attainment of primary education, CHNS 
 
Notes: The figures are produced from the study sample, which is constructed from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The two dashed vertical lines are used to highlight the treatment group, which 
consists of cohorts born between 1955 and 1970. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50
60
70
80
90
100
E
n
ro
lm
e
n
t 
ra
te
 a
m
o
n
g
 s
c
h
o
o
l-
a
g
e
d
 k
id
s
 (
%
)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
P
ri
m
a
ry
 s
c
h
o
o
l 
g
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
 (
1
0
,0
0
0
)
0
2
5
0
0
5
0
0
0
7
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
P
ri
m
a
ry
 s
c
h
o
o
l 
e
n
ro
lm
e
n
t 
(1
0
,0
0
0
)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
Enrolment
Graduation
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 a
 p
ri
m
a
ry
 s
c
h
o
o
l 
d
e
g
re
e
 (
p
o
in
t)
2
3
4
5
6
Y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
le
te
d
 p
ri
m
a
ry
 s
c
h
o
o
lin
g
 (
y
e
a
r)
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Year of birth
Years
Degree
 
 
120 
Figure 3: Treatment intensity, primary education 
 
Notes: The figure computes for each treated cohort for how long they may have been exposed to the expansion 
of primary education. Treatment intensity is calculated based on enrolment age (i.e. 7-10 years old) and school 
length (5 years). In practice, the potentially fully exposed cohorts are those born in 1959-1965 (the 1966 cohort 
is excluded because this group of individuals can still be in school when the Cultural Revolution was ended); the 
cohorts who were born before (the 1955-1958 cohorts) or after (1966-1970 cohorts) were potentially partially 
exposed. 
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Figure 4: Rural versus Urban, primary education, official statistics 
Figure 4A: Enrolment                                          Figure 4B: Graduation 
 
Figure 4C: Full-time teachers 
 
Notes: Data are obtained from National Education Commission, “Achievement of Education in China: Statistics, 
1949-1983” (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1984). The two dashed vertical lines mark the period in which 
the Cultural Revolution education system was in existence, i.e. from 1968-1976. 
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Figure 5: More Rural versus More Urban, primary education, official statistics 
Figure 5A: Enrolment                                          Figure 5B: Graduation 
 
Figure 5C: Full-time teachers 
 
Notes: Data are obtained from National Education Commission, “Achievement of Education in China: Statistics, 
1949-1983” (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1984). The two dashed vertical lines mark the period in which 
the Cultural Revolution education system was in existence, i.e. from 1968-1976. 
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Figure 6: Discontinuities in attainment of primary education, CHNS 
Figure 6A: The rural sample (Hukou)                    Figure 6B: The urban sample (Hukou) 
 
Notes: The two figures are produced from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). Local linear non-
parametric regression is used to fit the data (bin width equal to 1). The discontinuity sample is comprised of two 
neighbouring cohorts: The 1955-1956 cohorts for the policy of reduced school length and the 1965-1966 cohorts 
for the policy of retrenched school provision. The 1955 and 1965 cohorts (for each policy) are expected to have 
more primary education because of the institutional features of the Cultural Revolution education policies. 
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Table 1: Quality of primary education from 1965-1976, official statistics 
 
Notes: Data are obtained from National Education Commission, “Achievement of Education in China: Statistics, 
1949-1983” (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1984). It should be noted that direct official statistics on types 
of primary school teachers in terms of their academic credentials are not available. Because graduates from 
teacher-training, academic senior and academic junior middle schools formed the most part of primary school 
teachers over the revolution decade, this analysis uses trends in the number of these three types of graduates to 
reflect changes in primary school quality. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics, CHNS 
 
Notes: Summary statistics are computed from the study sample (the 1949-1970 cohorts), which is constructed 
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
Variable/year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
(1) Number of full-time teachers (10,000)
Total 385.7 322.1 319.6 325.5 348.7 361.2 409.5 439.8 467.9 494.4 520.4 528.9
   Hired by education department 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 175.8 178.9 179.5 175 162.6
   Hired by non-education department 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 19 21.2 23.1 24.6 24.7
   Hired by local communities 175.1 175.1 175.1 175.1 175.1 175.1 175.1 245 267.8 291.8 320.8 341.6
(2) Type of teachers (10,000)
   Graduates from teacher-training middle school 1.8 3.86 5.22 6.22 2.1 1.13 5.1 5.87 8.4 8.8 12.44 14.84
   Graduates from academic senior middle school 36 28 26.8 79.4 38 67.6 100.4 215.9 349.4 417.9 447 517.2
   Graduates from academic junior middle school 173.8 162 186.4 519 361.4 618.9 835 1036 1129 1061 1048 1206
(3) Class-size (person) 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34.7 34.7 35 34.9 34.2
(4) Student-to-teacher ratio 30.1 30.1 30.1 30.1 30.1 30.1 30.1 28.9 28.9 29.3 29 28.4
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Panel A: Human capital
(1) Education
Years of primary schooling (year) 14024 4.88 1.967 11108 5.74 1.034
Primary school degree (=1 if yes;0 no) 14024 0.78 0.414 11108 0.948 0.222
(2) Health
Body Mass Index (BMI) (kg/m2) 9758 23.212 3.157 6213 23.844 3.173
   Underweight (BMI<18.5) (=1 if yes;0 no) 9758 0.042 0.2 6213 0.029 0.167
   Overweight (BMI>=25) (=1 if yes;0 no) 9758 0.263 0.44 6213 0.337 0.473
Self-reported health: poor or fair (=1 if yes; 0 no) 7676 0.348 0.476 4991 0.337 0.473
Diagnosed high blood pressure (=1 if yes;0 no) 10341 0.05 0.218 6804 0.087 0.282
Diagnosed diabetes (=1 if yes; 0 no) 10287 0.006 0.077 6762 0.024 0.154
Panel B: Health behaviours
(1) Medical care utilisation
Medical insurance ownership 10681 0.414 0.493 6937 0.597 0.491
Preventive care utilisation 10662 0.015 0.122 6916 0.04 0.195
(2) Current smoking status (=1 if yes;0 no)
Currently smoking (=1 if yes;0 no) 9737 0.315 0.464 6209 0.293 0.455
(3) Diet habit (=1 if yes;0 no)
Daily % fat intake above Chinese guideline 10507 0.532 0.499 6858 0.793 0.405
(4) Physical activity (=1 if yes;0 no)
Physical activity 7829 0.02 0.139 5147 0.189 0.391
Panel C: Labour supply
(1) Labour force participation
Currently working (=1 if yes;0 no) 10735 0.822 0.382 6974 0.663 0.473
(2) Income (in 2009 Yuan)
Log(earnings*100) 2209 13.392 1.244 3997 14.061 0.817
Log(non-wage income*100) 8357 12.564 2.48 1781 13.317 2.052
Log(total income*100) 9104 12.763 2.653 5397 13.961 1.184
(3) Occupation (=1 if yes;0 no)
Light occupational activity 10495 0.099 0.299 6948 0.474 0.499
Moderate occupational activity 10495 0.043 0.203 6948 0.111 0.315
Heavy occupational activity 10495 0.686 0.464 6948 0.086 0.281
Panel D: Other individual covariates
Rural Hukou (=1 if yes;0 no) 14024 1 0 11108 0 0
Female (=1 if yes;0 no) 14024 0.518 0.5 11108 0.511 0.5
Age (year) 14024 45.774 7.163 11108 46.269 7.019
Panel E: More Rural and More Urban
(1) Community level (=1 if yes;0 no)
Presence of farmland 14024 0.914 0.28 11108 0.114 0.318
Suburban/Rural-village by official designation 14024 0.972 0.166 11108 0.162 0.369
Above median percent agricultural workforce 14024 0.77 0.421 11108 0.08 0.271
(2) Individual level (=1 if yes;0 no)
Suburban/Rural-village residence 14024 0.961 0.194 11108 0.242 0.428
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 3: More Rural-More Urban transition matrices, CHNS 
Table 3A: More Rural, community-level, presence of farmland 
 
Table 3B: More Rural, community-level, administrative district 
 
Table 3C: More Rural, community-level, agricultural workforce 
 
Table 3D: More Rural, individual-level, individual residence 
 
Notes: The four More Rural-More Urban transition matrices are computed from China Health and Nutrition 
Survey. The period covered is from 1989-2009, which is the entire sampling span. The four matrices are 
intended to show whether a community (or individual) remained More Rural over time. For details please refer 
to the Data section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comm. 1989- 1991- 1993- 1997- 2000- 2004- 2006- 2009-
Farmland Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
1989-Rural 1
1991-Rural 0.955 1
1993-Rural 0.908 0.894 1
1997-Rural 0.857 0.871 0.884 1
2000-Rural 0.811 0.847 0.8 0.837 1
2004-Rural 0.835 0.841 0.838 0.821 0.863 1
2006-Rural 0.807 0.798 0.774 0.766 0.816 0.832 1
2009-Rural 0.826 0.781 0.802 0.822 0.796 0.807 0.826 1
Comm. 1989- 1991- 1993- 1997- 2000- 2004- 2006- 2009-
Admin. District Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
1989-Rural ***
1991-Rural *** 1
1993-Rural *** *** ***
1997-Rural *** 0.759 *** 1
2000-Rural *** 0.714 *** 0.919 1
2004-Rural *** 0.737 *** 0.952 0.947 1
2006-Rural *** 0.719 *** 0.902 0.955 0.914 1
2009-Rural *** 0.732 *** 0.903 0.947 0.922 0.942 1
Comm. 1989- 1991- 1993- 1997- 2000- 2004- 2006- 2009-
Agri. Labour Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
1989-Rural 1
1991-Rural 0.671 1
1993-Rural 0.702 0.8 1
1997-Rural 0.597 0.686 0.686 1
2000-Rural 0.568 0.675 0.679 0.72 1
2004-Rural 0.654 0.701 0.725 0.73 0.747 1
2006-Rural 0.59 0.577 0.617 0.697 0.694 0.769 1
2009-Rural 0.651 0.667 0.634 0.711 0.663 0.736 0.69 1
Individual 1989- 1991- 1993- 1997- 2000- 2004- 2006- 2009-
residence Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
1989-Rural 1
1991-Rural 1 1
1993-Rural 1 1 1
1997-Rural 1 1 1 1
2000-Rural 1 1 1 1 1
2004-Rural 1 1 1 1 1 1
2006-Rural 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2009-Rural 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 4: Baseline results, educational outcomes 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with community 
farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual 
residence in Panel D. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6 (i.e. DID). Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary
education Years Degree Years Degree
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.543*** 0.099** 0.910*** 0.229***
(0.184) (0.040) (0.204) (0.048)
Partial before*More Rural -0.192 -0.078* 0.758*** 0.209***
(0.210) (0.043) (0.222) (0.052)
Partial after*More Rural 0.034 0.022 1.113*** 0.281***
(0.168) (0.038) (0.204) (0.047)
Observations 11,964 11,964 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.213 0.189 0.085 0.078
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural -1.692*** -0.237*** 0.609*** 0.148***
(0.381) (0.071) (0.105) (0.024)
Partial before*More Rural -2.711*** -0.414*** 0.167 0.069**
(0.372) (0.070) (0.147) (0.031)
Partial after*More Rural -1.720*** -0.235*** 0.772*** 0.188***
(0.370) (0.071) (0.107) (0.025)
Observations 11,964 11,964 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.215 0.189 0.094 0.085
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural -0.286** -0.049** 0.994*** 0.240***
(0.111) (0.023) (0.170) (0.038)
Partial before*More Rural -0.496*** -0.097*** 0.639*** 0.183***
(0.134) (0.027) (0.211) (0.045)
Partial after*More Rural -0.397*** -0.097*** 1.152*** 0.280***
(0.112) (0.023) (0.172) (0.039)
Observations 11,964 11,964 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.214 0.189 0.098 0.090
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural -1.068*** -0.190*** 0.669*** 0.129***
(0.297) (0.057) (0.081) (0.017)
Partial before*More Rural -1.190*** -0.131* 0.444*** 0.080***
(0.345) (0.075) (0.105) (0.022)
Partial after*More Rural -1.338*** -0.238*** 0.796*** 0.166***
(0.274) (0.055) (0.087) (0.019)
Observations 11,964 11,964 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.214 0.189 0.108 0.089
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Rural non-migrants Urban non-migrants
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Table 5: Discontinuity results, educational outcomes 
 
Notes: The discontinuity sample is composed of the 1955-1956 cohorts, i.e. the two neighbouring cohorts who 
were and were not affected by the policy of reduced school length. The dependent variable is either years of 
primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual had a primary school degree. Each column is 
obtained from an OLS regression using a specification similar to Equation 7, which does not have the 
interaction term (between treatment and More Rural) and More Rural. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary education Years Degree Years Degree
The 1955 cohort 0.557** 0.183*** 0.492*** 0.099***
(0.238) (0.049) (0.181) (0.035)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.210 0.175 0.125 0.118
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 6: Placebo tests, educational outcomes 
 
Notes: The discontinuity sample is composed of the 1955-1956 cohorts (i.e. for reduced school length). Since 
the educational discontinuity in terms of the retrenching policy is not well-defined (i.e. no significant results 
found), it is not considered by Table 6. The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary 
indicator for whether an individual had a primary school degree. The panels differ by how More Rural is 
defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel 
C and individual residence in Panel D. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 7. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced school length:
Primary education Years Degree Years Degree
Panel A: Community farmland
Partial before*More Rural -0.800** -0.168** 0.685*** 0.129***
(0.344) (0.066) (0.204) (0.042)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.221 0.195 0.131 0.124
Panel B: Community administrative district
Partial before*More Rural 1.572*** 0.301*** -0.538** -0.081*
(0.187) (0.039) (0.229) (0.045)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.225 0.188 0.139 0.127
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Partial before*More Rural -0.484* -0.132** 0.213 0.069
(0.274) (0.057) (0.291) (0.054)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.218 0.183 0.129 0.122
Panel D: Individual residence
Partial before*More Rural -0.788 -0.231* -0.209 -0.054
(0.565) (0.136) (0.194) (0.039)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.213 0.178 0.141 0.130
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 7: First-stage results, decision to migrate 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for non-migrant status: It is equal to 1 for those who had not 
moved by the time of the survey and equal to 0 otherwise. Each column is obtained from a probit regression using 
the specification in Equation 8. The other right-hand-side variables are a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed 
effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as 
two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). For space concern, only results obtained when More 
Rural is defined using community farmland are reported; those obtained when More Rural is defined using the 
remaining three classifications are virtually the same. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage:Decision to migrante Policy Policy-Input Output Policy Policy-Input Output
More Rural: Community farmland
Government procurement price of output 0.006 0.009 0.008*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.012)
Market price of output -0.001 -0.025** 0.003 0.013
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011)
Household Responsibility System -0.303 -0.768** -0.390* -1.428***
(0.257) (0.373) (0.230) (0.341)
Percentage of sown areas for grain crops -0.111*** -0.169 -0.227*** 0.066
(0.036) (0.119) (0.032) (0.104)
Multiple Cropping Index 0.040 0.049 0.014 -0.091**
(0.032) (0.045) (0.028) (0.040)
Log labour:Farming (including cropping) 9.955* -6.574
(5.238) (4.539)
Log labour:Cropping -1.138 7.205***
(1.543) (1.348)
Log land -48.530** -31.890*
(21.193) (18.318)
Log capital -2.175 1.138
(1.629) (1.466)
Log fertiliser 0.137 1.602***
(0.515) (0.427)
Log gross value of crop output 0.753 0.782*
(0.469) (0.406)
Joint significance:P-value [0.003] [0.001] [0.108] [0.000] [0.000] [0.054]
Observations 14,024 14,024 14,024 11,108 11,108 11,108
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 8: Correcting for non-random migration, second-stage results, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual 
had a primary school degree. The columns differ by the set of instrumental variables used, with the policy set in 
Columns 1-2, the policy and input set in Columns 3-4 and the output set in Columns 5-6. Each column is obtained 
from jointly estimating Equations 6 and 8. The other observable controls include a set of province and quarter-of-
birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 
and two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community 
farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural primary:
Correcting for migration bias Years Degree Years Degree Years Degree
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.420** 0.063 0.452** 0.071* 0.328 0.040
(0.196) (0.042) (0.195) (0.042) (0.209) (0.044)
Partial before*More Rural -0.131 -0.061 -0.150 -0.065 -0.088 -0.050
(0.213) (0.044) (0.211) (0.044) (0.214) (0.044)
Partial after*More Rural -0.154 -0.032 -0.105 -0.020 -0.291 -0.066
(0.197) (0.045) (0.194) (0.044) (0.216) (0.048)
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.894* -0.256** -0.658 -0.203** -1.546** -0.419***
(0.474) (0.100) (0.449) (0.093) (0.624) (0.128)
R-squared 11,964 11,964 11,964 11,964 11,964 11,964
Observations 0.213 0.190 0.213 0.190 0.214 0.190
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
Policy Policy and Input Output
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Table 9: Correcting for non-random migration, second-stage results, urban 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban primary:
Correcting for migration bias Years Degree Years Degree Years Degree
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.913*** 0.235*** 0.982*** 0.244*** 1.221*** 0.259***
(0.222) (0.052) (0.211) (0.049) (0.365) (0.083)
Partial before*More Rural 0.760*** 0.213*** 0.802*** 0.218*** 0.946*** 0.227***
(0.231) (0.053) (0.224) (0.052) (0.291) (0.067)
Partial after*More Rural 1.115*** 0.284*** 1.144*** 0.288*** 1.266*** 0.296***
(0.209) (0.049) (0.205) (0.048) (0.258) (0.059)
Inverse Mill's ratio 0.010 0.018 0.186 0.039 0.854 0.083
(0.192) (0.048) (0.132) (0.031) (0.797) (0.180)
R-squared 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
Observations 0.085 0.078 0.086 0.078 0.086 0.078
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.604*** 0.148*** 0.621*** 0.150*** 0.710*** 0.170***
(0.106) (0.024) (0.106) (0.024) (0.138) (0.032)
Partial before*More Rural 0.166 0.069** 0.171 0.070** 0.195 0.075**
(0.147) (0.031) (0.147) (0.031) (0.151) (0.032)
Partial after*More Rural 0.773*** 0.188*** 0.769*** 0.187*** 0.788*** 0.191***
(0.107) (0.025) (0.107) (0.025) (0.108) (0.025)
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.105 0.003 0.175 0.040 1.703 0.377
(0.200) (0.051) (0.135) (0.032) (1.570) (0.362)
R-squared 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
Observations 0.094 0.085 0.094 0.085 0.094 0.085
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.946*** 0.238*** 1.068*** 0.256*** 0.707 0.155
(0.187) (0.043) (0.178) (0.040) (0.544) (0.127)
Partial before*More Rural 0.610*** 0.182*** 0.685*** 0.193*** 0.464 0.131
(0.218) (0.047) (0.212) (0.046) (0.391) (0.088)
Partial after*More Rural 1.114*** 0.279*** 1.208*** 0.292*** 0.912** 0.209*
(0.181) (0.042) (0.177) (0.040) (0.458) (0.108)
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.135 -0.006 0.210 0.044 -0.801 -0.238
(0.209) (0.053) (0.135) (0.032) (1.431) (0.335)
R-squared 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
Observations 0.098 0.090 0.098 0.090 0.098 0.090
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.644*** 0.124*** 0.709*** 0.136*** 0.602*** 0.093**
(0.087) (0.019) (0.084) (0.018) (0.180) (0.038)
Partial before*More Rural 0.425*** 0.076*** 0.474*** 0.085*** 0.394** 0.053
(0.111) (0.023) (0.106) (0.022) (0.167) (0.034)
Partial after*More Rural 0.780*** 0.163*** 0.822*** 0.171*** 0.749*** 0.140***
(0.088) (0.020) (0.087) (0.020) (0.144) (0.030)
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.149 -0.029 0.234* 0.042 -0.385 -0.209
(0.208) (0.053) (0.128) (0.031) (1.024) (0.218)
R-squared 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
Observations 0.108 0.089 0.108 0.089 0.108 0.089
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
Policy Policy and Input Output
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Notes: The dependent variable is either years of primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an individual 
had a primary school degree. The columns differ by the set of instrumental variables used, with the policy set in 
Columns 1-2, the policy and input set in Columns 3-4 and the output set in Columns 5-6. Each column is obtained 
from jointly estimating Equations 6 and 8. The other observable controls include a set of province and quarter-of-
birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 
and two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, 
with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and 
individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 10A: Correcting for pre-existing difference in education, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6. The 
empirical specification controls for cohort pre-trend in educational attainment, enrolment in primary schools in 
Columns 1 and 3 and enrolment in all the academic institutions in Columns 2 and 4, in addition to a set of province 
and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for 
sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined 
using community farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary education Primary All Primary All
More Rural: Community presence of farmland
Full*More Rural 0.524*** 0.521*** 0.095** 0.095**
(0.184) (0.183) (0.040) (0.040)
Partial before*More Rural -0.224 -0.227 -0.084* -0.085*
(0.210) (0.211) (0.044) (0.044)
Partial after*More Rural 0.001 -0.003 0.016 0.015
(0.168) (0.168) (0.038) (0.038)
Observations 11,964 11,964 11,964 11,964
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.194 0.194
Enrolment:Primary Y Y Y Y
Enrolment:All N Y N Y
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Years Degree
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Table 10B: Correcting for pre-existing difference in education, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6. The 
empirical specification controls for cohort pre-trend in educational attainment, enrolment in primary schools in 
Columns 1 and 3 and enrolment in all the academic institutions in Columns 2 and 4, in addition to a set of province 
and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for 
sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by 
More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel 
C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary education Primary All Primary All
Panel A: Community presence of farmland
Full*More Rural 0.910*** 0.909*** 0.229*** 0.229***
(0.203) (0.203) (0.047) (0.047)
Partial before*More Rural 0.760*** 0.750*** 0.210*** 0.208***
(0.223) (0.223) (0.052) (0.051)
Partial after*More Rural 1.115*** 1.121*** 0.283*** 0.284***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.085 0.086 0.079 0.079
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.610*** 0.611*** 0.148*** 0.149***
(0.105) (0.105) (0.024) (0.024)
Partial before*More Rural 0.169 0.166 0.070** 0.070**
(0.147) (0.147) (0.031) (0.031)
Partial after*More Rural 0.773*** 0.772*** 0.189*** 0.188***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.094 0.095 0.085 0.086
Panel C: Community agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.995*** 0.998*** 0.241*** 0.242***
(0.170) (0.170) (0.038) (0.038)
Partial before*More Rural 0.641*** 0.635*** 0.185*** 0.183***
(0.211) (0.211) (0.045) (0.045)
Partial after*More Rural 1.153*** 1.157*** 0.282*** 0.283***
(0.172) (0.172) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.090 0.091
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.669*** 0.671*** 0.129*** 0.130***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.017) (0.017)
Partial before*More Rural 0.444*** 0.446*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.105) (0.105) (0.022) (0.022)
Partial after*More Rural 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 6,668 6,668 6,668 6,668
R-squared 0.108 0.108 0.089 0.090
Enrolment:Primary Y Y Y Y
Enrolment:All N Y N Y
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Years Degree
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Table 11: Excluding the disrupted cohorts 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. The treatment group is now the 1961-1965 cohorts and the control group is 
the 1949-1954 cohorts. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6. The empirical 
specification controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a 
flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and 
age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in 
Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary education Years Degree Years Degree
Panel A: Community presence of farmland
Full*More Rural 0.459** 0.076* 0.860*** 0.221***
(0.189) (0.041) (0.208) (0.048)
Observations 5,944 5,944 3,612 3,612
R-squared 0.262 0.236 0.117 0.112
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.581*** 0.145***
(0.109) (0.025)
Observations 3,612 3,612
R-squared 0.122 0.118
Panel C: Community agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.940*** 0.228***
(0.170) (0.038)
Observations 3,612 3,612
R-squared 0.136 0.129
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.622*** 0.119***
(0.082) (0.018)
Observations 3,612 3,612
R-squared 0.145 0.121
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 12: More on confounding by omitted cohort attributes 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is either years of completed primary schooling or a binary indicator for whether an 
individual had a primary school degree. The estimating sample is restricted to those born between 1949 and 1954. 
The treatment group is the 1952-1954 cohorts and the control group is the 1949-1951 cohorts. Each column is 
obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6. The empirical specification controls for a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample 
wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More 
Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C 
and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control:Primary education Years Degree Years Degree
Panel A: Community presence of farmland
Treat*More Rural -0.067 0.001 0.780** 0.300***
(0.317) (0.068) (0.396) (0.090)
Observations 3,032 3,032 1,940 1,940
R-squared 0.248 0.209 0.140 0.133
Panel B: Community administrative district
Treat*More Rural -0.035 0.007
(0.200) (0.046)
Observations 1,940 1,940
R-squared 0.151 0.137
Panel C: Community agricultural workforce
Treat*More Rural 0.351 0.173**
(0.334) (0.076)
Observations 1,940 1,940
R-squared 0.163 0.150
Panel D: Individual residence
Treat*More Rural -0.066 -0.025
(0.148) (0.032)
Observations 1,940 1,940
R-squared 0.165 0.129
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou
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Table 13: The long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution, rural 
Table 13A: Rural, health 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a set of binary indicators for underweight and overweight status, self-reported 
poor health as well as diagnosed high blood pressure and diabetes. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression 
using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort 
size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates 
(gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 13B: Rural, health behaviours 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for medical care utilisation (medical insurance and preventive 
care), smoking status, dietary pattern and physical activity. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression using 
Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a 
flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and 
age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expansion of Poor/fair High blood
primary education Under Over health pressure Diabetes
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural -0.045*** -0.145** -0.037 0.069** 0.014
(0.016) (0.058) (0.054) (0.032) (0.015)
Partial before*More Rural -0.056** -0.070 -0.052 0.031 0.005
(0.022) (0.063) (0.063) (0.041) (0.019)
Partial after*More Rural -0.055*** -0.053 -0.028 0.076*** 0.019
(0.019) (0.059) (0.053) (0.029) (0.014)
Observations 8,341 8,341 6,604 8,862 8,822
R-squared 0.020 0.064 0.061 0.042 0.011
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expansion of Medical Preventive % Fat Leisure
primary education insurance care Smoke above activity
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.050 0.001 -0.122** 0.044 -0.009
(0.042) (0.008) (0.058) (0.059) (0.025)
Partial before*More Rural 0.103** -0.002 -0.133** 0.014 -0.016
(0.046) (0.013) (0.063) (0.067) (0.029)
Partial after*More Rural 0.053 -0.013 0.061 0.030 0.003
(0.045) (0.014) (0.061) (0.063) (0.026)
Observations 9,140 9,126 8,332 8,984 6,685
R-squared 0.593 0.012 0.401 0.056 0.012
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 13C: Rural, labour supply 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for current working status, income (log wage, log non-wage and 
log total income) and types of occupation (light and moderate). Each column corresponds to an OLS regression 
using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort 
size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates 
(gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expansion of Log Log Log
primary education Work (wage) (non-wage) (income) Light Moderate
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.037 0.098 0.140 0.147 0.029 0.009
(0.054) (0.365) (0.361) (0.359) (0.035) (0.018)
Partial before*More Rural -0.050 0.065 0.463 0.140 -0.120** 0.028**
(0.056) (0.383) (0.449) (0.387) (0.048) (0.014)
Partial after*More Rural -0.051 -0.001 0.444 0.500 0.034 0.037**
(0.054) (0.358) (0.433) (0.397) (0.036) (0.018)
Observations 9,181 1,890 7,321 7,908 8,965 8,965
R-squared 0.095 0.166 0.046 0.063 0.039 0.048
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 14: The impact of the Cultural Revolution on health, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a set of binary indicators for underweight and overweight status, self-reported 
poor health as well as diagnosed high blood pressure and diabetes. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression 
using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort 
size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates 
(gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, 
administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expansion of Poor/fair High blood
primary education Under Over health pressure Diabetes
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.014 0.136 -0.190* -0.055 -0.020
(0.027) (0.096) (0.105) (0.067) (0.029)
Partial before*More Rural -0.018 0.096 -0.074 -0.059 -0.007
(0.011) (0.099) (0.107) (0.070) (0.028)
Partial after*More Rural -0.021 -0.051 -0.235** 0.014 0.034
(0.027) (0.099) (0.119) (0.075) (0.036)
Observations 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
R-squared 0.034 0.057 0.058 0.055 0.027
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural -0.007 0.085* -0.051 -0.006 -0.007
(0.018) (0.051) (0.061) (0.032) (0.017)
Partial before*More Rural -0.024* 0.155** -0.041 0.010 0.012
(0.015) (0.060) (0.067) (0.039) (0.019)
Partial after*More Rural 0.011 0.071 -0.113* 0.010 0.026
The individual/cohort covariates include age (and its square), polynomials in cohort size and flexible cohort trends. (0.026) (0.057) (0.067) (0.032) (0.017)
Observations 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
R-squared 0.033 0.057 0.057 0.054 0.027
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.009 0.061 -0.077 0.036 -0.008
(0.017) (0.060) (0.075) (0.040) (0.021)
Partial before*More Rural -0.017* 0.151** -0.043 0.041 0.000
(0.010) (0.072) (0.083) (0.047) (0.020)
Partial after*More Rural 0.056* 0.000 -0.104 0.066 0.030
(0.032) (0.065) (0.084) (0.043) (0.022)
Observations 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
R-squared 0.035 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.027
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural -0.017 0.093** -0.065 -0.031 -0.023
(0.013) (0.042) (0.047) (0.026) (0.015)
Partial before*More Rural 0.015 0.155*** -0.119** 0.024 0.005
(0.014) (0.047) (0.052) (0.032) (0.016)
Partial after*More Rural 0.011 0.080* -0.027 -0.009 0.010
(0.020) (0.047) (0.054) (0.026) (0.013)
Observations 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
R-squared 0.034 0.062 0.056 0.055 0.028
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
BMI
148 
 
Table 15: The impact of the Cultural Revolution on health behaviours, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for medical care utilisation (medical insurance and preventive 
care), smoking status, dietary pattern and physical activity. Each column corresponds to an OLS regression using 
Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort size, a 
flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates (gender and 
age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in 
Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expansion of Medical Preventive % Fat Leisure
primary education insurance care Smoke above activity
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.246*** -0.010 0.034 0.067 0.119*
(0.084) (0.023) (0.062) (0.078) (0.065)
Partial before*More Rural 0.289*** 0.031 0.024 0.037 0.073
(0.086) (0.032) (0.081) (0.080) (0.068)
Partial after*More Rural 0.191** 0.037 -0.093 0.070 0.119*
(0.095) (0.031) (0.061) (0.086) (0.069)
Observations 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
R-squared 0.153 0.020 0.431 0.046 0.029
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.200*** -0.030 0.006 0.077** 0.032
(0.048) (0.021) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047)
Partial before*More Rural 0.102* -0.024 0.049 -0.075 -0.031
(0.054) (0.023) (0.048) (0.048) (0.051)
Partial after*More Rural 0.128** 0.003 -0.030 -0.004 0.037
(0.055) (0.023) (0.041) (0.048) (0.051)
Observations 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
R-squared 0.170 0.021 0.430 0.047 0.032
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.250*** 0.013 -0.058 0.077 0.075
(0.059) (0.018) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050)
Partial before*More Rural 0.205*** 0.032 0.033 -0.022 0.019
(0.066) (0.024) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054)
Partial after*More Rural 0.160** 0.030 -0.096** -0.025 0.087
(0.068) (0.019) (0.048) (0.058) (0.056)
Observations 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
R-squared 0.171 0.022 0.430 0.045 0.033
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.121*** -0.001 0.020 0.016 0.043
(0.037) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) (0.040)
Partial before*More Rural 0.073* -0.003 -0.008 -0.049 0.017
(0.042) (0.022) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045)
Partial after*More Rural 0.035 -0.005 -0.006 -0.047 -0.057
(0.044) (0.018) (0.034) (0.037) (0.043)
Observations 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
R-squared 0.151 0.019 0.430 0.044 0.028
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 16: The impact of the Cultural Revolution on labour supply, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for current working status, income (log wage, log non-wage and 
log total income) and types of occupation (light and moderate). Each column corresponds to an OLS regression 
using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effects, polynomial terms in cohort 
size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 as well as two individual-level covariates 
(gender and age and its square). The panels differ by More Rural, with community farmland in Panel A, 
administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expansion of Log Log Log
primary education Work (wage) (non-wage) (income) Light Moderate
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.115 -0.031 0.316 0.773 0.040 0.019
(0.077) (0.164) (0.679) (0.579) (0.072) (0.056)
Partial before*More Rural 0.118 0.046 -0.694 0.828 -0.047 0.116*
(0.076) (0.143) (0.789) (0.590) (0.072) (0.061)
Partial after*More Rural 0.148* 0.019 0.842 1.205** -0.075 0.240***
(0.088) (0.161) (0.682) (0.553) (0.078) (0.079)
Observations 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
R-squared 0.211 0.201 0.142 0.135 0.104 0.089
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.059 -0.010 -0.466 0.110 0.029 -0.020
(0.046) (0.116) (0.570) (0.219) (0.048) (0.032)
Partial before*More Rural 0.041 -0.025 -0.724 0.052 -0.032 0.021
(0.052) (0.115) (0.495) (0.234) (0.053) (0.035)
Partial after*More Rural 0.030 0.231* 0.339 0.522*** -0.075 0.094**
(0.055) (0.122) (0.516) (0.197) (0.055) (0.043)
Observations 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
R-squared 0.217 0.203 0.130 0.120 0.116 0.086
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.075 -0.038 -0.119 0.608 0.035 0.009
(0.058) (0.158) (0.709) (0.426) (0.055) (0.037)
Partial before*More Rural 0.045 0.011 -0.621 0.569 -0.077 0.065
(0.063) (0.155) (0.708) (0.448) (0.060) (0.042)
Partial after*More Rural 0.043 0.081 0.871 0.942** -0.116* 0.136***
(0.070) (0.167) (0.640) (0.411) (0.061) (0.050)
Observations 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
R-squared 0.216 0.202 0.143 0.131 0.119 0.086
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.075** -0.347*** -0.008 0.065 0.048 -0.005
(0.036) (0.084) (0.490) (0.115) (0.040) (0.025)
Partial before*More Rural -0.008 -0.258*** -0.322 -0.007 -0.053 0.000
(0.041) (0.096) (0.325) (0.140) (0.044) (0.026)
Partial after*More Rural -0.030 -0.201** 0.592 0.342*** -0.224*** 0.094***
(0.043) (0.096) (0.514) (0.127) (0.046) (0.031)
Observations 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
R-squared 0.213 0.218 0.130 0.112 0.108 0.086
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 17: Preferences and the Cultural Revolution, rural 
Table 17A: Preferences for food, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual preferences for fast food, salty snacks, fruits, vegetables and soft 
drinks. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample 
wave 2000, a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. More Rural is defined 
using community farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 17B: Preferences for physical activities, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual preferences for walking, sports, body-shaping, watching TV, 
playing computer and reading. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a 
set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary 
indicator for sample wave 2000, a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. More 
Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fast Salty Soft
Rural: Preferences food snacks Fruits Vegetables drinks
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.153*** 0.198*** 0.126*** 0.058* 0.641***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.047) (0.033) (0.069)
Partial before*More Rural 0.110*** 0.085* 0.074 0.019 0.341***
(0.028) (0.044) (0.051) (0.034) (0.069)
Partial after*More Rural 0.260*** 0.230*** 0.170*** 0.105** 0.749***
(0.052) (0.065) (0.051) (0.041) (0.084)
R-squared 6,725 6,726 6,729 6,729 6,722
Observations 0.035 0.058 0.022 0.010 0.078
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Body Watching Playing
Rural: Preferences Walking Sports shaping TV computer Reading
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.556*** 0.366*** 0.466*** 0.142*** 0.244*** 0.165***
(0.069) (0.046) (0.054) (0.053) (0.041) (0.063)
Partial before*More Rural -0.019 0.124*** 0.091 0.009 0.083** 0.003
(0.076) (0.046) (0.058) (0.051) (0.041) (0.065)
Partial after*More Rural 0.690*** 0.527*** 0.653*** 0.257*** 0.379*** 0.332***
(0.081) (0.058) (0.067) (0.061) (0.049) (0.072)
R-squared 6,718 6,716 6,716 6,725 6,711 6,719
Observations 0.071 0.065 0.080 0.015 0.045 0.054
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 17C: Lifetime priorities, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual perceptions of the importance of having a good income, being 
physically active, eating a healthy diet, having kids being physically active and having kids eating a healthy diet. 
Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-
birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000, 
a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. More Rural is defined using 
community farmland. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Good Physically Healthy Kids Kids
Rural: Preferences income active diet active diet
More Rural: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.006 0.119* 0.025 0.029 0.068*
(0.033) (0.062) (0.051) (0.042) (0.037)
Partial before*More Rural 0.025 -0.063 -0.066 0.013 0.024
(0.036) (0.056) (0.049) (0.043) (0.036)
Partial after*More Rural 0.017 0.222*** 0.148** 0.042 0.085**
(0.040) (0.070) (0.062) (0.046) (0.042)
R-squared 6,720 6,720 6,720 6,719 6,719
Observations 0.006 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.012
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 18: Preferences for food, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual preferences for fast food, salty snacks, fruits, vegetables and soft 
drinks. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and 
quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample 
wave 2000, a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. The panels differ by how 
More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural 
workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fast Salty Soft
Urban: Preferences food snacks Fruits Vegetables drinks
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural -0.158 -0.197 0.056 -0.011 -0.054
(0.099) (0.150) (0.122) (0.015) (0.162)
Partial before*More Rural 0.025 -0.096 0.067 -0.015 0.143
(0.070) (0.123) (0.094) (0.014) (0.122)
Partial after*More Rural -0.369*** -0.371* 0.168 0.058 0.035
(0.139) (0.191) (0.164) (0.047) (0.224)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,018 3,018 3,017
Observations 0.066 0.054 0.035 0.013 0.055
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural -0.035 -0.022 0.107* 0.030 0.058
(0.067) (0.086) (0.065) (0.028) (0.101)
Partial before*More Rural -0.020 -0.047 0.062 0.000 0.077
(0.043) (0.067) (0.048) (0.018) (0.077)
Partial after*More Rural -0.225** -0.007 0.219** 0.137** 0.121
(0.098) (0.121) (0.094) (0.057) (0.144)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,018 3,018 3,017
Observations 0.074 0.056 0.039 0.022 0.058
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.014 0.045 0.081 0.019 0.245**
(0.077) (0.115) (0.081) (0.022) (0.120)
Partial before*More Rural 0.033 -0.009 0.020 -0.026* 0.152
(0.048) (0.092) (0.063) (0.014) (0.093)
Partial after*More Rural -0.098 0.048 0.158 0.114** 0.283*
(0.111) (0.149) (0.107) (0.046) (0.164)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,018 3,018 3,017
Observations 0.070 0.054 0.034 0.017 0.056
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.128** 0.085 0.142*** 0.021 0.226***
(0.054) (0.064) (0.044) (0.019) (0.074)
Partial before*More Rural -0.001 -0.022 0.082** -0.016 0.078
(0.035) (0.049) (0.035) (0.015) (0.057)
Partial after*More Rural 0.061 0.178* 0.242*** 0.090** 0.344***
(0.083) (0.093) (0.061) (0.036) (0.106)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,018 3,018 3,017
Observations 0.073 0.059 0.039 0.018 0.060
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 19: Preferences for physical activities, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual preferences for walking, sports, body-shaping, watching TV, 
playing computer and reading. Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a 
set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary 
indicator for sample wave 2000, a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. The 
panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, 
agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Body Watching Playing
Urban: Preferences Walking Sports shaping TV computer Reading
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural 0.663*** 0.511*** 0.578*** 0.137 0.408*** -0.025
(0.176) (0.135) (0.157) (0.107) (0.108) (0.178)
Partial before*More Rural 0.267* 0.325*** 0.255** 0.111 0.219*** 0.077
(0.144) (0.109) (0.126) (0.092) (0.075) (0.139)
Partial after*More Rural 0.980*** 0.871*** 1.041*** 0.352** 0.809*** -0.165
(0.245) (0.191) (0.225) (0.147) (0.176) (0.244)
R-squared 3,013 3,012 3,012 3,016 3,012 3,012
Observations 0.045 0.045 0.038 0.009 0.065 0.034
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural 0.395*** 0.439*** 0.460*** -0.050 0.263*** 0.065
(0.108) (0.094) (0.098) (0.059) (0.079) (0.109)
Partial before*More Rural 0.020 0.191*** 0.183** -0.016 0.112* 0.049
(0.084) (0.071) (0.074) (0.044) (0.057) (0.083)
Partial after*More Rural 0.664*** 0.760*** 0.867*** -0.016 0.339*** -0.149
(0.151) (0.133) (0.138) (0.086) (0.124) (0.150)
R-squared 3,013 3,012 3,012 3,016 3,012 3,012
Observations 0.050 0.055 0.054 0.009 0.074 0.046
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural 0.484*** 0.500*** 0.481*** 0.028 0.348*** 0.063
(0.137) (0.113) (0.125) (0.079) (0.094) (0.136)
Partial before*More Rural 0.087 0.267*** 0.241** 0.030 0.118* 0.054
(0.109) (0.091) (0.099) (0.063) (0.070) (0.107)
Partial after*More Rural 0.664*** 0.806*** 0.921*** 0.050 0.438*** -0.212
(0.178) (0.151) (0.165) (0.104) (0.142) (0.175)
R-squared 3,013 3,012 3,012 3,016 3,012 3,012
Observations 0.049 0.052 0.047 0.008 0.073 0.042
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.410*** 0.532*** 0.476*** 0.031 0.357*** 0.146*
(0.079) (0.074) (0.078) (0.044) (0.065) (0.078)
Partial before*More Rural 0.086 0.255*** 0.207*** 0.036 0.099** 0.077
(0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.036) (0.050) (0.062)
Partial after*More Rural 0.708*** 0.833*** 0.788*** 0.027 0.453*** 0.054
(0.110) (0.105) (0.109) (0.060) (0.098) (0.109)
R-squared 3,013 3,012 3,012 3,016 3,012 3,012
Observations 0.053 0.062 0.057 0.007 0.077 0.039
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 20: Lifetime priorities, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include individual perceptions of the importance of having a good income, being 
physically active, eating a healthy diet, having kids being physically active and having kids eating a healthy diet. 
Each column is obtained from an OLS regression using Equation 6, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-
birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000, 
a More Rural-specific quadratic trend in individual age and a female dummy. The panels differ by how More Rural 
is defined, with community farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel 
C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Good Physically Healthy Kids Kids
Urban: Preferences income active diet active diet
Panel A: Community farmland
Full*More Rural -0.079 0.051 0.079 -0.010 -0.010
(0.092) (0.100) (0.073) (0.043) (0.043)
Partial before*More Rural -0.043 -0.018 0.026 -0.003 -0.007
(0.081) (0.076) (0.050) (0.014) (0.013)
Partial after*More Rural -0.012 0.284** 0.128 0.036 0.025
(0.099) (0.137) (0.089) (0.061) (0.062)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,017 3,016 3,016
Observations 0.032 0.034 0.019 0.010 0.013
Panel B: Community administrative district
Full*More Rural -0.044 0.053 -0.009 0.023 0.001
(0.048) (0.064) (0.038) (0.033) (0.026)
Partial before*More Rural -0.046 0.015 -0.046 0.000 -0.023
(0.044) (0.049) (0.031) (0.026) (0.021)
Partial after*More Rural 0.010 0.089 0.050 0.037 0.005
(0.059) (0.093) (0.053) (0.041) (0.036)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,017 3,016 3,016
Observations 0.031 0.032 0.020 0.012 0.016
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Full*More Rural -0.084 0.025 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015
(0.067) (0.089) (0.057) (0.038) (0.038)
Partial before*More Rural -0.079 -0.019 -0.060 -0.025 -0.030
(0.063) (0.072) (0.049) (0.032) (0.032)
Partial after*More Rural -0.033 0.065 0.047 -0.008 -0.018
(0.075) (0.120) (0.073) (0.046) (0.046)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,017 3,016 3,016
Observations 0.032 0.033 0.020 0.013 0.017
Panel D: Individual residence
Full*More Rural 0.004 0.065 0.056* 0.063** 0.039
(0.044) (0.044) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026)
Partial before*More Rural -0.026 0.035 0.017 0.023 -0.003
(0.037) (0.036) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021)
Partial after*More Rural 0.053 0.081 0.083** 0.060* 0.032
(0.051) (0.062) (0.039) (0.033) (0.031)
R-squared 3,016 3,017 3,017 3,016 3,016
Observations 0.033 0.031 0.020 0.014 0.018
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 21: Returns to education, rural 
Table 21A: Health returns to education, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include a set of binary indicators for underweight and overweight status, self-
reported poor health and diagnosed high blood pressure and diabetes. Each column is obtained from an IV 
regression using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual 
characteristics (gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 21B: Behaviour returns to education, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for individual medical care utilisation (medical insurance and 
preventive care), smoking, dietary pattern and physical activity. Each column is obtained from an IV regression 
using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in 
cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual characteristics 
(gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poor/fair High blood
IV: Health-Years Under Over health pressure Diabetes
More Rural: Community farmland
Years -0.029 -0.163* -0.018 0.067* 0.013
(0.024) (0.085) (0.056) (0.035) (0.015)
R-squared 8,341 8,341 6,604 8,862 8,822
Observations 0.061
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medical Preventive % Fat Leisure
IV: Consumption-Years insurance care Smoke above activity
More Rural: Community farmland
Years 0.015 0.004 -0.122 0.045 -0.007
(0.043) (0.008) (0.075) (0.066) (0.028)
R-squared 9,140 9,126 8,332 8,984 6,685
Observations 0.591 0.008 0.180 0.058
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 21C: Labour market returns to education, rural 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for current working status, income (log wage, log non-wage and 
log total income) and types of occupation (light and moderate). Each column is obtained from an IV regression 
using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in 
cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual characteristics 
(gender and age and its square). More Rural is defined using community farmland. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 22: Health returns to education, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include a set of binary indicators for underweight and overweight status, self-
reported poor health and diagnosed high blood pressure and diabetes. Each column is obtained from an IV 
regression using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial 
terms in cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual 
characteristics (gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with community 
farmland in Panel A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in 
Panel D. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log
IV: Labour supply-Years Work (wage) (non-wage) (income) Light Moderate
More Rural: Community farmland
Years 0.076 0.021 -0.135 0.003 0.085* -0.007
(0.061) (0.462) (0.381) (0.365) (0.044) (0.022)
R-squared 9,181 1,890 7,321 7,908 8,965 8,965
Observations 0.167 0.037 0.062 0.042
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poor/fair High blood
IV: Health-Years Under Over health pressure Diabetes
Panel A: Community farmland
Years -0.007 0.010 -0.307* -0.006 0.018
(0.026) (0.101) (0.161) (0.079) (0.038)
R-squared 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
Observations 0.028 0.054 0.053 0.020
Panel B: Community administrative district
Years 0.021 0.013 -0.119 -0.004 0.008
(0.025) (0.062) (0.092) (0.038) (0.019)
R-squared 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
Observations 0.024 0.052 0.053 0.026
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Years 0.044* -0.015 -0.110 0.046 0.012
(0.023) (0.055) (0.090) (0.037) (0.020)
R-squared 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
Observations 0.057 0.004 0.028 0.025
Panel D: Individual residence
Years -0.007 0.089* -0.045 -0.028 -0.009
(0.016) (0.047) (0.056) (0.029) (0.016)
R-squared 3,631 3,631 2,896 3,968 3,941
Observations 0.027 0.008 0.045 0.044 0.021
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
BMI
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Table 23: Behaviour returns to education, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for individual medical care utilisation (medical insurance and 
preventive care), smoking, dietary pattern and physical activity. Each column is obtained from an IV regression 
using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in 
cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual characteristics 
(gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel 
A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medical Preventive % Fat Leisure
IV: Consumption-Years insurance care Smoke above activity
Panel A: Community farmland
Years 0.236** 0.021 -0.053 0.088 0.144*
(0.117) (0.032) (0.068) (0.096) (0.083)
R-squared 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
Observations 0.017 0.417 0.001
Panel B: Community administrative district
Years 0.202*** -0.005 -0.054 0.108* 0.073
(0.067) (0.026) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055)
R-squared 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
Observations 0.063 0.018 0.416 0.017
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Years 0.186*** 0.016 -0.101** 0.039 0.089*
(0.062) (0.017) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047)
R-squared 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
Observations 0.084 0.020 0.381 0.038 0.004
Panel D: Individual residence
Years 0.096** -0.004 0.012 -0.013 -0.012
(0.043) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036) (0.046)
R-squared 4,023 4,007 3,627 3,992 3,016
Observations 0.146 0.017 0.428 0.040 0.021
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 24: Labour market returns to education, urban 
 
Notes: The dependent variables include measures for current working status, income (log wage, log non-wage and 
log total income) and types of occupation (light and moderate). Each column is obtained from an IV regression 
using Equations 9 and 10, and controls for a set of province and quarter-of-birth fixed effect, polynomial terms in 
cohort size, a flexible cohort trend, a binary indicator for sample wave 2000 and two individual characteristics 
(gender and age and its square). The panels differ by how More Rural is defined, with community farmland in Panel 
A, administrative district in Panel B, agricultural workforce in Panel C and individual residence in Panel D. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log
IV: Labour supply-Years Work (wage) (non-wage) (income) Light Moderate
Panel A: Community farmland
Years 0.166* -0.130 0.559 1.168* -0.036 0.194**
(0.098) (0.463) (0.433) (0.689) (0.082) (0.090)
R-squared 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
Observations 0.150 0.175 0.064 0.086
Panel B: Community administrative district
Years 0.044 0.591* 0.546 0.752** -0.022 0.050
(0.062) (0.303) (0.426) (0.324) (0.065) (0.048)
R-squared 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
Observations 0.223 0.021 0.059 0.106 0.063
Panel C: Community percentage agricultural workforce
Years 0.055 0.389 0.478 1.025* -0.024 0.066
(0.058) (0.621) (0.391) (0.578) (0.055) (0.042)
R-squared 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
Observations 0.221 0.138 0.089 0.108 0.047
Panel D: Individual residence
Years 0.035 -0.502** 0.308 0.381** -0.106** 0.059**
(0.042) (0.245) (0.355) (0.182) (0.048) (0.030)
R-squared 4,045 2,404 978 3,177 4,035 4,035
Observations 0.218 0.117 0.082 0.022 0.054
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample wave fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter-of-birth fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual/cohort covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Education, 1949-1986 
 
Notes: The table is based on information provided by the Cambridge History of China, Volumes 14-15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase Time period Type of schools
Consolidation and reconstruction 1949 A two-track system
-1952 Regular schools, state-run
Informal schools and various adult programs, not state-run
The 1st phase of expanding primary schooling
Socialist construction and consolidation 1953 A two-track system
-1957 Regular schools, state-run
Informal schools and various adult programs, not state-run
The 2nd phase of expanding primary schooling
The Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1958 A two-track system
Economic depression -1962 Regular schools, state-run
Informal schools and various adult programs, not state-run
The 3rd phase of expanding primary schooling
The 1st phase of expanding secondary schooling
Post the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1963 A two-track system
Economic recovery -1965 Regular schools, state-run
Informal schools and various adult programs, not state-run
The 4th phase of expanding primary schooling
The 2nd phase of expanding secondary schooling
The Cultural Revolution 1966 Collapse of the old system
Mobalisation phase -1967 Suspension of classes and admission examinations
Student and teacher protests
Factional conflicts between polarized student groups
Classification of students into red and bourgeois family background
(Red family background: Workers, peasants, soldiers, cadres and
revolutionary martyrs)
The Cultural Revolution 1968 The 1968-1976 education system
Consolidation phase -1976 An egalitarian education system
Disbanding of the student and teacher protest groups
The Rustication Program (middle school graduates)
The 5th phase of expanding primary schooling
The 3rd phase of expanding secondary schooling
Post the Cultural Revolution 1977 A two-track system
-1979 Regular schools, state-run
Informal schools and various adult programs, not state-run
Post the Cultural Revolution 1980 The 1st round of educational reform after 1976
-1984
The 6th phase of expanding primary schooling
Post the Cultural Revolution 1985 The 2nd round of educational reform after 1976
-1986
Passage of the Law of Nine-year Compulsory Schooling in 1986
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Table A2: The politics, 1949-1976 
 
Notes: The table is based on information provided by the Cambridge History of China, Volumes 14-15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase Time period The politics
Consolidation and reconstruction 1949 Consensual model of the central leadership
-1952
The Anti-counterrevolutionary Campaign
The Three Antis Campaign (political leaders)
The Five Antis Campaign (capitalists)
The Thought Reform Campaign (intellectuals)
The 1st classification of the peasantry into five classes
(Landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants
and landless labourers)
Socialist construction and consolidation 1953 Consensual model of the central leadership
-1957
The Thought Reform Campaign (intellectuals)
The Hu Feng Campaign (intellectuals)
The Anti-rightist Campaign (intellectuals)
The Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1958 Friction within the central leadership
Economic depression -1962
The Rectification Campaign
(Political leaders, urban students and intellectuals)
Post the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1963 Friction within the central leadership
Economic recovery -1965
The Rectification Campaign (intellectuals)
The 2nd classification of the peasantry into five classes
(Landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants
and landless labourers)
The Cultural Revolution (CR) 1966 Shattered central leadership
Mobalisation phase -1967 Collapse of authority
The thorough-going purge of revisionism
(Intellectuals, the Party, the government, the army, former
industralists and landlords)
The February Adverse Current (Party leaders)
The Wuhan Incident (military commanders)
The Purge of the 516 Group of radicals (radical mass)
The Cultural Revolution (CR) 1968 Reconstructing the political system:
Consolidation phase -1976 Completion of the organisation of revolutionary committee
Rehabilitation of the Party
Militarisation of the politics
The Continuing Purify the Class Ranks Campaign
(The ultra-leftist)
Fall of Lin Biao and the Rectification Campaign
(Lin Biao's supporters)
The 13th September Incident
(The set-up of a rival regime in Guangdong to Beijing)
Rise and Fall of the Gang of Four
The Return of Deng Xiaoping
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Table A3: The economy, 1949-1976 
 
Notes: The table is based on information provided by the Cambridge History of China, Volumes 14-15. 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase Time period Economic policies
Consolidation and reconstruction 1949 The Soviet model:
-1952 Urban-oriented developmental strategy
Emphasis on heavy industry
Downplay of agriculture and light industry
Land reform (land redistribution)
Formation of the Mutual Aid Teams (MATs)
(Agricultural collectivisation)
Incorporating private enterprises into the state sector
(Industrial nationalisation)
Socialist construction and consolidation 1953 The Soviet model:
-1956 Urban-oriented developmental strategy
Emphasis on heavy industry
Downplay of agriculture and light industry
Formation of the Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs)
(Agricultural collectivisation)
Expanding state ownership to modern industry
Re-organising private enterprises
(Industrial nationalisation)
Adjusting socialist construction and 1956 The Soviet model:
consolidation -1957 Urban-oriented developmental strategy
Emphasis on heavy industry
Downplay of agriculture and light industry
Increasing private production within the Agricultural Producers'
Cooperatives (APCs) framework
Establishing a limited rural free market
The Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1958 Collapse of the economy
Economic depression -1962
Formation of the People's Communes (PC)
(Agricultural collectivisation)
A sequence of ill-designed and unrealistic economic policies
concerning agriculture, light and heavy industry
Post the Great Leap Forward (GLF) 1963 The transformed Soviet model
Economic recovery -1965
Modification of the People's Communes (PC)
Increasing private production within the People's Communes
(PC) framework
Sanctioned private service trade
A sequence of policies intended for the recovery of agriculture,
light and heavy industry
The Cultural Revolution (CR) 1966 Disruption in the economy
Mobalisation phase -1967 (To a smaller extent than that caused by GLF)
Factional conflicts between polarised peasant and worker groups
The Cultural Revolution (CR) 1968 Disruption in the economy
Consolidation phase -1969 (To a smaller extent than that caused by GLF)
Factional conflicts between polarised peasant and worker groups
The Cultural Revolution (CR) 1970 Transformed Soviet model
Consolidation phase -1976 Pieces of the GLF formula
Economic recovery, few fundamental new policies
The Da Chai Model
(Egalitarianism in agriculture)
The emerging of a series of policies proposed by Deng Xiaoping
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Appendix B: The Cultural Revolution Education System (1968-1976) 
A comprehensive description of the Chinese proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
is given in The Cambridge History of China by MacFarquhar and Fairbank (1991). This section 
briefly summarizes the educational influence of this nationwide movement. The targets of the 
Cultural Revolution were to “thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas 
in the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art and publishing, and 
seize the leadership in these cultural spheres…to criticize and repudiate those representatives of 
the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and all spheres of 
culture, to clear them out or transfer some of them to other positions”. Specifically, in order to 
“drag out the academic power holders and bourgeois intellectual authorities who presided over 
the breeding ground for intellectual aristocrats” (Pepper 1991), school system reform was one of 
the ultimate goals of the Cultural Revolution, which went through two phases over the revolution 
decade. Over the first mobilization phase in 1966-1967, school system reform was launched 
from schools with students and teachers mobilized as vanguards. The result was the overturn of 
the pre-1966 education system. But while the students and teachers were turning all their 
attention to this movement, no systematic education was provided in schools across the country. 
After the students were ordered back to schools that were reopened in 1967/1968, a new 
education system was institutionalized during the second consolidation phase from 1968-1976. 
Abruptly and comprehensively, this new education system was dismantled when the Cultural 
Revolution was officially terminated in 1977. Thereafter, the pre-1966 education framework was 
reinstalled. 
The Cultural Revolution education system (1968-1976) was never officially standardized 
on a nationwide basis, making it a provisional system that changed almost from year to year and 
varied in detail from place to place throughout the consolidation phase. Nevertheless, guidelines 
from the centre indeed defined several basic parameters of this system. Education policy was 
made by the Central Cultural Revolution Group and its special education committees who 
however had little experience in this sphere (the Ministries of Education and Higher Education 
ceased to function in 1966). Education administration was decentralized down to the level of the 
provincial education bureaus and beyond: School length, curriculum, textbooks and teaching 
materials were fixed by provinces, cities and even communes at the primary and secondary 
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school level and by each institution at the college level. Teachers were either assigned by the 
state through the education bureau or hired locally. 
The objective of the new system was to equalize the quantity and quality of schooling 
across the country. At the primary and secondary level, a nationwide expansion of schools was 
sustained throughout the period 1968-1976. Mostly commonly, these schools were financed both 
by the state and by local collective funding. Unified entrance examinations at the primary and 
secondary levels were abolished; students attended their nearest neighbourhood school. At the 
end of the Cultural Revolution decade, primary school education was almost universal with 95 
percent of all school-aged children (or 150 million) enrolled. Enrolment in middle schools also 
rose substantially from 1968-1976 (albeit less than universal), by around 319% to 44 million for 
junior middle school and 15 million for senior middle school. Yet this rapid expansion of 
schooling was accompanied by a decline in school quality. School length was reduced, i.e. from 
12 years of primary and secondary schooling combined in the pre-1966 system to around 10 
years. Courses and teaching materials were condensed and simplified. Increased emphasis was 
placed on practical learning, politics and manual labour. In practice, everyone was engaged in 
some form of work-study education. More time was spent on labour in the earlier years when 
students often participated in the building of new schools and other local work projects.Teaching 
and testing methods were also revised to eliminate the marks-in-command approach adopted in 
the pre-1966 system. Teachers were required to devise more flexible and informal teaching and 
testing methods. The result was that students tended to be passed on from grade to grade 
regardless of performance. 
Most tertiary institutions did not resume operation until 1970. Middle school graduates 
were no longer permitted to go directly to colleges without working for a period of time first. 
Typically, city youth were required to go to the countryside and engage in manual labour. The 
national college entrance examinations were cancelled and college candidates were selected on 
the basis of recommendations by their places of work. Apart from these, the same principles 
were applied to tertiary institutions as elsewhere in the new education system. Despite the 
changed admission criterion and the intended objective of a more egalitarian kind of higher 
education, enrolment at the tertiary level was less uniform than that at the primary and secondary 
level: In the early 1970s college enrolment was concentrated on urban youth who were 
previously sent down to the countryside. Rural candidates did gain admission, but they tended to 
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attend agricultural and junior college courses. Undergraduate coursework was cut from 4-5 years 
to about 3 years. Content was abbreviated and simplified, with heavy emphasis on practical 
application. 
The Cultural Revolution education system was abruptly and comprehensively dismantled 
in 1977 when the end of the mass movement was officially proclaimed. The education system 
was restored to its pre-1966 framework. Everything that was criticized during the Cultural 
Revolution decade was exonerated, and everything that was promoted during that decade was 
discredited. Overall, the Cultural Revolution education system was criticized as “…the standards 
were too low…education was now concerned only with the present and not with future 
needs…universities were not engaged in theoretical and scientific research…intellectuals could 
not work properly so long as they continued to be opposed” (Pepper 1991). 
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Chapter 3   Health, Pollution and the Five-Year Plans 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been well established that hazardous air conditions adversely affect human health (see 
Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013) and references therein). As health is one of the major human 
capital factors for sustained economic growth, the potential health benefit associated with a 
cleaner air environment is substantial. Between 2001 and 2010, the Chinese State Council put 
forward the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans (FYP) on environmental protection, which required a 
20% decline in national 𝑆𝑂2 discharge over that period. Despite a burgeoning strand of studies 
that have been evaluating the effectiveness of the FYPs in terms of their pollution abatement, 
less attention has been paid to their intended health objective. Since more stringent standards for 
𝑆𝑂2  were proposed in 2011, resolving this gap in the current literature becomes even more 
relevant. This study provides new insight into the health impact of the FYPs. 
The 10th and 11th FYPs on environmental protection (2001-2010) marked an unprecedented 
effort by Chinese State Council and Ministry of Environmental Protection (CMEP) to reduce 
ambient air pollutant concentrations. To achieve the national 𝑆𝑂2 reduction target, a series of 
environmental protection regulations was promulgated. As a part of these regulations, MEP 
established Total Emission Control (TEC) that stated the total quantity of regulated pollutants 
that can be discharged by an industrial sector. Typically, the central government distributed 
emission targets to provincial and local governments who then allocated these targets to polluters 
under their jurisdiction. More polluted areas were mandated with a stricter target at the first 
stage. 
This study combines two sources of rich data to empirically assess the effects of the FYPs on 
individual health in the 2000-2009 period. It determines province High/Low regulation status for 
each FYP using pollution data provided by CMEP and then relates detailed individual health 
information contained in the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) panel to it. This study’s 
approach overcomes some of the difficulties with identifying the health impact of the FYPs. 
First, the biggest obstacle to estimating the FYP-health association is the lack of direct measures 
of regulation. This analysis proposes a novel approach based on target strictness. I construct an 
indicator for provinces with high and low pollutant concentrations (i.e. 𝑃𝑀10 , 𝑆𝑂2 and 𝑁𝑂2) 
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before the implementation of the FYPs. The idea is that more polluted areas in the base years 
(High) should be subject to stricter regulatory oversight than their less polluted counterparts 
(Low). Therefore, variation in the High/Lows across provinces should capture the regional 
variation that the State Council and CMEP imposed with the FYPs. In fact, “High” provinces 
enjoyed relative pollution reductions in post-FYP periods compared to “Low” provinces, 
meaning that the High/Lows are legitimate proxies for FYP toughness. 
Second, the detailed health questionnaires of CHNS allows for an examination of regulation’s 
impact across a number of health outcomes. Previous medical studies have predominantly 
focused on Respiratory Allergic Cardiovascular (RAC) symptoms, this may provide an 
incomplete picture of the consequences of environmental regulations because recent reports have 
also revealed systemic effects of pollutant aerosols on neuropathology and central nervous 
system dysfunction. In contrast, this analysis examines a more aggregate health measure (i.e. 
being sick or not) in addition to the RAC indicator. Furthermore, because these two variables are 
self-reported and reflect short-term health disorders, this analysis also ascertains their validity as 
health indicators by their doctor-diagnosed (i.e. for concerns over reporting bias) and long-term 
(i.e. episodic impact of air pollution differs from its cumulative effect) measures. 
Lastly, the empirical specification that links individual health to the High/Lows includes 
individual fixed effects. It further controls for non-random panel attrition (i.e. CHNS is an 
unbalanced panel) by explicitly modeling individual decision to attrite or not. Consequently, the 
estimated regulation effects are purged of all permanent individual characteristics that determine 
health and time-varying individual tastes for clean air that are associated with migration 
decisions. This is important because the study sample covers a period of dramatic changes in 
China, including demographic transformations (e.g. an aging population and declining fertility 
rate), economic restructuring (e.g. privatization of State-Owned Enterprises and large-scale 
labour mobilization) as well as an overhaul of the social security network (e.g. newly introduced 
pension, health and unemployment insurance programs). 
This analysis finds that 2000 High (i.e. more regulated by the 10th) is significantly and positively 
associated with a 6-point increase in both self-reported sickness and RAC. 2005 High (i.e. more 
regulated by the 11th) does not turn out to have a significant impact on the probability of being 
sick but it is estimated to have induced a relative shift-up in RAC of around 5 points among 
treated individuals. These effects are large based on the sample means: The corresponding 
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percentage increase is around 49% for sickness and around 46-56% for RAC. They also suggest 
that neither the 10th nor the 11th FYP fulfilled its health objectives. More definitive comparisons 
of the two plans are provided by the absolute High (i.e. more regulated by both), which suggests 
that individuals in absolute High provinces were around 6-11 points (49-89%) and 9 points 
(83%) more likely to report sickness and RAC from 2000-2004. They were also more likely to 
report the same two symptoms from 2006-2009, i.e. around 11-13 points (89-106%) for sickness 
and around 6-7 points (56-65%) for RAC. These reassure that the 11th FYP did no better than its 
predecessor in improving public health. Replacing self-reported sickness and RAC by their 
doctor-diagnosed or long-term alternatives does not change the estimated results qualitatively or 
quantitatively, implying that they are valid health indicators and that the perverse health impact 
of the FYPs inferred from them is reliable. Wald tests of no sample attrition bias mostly reject 
the null hypothesis for the 2000-2004 period, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates 
without controlling for non-random attrition tend to be larger in magnitude than the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimates. This suggests that health of treated non-attriters tends to be 
negatively selected and that OLS estimates are likely to be biased upward. 
The perverse health impact of the FYPs may be interpreted as causal. First of all, the High/Lows 
can be shown to be largely uncorrelated with a comprehensive set of observable individual and 
community level covariates present in CHNS, implying that they are unlikely to be correlated 
with unobserved health confounders as well. Second, restricting the estimating sample to 
matched treated and control subjects (i.e. propensity score matching using all the observables) 
does not make much difference to the estimated FYP impact, either statistically or economically. 
Since the matched samples are more comparable in terms of their observables and probably 
unobservables as well, this result reinforces the contention that selection into treatment is less of 
a problem and that the assumption of conditional unconfoundedness of the High/Lows is likely 
to be tenable within current context. Lastly, the perverse FYP health impact is insensitive to 
replacing the High/Lows by various alternative definitions of FYP regulatory status. An 
additional insight provided by this exercise is that the High/Lows are not disqualified for their 
neglecting non-linearity in the health-concentration relationship and the non-uniformity of the 
spatial distribution of pollutant concentrations. 
The coexistence of a relative air quality improvement and health deterioration in more regulated 
provinces can be explained by the re-location of pollution-intensive industries from High to Low 
168 
 
provinces to avoid stricter regulation and by the fact that little adaptation was made by polluting 
industries of High provinces in terms of their pollution abatement activities. This implies that the 
substantial investment in pollution abatement technologies and related operating and 
maintenance expenses offer little incentive for pollution-intensive industries to effectively 
control their emission discharges. Future environmental regulations that more effectively lower 
the costs associated with pollution reductions, e.g. Cap-and-Trade (Carlson et al. 2000; Montero 
1999) and Self-policing (Innes 1999a and 1999b) regulation designs, may bear more fruit in 
safeguarding public health. 
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the FYPs and outlines the 
quasi-experimental design used by this study to identify their health impact. Section 3 next 
introduces the CHNS and pollution data. Baseline model and identification issues are then 
detailed in Section 4. Section 5 further establishes the propriety of the quasi-experimental design. 
Main results and several more robustness checks are then presented in Sections 6 and 7. Section 
8 discussed the estimated empirical results and concludes. 
 
2. Background and Research Design 
2.1 The 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans (2001-2010) on Environmental Protection 
Concerned with the detrimental health effect of persistently high levels of atmospheric 
pollutants93, the State Council put forward the 10th Five-Year Plan on environmental protection 
(henceforth Five-Year Plan or FYP) on December 26th 200194 and the 11th FYP on August 5th 
20069596. The two plans required that, by the end of 2010, national total 𝑆𝑂2 discharge
97 be 
reduced by 20% (i.e. 10% in each five years). To achieve this national target, a series of 
environmental protection regulations were promulgated from 2001-20109899100, including (1) 
                                                        
93Sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, greenhouse gases, and Total Suspended Particulates (TSPs). 
94http://zfs.mep.gov.cn/fg/gwyw/200112/t20011226_81977.htm 
95http://zfs.mep.gov.cn/fg/gwyw/200611/t20061117_96183.htm 
96The Five-Year Plan, or the National Economic and Social Development Plan, is promulgated every five years by 
the Communist Party and approved by the People’s Congress. It is the most important strategic planning document 
in China and outlines the governments’ priorities in the period concerned. 
97To be more precise, the 10th FYP also required a 10% reduction in TSPs discharge. The 10% is in terms of base 
year 𝑆𝑂2 and TSPs discharges. The 𝑆𝑂2 base volumes were 1,995 (10,000 tons) in 2000 and 2,549 (10,000 tons) in 
2005, and the TSPs base volume was 2,257 (10,000 tons) in 2005, according to China Ministry of Environmental 
Protection. 
98Related policies and regulations in the period 2001-2005 were Promotion of Clean Production Act (People’s 
Congress, 2002), Environmental Impact Assessment Act (People’s Congress, 2002), the Tenth Five-Year Plan on 
Control of Acid Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution (State Council, 2002), A Notice on Expanding Clean Production 
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Emission Standards for Maximum 𝑆𝑂2 Concentration, which set emission limit for coal-fired 
power plants and forced them to install Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD) technology; (2) Total 
Emission Control, which established the total quantity of regulated pollutants that can be 
discharged by an industrial sector. Typically, the central government distributed emission targets 
to provincial and local governments who then allocated these targets to polluters under their 
jurisdiction. More polluted areas were mandated with a stricter target at the first stage; and (3) 
closing of inefficient and polluting power plants (Zhang et al. 2012; Schreifels et al. 2012; Gao et 
al. 2009). 
To achieve compliance, noncompliance penalties were levied on violators of emission 
standards/targets while price premiums were offered to plants installed with FGD technology 
(van Rooij and Lo 2010; Xu 2011; Tang et al. 2010). Provincial authorities were assessed on 
their process of implementing emission mitigating and control measures, as well as on their 
fulfillment of prescribed 𝑆𝑂2 reduction quotas. Outcome of this assessment was directly linked 
to their performance evaluation and hence prospect of further promotion (Zhang et al. 2012; 
Schreifels et al. 2012; Gao et al. 2009). Lastly, the elevated role of public supervision (e.g. 
greater transparency, public participation and interest litigation) and a better organized formal 
administrative system (e.g. the establishment of regional supervision centers) had the potential to 
enhance both plant and government accountability (Chen et al. 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(State Council, 2003), Pollutant Discharge Fee Collection Standards (State Development Planning Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environmental Protection, and State Economic and Trade Commission, 2003), and 
Administration of Pollutant Discharge Fee Collection (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2003). 
99Related policies and regulations in the period 2006-2010 were A Notice on Encouraging the Production of Low-
emission Vehicles (State Council, 2005), A Notice on City Development (State Council, 2006), the 2006 Work Plan 
(State Council, 2006), Closing Small Power Plants (State Council, 2007), A Comprehensive Plan on Energy Saving 
and Emission Reduction (State Council, 2007), A Notice on the Monitoring and Implementation of Energy Saving 
and Emission Reduction (State Council, 2007), the 2008 Work Plan (State Council, 2008), the 2008 Economic 
System Reform (State Council, 2008), the 2009 Economic System Reform (State Council, 2009), the 2009 Plan on 
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction (State Council, 2009), Enhancing the Collection of Pollutant Discharge Fee 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2007), Implementation of the 11th Five-Year plan (State Council, 2006), the 
11th Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection (State Council, 2007), Control of the Emission of Major Pollutants 
between 2006 and 2010 (State Council, 2006), and Regulations on the Violation of Environmental Protection 
Statutes (Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2006). 
100These plant-specific legislations and/or regulations were Promotion of Clean Production Act (People’s Congress, 
2002), Environmental Impact Assessment Act (People’s Congress, 2002), A Notice on Expanding Clean Production 
(State Council, 2003), Pollutant Discharge Fee Collection Standards (State Development Planning Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environmental Protection, and State Economic and Trade Commission, 2003), 
Administration of Pollutant Discharge Fee Collection (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2003), Enhancing the 
Collection of Pollutant Discharge Fee (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2007), and Regulations on the 
Violation of Environmental Protection Statutes (Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
2006). 
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Results were mixed. By the end of 2005, reported 𝑆𝑂2 emissions increased by 28% from the 
2000 level. Conversely, the 11th FYP outperformed its 10% national target by an additional 4%. 
It therefore seems that the 11th FYP was more effective than its predecessor in terms of pollution 
control. Yet, still, little is known about the health impact of the FYPs, either respectively or 
relatively, this analysis attempts this exercise using a quasi-experimental design that is outlined 
in the subsection that follows. 
2.2 Geographical Variation in reduction quotas 
Time-series and cohort medical studies have linked exposure to ambient air pollution to 
inflammation and destruction of peripheral airways as well as increased sensitization to common 
allergens that cause lung dysfunction (e.g. respiratory tract infections, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary diseases and lung cancer), cardiovascular disorders (e.g. myocardial infarction, 
congestive and ischemic heart failure) and allergies (Ezzati and Kammen 2001; Boezen et al. 
1999; Shah et al. 2013; Peters et al 1997). Indeed, the potential health benefit associated with a 
cleaner air environment was one of the motives behind the promulgation of the Five-Year Plans 
(FYP), yet until recently very few studies have identified the extent to which this target had been 
fulfilled, leaving open the question as to whether the health benefits of the FYPs outweighed 
their costs and therefore offering little insights for further policy remedies. This gap in the 
literature is partly due to the difficulty in obtaining an appropriate measure for FYP regulatory 
impact that pertains to air quality only and that is less likely to be confounded by other 
institutional features concurrent with the interventions. This study adds to the first set of 
evidences on the health impact of the FYPs by exploiting the substantial geographic variation in 
ambient air quality across provinces before the implementation of the FYPs. Specifically, it 
proposes measuring FYP regulatory impact by base year province High/Low pollution status and 
then compares changes in individual health in more affected provinces to the changes in less 
affected areas, using a panel of individuals taken from China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. This section outlines this quasi-experimental design of 
this study and it begins by demonstrating that pre-regulation province High/Low pollution status 
is a reasonable proxy for province High/Low FYP regulatory status over the respective treatment 
period of the two FYPs. 
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Ideally, FYP toughness can be measured by province-specific101𝑆𝑂2 reduction quotas prescribed 
by each FYP, this possibility is precluded however because it is not clear what these quotas were 
for the 10th FYP. Yet a closer look at the 𝑆𝑂2 quotas of the 11
th FYP and total 𝑆𝑂2 discharge by 
each province in 2005 reveals that a higher reference year total 𝑆𝑂2 volume is associated with a 
stricter pollution reduction task (Columns 1-2 of Table 1). This suggests that base year ambient 
air quality can be tantamount to FYP regulatory pressure and if this is true then more polluted 
provinces in 2000 (2005) should experience relative pollution reductions from 2000-2004 (2006-
2009). To test this contention, Table 1 first shows that there was spatial variation in province 
atmospheric air quality in pre-FYP periods. Province atmospheric air quality is measured by 
Province Air Pollution Index (PAPI) which is provided by China Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (CMEP) on a daily basis from 2000 onwards. A higher value of PAPI (ranges from 0-
500) denotes a higher level of air pollution and China Ambient Air Quality Standards have 
designated PAPI equal to 300 as the threshold of heavy pollution (Data section). In 2000 (Panel 
A), the 95% range of the yearly average PAPIs across the nine provinces included in the study 
sample was around 73 units (mean: 330 units), and the standard deviation of the distribution of 
yearly PAPI bites (fraction of PAPI>300) was around 12% (mean: 74%). A similar pattern 
emerged in the year 2005 as well (Panel B). 
Given these inter-province variations, Panels C-E of Table 1 next divides provinces into 
High/Low pollution status by their base year PAPIs. The 2000 High/Low provinces in Panel C 
are those with above/below median average PAPIs (or PAPI bite) in 2000. The 2005 High/Low 
provinces in Panel D are defined similarly with 2005 in place of 2000. Panel E flags a province 
as absolute High/Low if its yearly average PAPI (or PAPI bite) was above/below the median in 
the reference period of both FYPs. It is noteworthy that the 2005 High/Low classified by PAPIs 
in Columns 3-4 broadly mirror that in Column 2 grouped by absolute 𝑆𝑂2 reduction mandates, 
suggesting that pre-FYP pollution levels are likely to correspond well with FYP relevance for 
each province. More definitive evidences are provided by Table 2 which compares changes in 
yearly average PAPI and PAPI bite in High provinces to the changes in Low provinces over the 
regulation period of each FYP. It is clear from Table 2 that pollutant concentrations in High 
provinces remained significantly higher cross-sectionally but they enjoyed a relative shift-down 
                                                        
101It should be noted that the 10% 𝑆𝑂2 reduction quota described in the previous subsection is on a national basis, 
and hence for each province its pollution reduction quota during each FYP can well differ from the 10% national 
target. 
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from 2000-2004 (Column 3) and from 2006-2009 (Column 6). For example among 2000 
High/Low provinces, the magnitude of this relative improvement was around 49 units (p-value: 
0.000) by PAPI and around 9 points (p-value: 0.000) by high PAPI from 2000-2004 (Panel A). 
The same is true for 2005 High/Low provinces over 2006-2009 (Panel B): Yearly PAPI went 
disproportionately down by 7 units (p-value: 0.142) in initially more polluted areas. Notably, 
absolute High provinces accomplished more in pollution management between both 2000-2004 
and 2006-2009, compared to absolute Low provinces (Panel C). These suggest that the impact of 
the FYPs is indeed mainly concentrated on provinces that started worse, and hence FYP 
toughness can be properly approximated by High/Low province status derived from pre-FYP 
pollution levels. 
This study takes advantage of this geographic variation in FYP toughness across provinces as a 
consequence of base year ambient air quality variation and evaluates the effectiveness of the 
FYPs in promoting public health. Specifically, it compares the pre-post treatment changes in 
individual health in High provinces to the changes in Low provinces, exploiting the panel nature 
of CHNS that gives detailed health information in both pre- and post-FYP periods alongside a 
comprehensive set of other individual and community covariates. In Table 1, there are three 
possible ways to define High/Low provinces, i.e. 2000 High/Low, 2005 High/Low and absolute 
High/Low. As measures for FYP toughness, the former two are well suited for each FYP 
separately and the latter one is the most legitimate for both. Identification also requires random 
assignment of the regulative pressure indicator across provinces, or in other words, changes in 
health of residents in High provinces should have been the same as those in Low provinces 
absent the introduction of the FYPs. It will become clearer later that this requirement is likely to 
be met by all the three High/Lows, at least after netting out any time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity and controlling for all the changes in observable determinants of health. Hence one 
advantage of this research design is its ability to estimate and compare the FYP-health 
association using various High/Low classifications. More importantly, investigation of this inter-
province pattern of pre-post FYP health variation for individuals provides a convincing test for 
the causal pathway from the FYPs by affecting air pollution to human health, rather than from 
other factors that were concomitant with the FYPs. 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, Table 3 first provides some preliminary evidence on 
the health impact of the FYPs. The health outcome variables are individual self-reported sickness 
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and individual self-reported Respiratory Allergic Cardiovascular (RAC) symptoms. Self-reported 
sickness is an aggregate measure of personal physical well-being whereas RAC disorders have 
been overwhelmingly associated with ambient pollutant particles by the medical literature and 
hence they may more likely detect any adverse impact of hazardous air conditions (Data section). 
Yearly changes in the incidence of self-reported sickness between High and Low provinces are 
compared in Columns 1-6, and a similar analysis is performed for RAC symptoms in Columns 7-
12. High/Low provinces are defined as 2000 High/Low in Panel A, 2005 High/Low in Panel B 
and absolute High/Low in Panel C. If the FYPs succeeded in reducing environmental health 
risks, one would expect a relative shift-down in the frequency of adverse health episodes in High 
provinces. 
Yet on the contrary this exercise suggests little health accomplishment that was made by the 
FYPs: Health of residents in provinces where the FYP had more relevance deteriorated more 
than those in less regulated provinces, no matter how High/Low is defined and which FYP is 
under consideration. For example, this relative shift-down in health was around 4 points (p-
value:0.007) by sickness and 5 points (p-value:0.001) by RAC in 2000 High provinces from 
2000-2004, it was around 1 point (p-value:0.536) by sickness and 4 points (p-value:0.016) by 
RAC in 2005 High provinces from 2006-2009, and it was as large as 10 points (p-value:0.000) 
by sickness and 8 points (p-value:0.000) by RAC in absolute High provinces throughout the 
sample period. It should also be noted that the prevalence of disease episodes in High provinces 
was not necessarily significantly higher than in Low provinces, which could be partly explained 
by a still health-threatening ambient air quality by either Chinese or international standards even 
in Low provinces (Data section). Admittedly, these contrasts are almost certainly confounded by 
e.g. individual initial health conditions and regional economic development, a more careful 
analysis that more rigorously accounts for any selection bias is detailed in the following sections. 
 
3. Data 
The study sample is constructed from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) which is an 
unbalanced panel designed to examine the effects of health, nutrition, and family planning 
programs implemented by central and local governments in China. It contains rich health and 
nutrition information for the Chinese population during a period of rapid economic transition in 
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nine provinces102, which vary in geography, economic development, public resources, and health 
indicators. The first round of the survey was carried out in 1989, and seven subsequent rounds 
were conducted in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2009. From 2000 onwards, sampling 
units were interviewed in August-December. Two cities and four counties were sampled from 
each province in every wave, resulting in a total of 54 cities/counties. This study uses waves 
2000-2009 because pollution data are not available for years before 2000, which leads to a final 
panel of around 28,643 individuals in total (aged 1-102y) with an average of around 7,161 
observations per wave. This section presents some descriptive statistics for the outcome and 
explanatory variables included in the following analysis. 
3.1 Health Outcome Variables 
Two binary indicators for self-reported 103  sickness and self-reported Respiratory Allergic 
Cardiovascular (RAC) disorders104 are examined in order to see whether and to what extent the 
FYPs succeeded in protecting public health. They are equal to 1 if an individual self-reported as 
being unwell in the 4 weeks prior to his/her interview and 0 otherwise. Self-reported RAC is 
designed to more closely capture any adverse impact of hazardous air conditions because 
medical studies in the past decades have predominantly linked exposure to ambient air pollution 
to lung dysfunction (e.g. respiratory tract infections, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases and 
lung cancer), cardiovascular disorders (e.g. myocardial infarction, congestive and ischemic heart 
failure) and allergies (Ezzati and Kammen 2001; Boezen et al. 1999; Shah et al. 2013; Peters et 
al 1997). In addition recent reports have also revealed systemic effects of pollutant aerosols on 
neuropathology and central nervous system dysfunction (Block et al. 2009), therefore, the more 
aggregate sickness indicator is intended to incorporate any not yet revealed pathways through 
which pollutants impair health. There was significantly more self-reported sickness in 2004 (8 
points; p-value: 0.000) and in 2009 (3 points; p-value: 0.000), and the prevalence of RAC 
disorders was around 10 points higher (p-value: 0.000) in 2004 and around 1 point higher (p-
value: 0.248) in 2009 (Table 4). Hence consistent with findings in Table 3, these patterns also 
imply that little health benefit was generated by the two FYPs, at least within the study sample. 
                                                        
102They are Liao Ning, HeiLongjiang, Jiang Su, Shan Dong, He Nan, Hu Bei, Hu Nan, Guang Xi, and Gui Zhou. 
103It is not clear from the questionnaires whether kids self-reported their illness or not, but presumably for those 
who were too young to be surveyed, their health status should be reported by their parents. 
104The Respiratory Allergic Cardiovascular (RAC) disorders include fever, sore throat, cough, headache, rash, 
eye/ear disease, infectious illness and heart failure. 
175 
 
3.2 PAPI and FYP Toughness Indicator 
Daily city-level ambient air quality data are obtained from China Ministry of Environmental 
Protection105 (CMEP) for years 2000-2009. This database reports daily Air Pollution Index (API) 
for most median- and large-size cities in China, including all the province-level municipalities 
and provincial capitals106 . The API is constructed using pollutant concentrations of sulphur 
dioxide (𝑆𝑂2 ), nitrogen dioxide (𝑁𝑂2 ), and fine particles (𝑃𝑀10 )
107  collected by CMEP’s 
nationwide network of pollution monitors108, i.e. CMEP translates each pollutant’s daily average 
concentration into a pollutant-specific API, with the reported API for each city being the 
maximum of all the pollutant-specific APIs on a given day (Chen et al. 2013). Each API ranges 
from 0-500 units and is capped at 500 if the maximum pollutant API is above the upper bound. 
This top-coding of API may raise concerns over misclassification of pollution exposures within 
the study sample, an issue that can be circumvented by making use of China Ambient Air 
Quality Standards which will be described in more detail below. Another drawback of the API 
dataset along the same line is its absence of data on exact geographic locations of its monitoring 
stations, but this lack of information does not invalidate API as being a representative indicator 
of city air conditions because it is known that all the pollution monitors are sparsely distributed 
within each city, e.g. one monitor is required for every 25-30 𝑘𝑚2 in Beijing. 
Using this API database, this study constructs daily Province Air Pollution Index (PAPI) as the 
atmospheric air quality measure for the sampling provinces in CHNS: PAPI is the city annual 
population weighted average of APIs of each province on a given day. The aggregation from city 
to province is necessary for accurate assignment of pollution exposure because CHNS does not 
release city identifiers for its sampling cities (Liu and Zhao, 2012). Nevertheless, an attempt is 
made to identify the sampling cities and APIs (not PAPIs) are matched to each city directly. As 
mentioned above, the censoring of PAPI at 500 leads one to doubt the accurateness of pollution 
exposure determined by this atmospheric air quality measure. To ameliorate this kind of concern, 
                                                        
105The website is http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn/. 
106The number of monitored cities was 42 in 2000, 47 in 2001, 72 in 2002-2003, 84 in 2004, and 86 in 2005-2009. 
107Fine particles (𝑃𝑀10) are within the category of Total Suspended Particulates (TSPs), while TSPs are particulates 
with an aerodynamic diameter less than 100 micrometers ( 𝜇𝑚 ) and 𝑃𝑀10  are particles with an aerodynamic 
diameter of at most 10 𝜇𝑚. 
108Carbon monoxide (𝐶𝑂) intensity is also monitored but is not reported by this database. 
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another air quality variable is also used and compared, i.e. high PAPI109  which is a binary 
indicator equal to 1 if PAPI exceeds 300 and 0 otherwise. 300 is the threshold of heavy pollution 
designated by China Ambient Air Quality Standard and it is in conformity with (if anything 
looser than) other existing international air quality guidelines (Table A1). Together, PAPI more 
amply captures prolonged pollution exposure whereas high PAPI emphasizes high spikes of 
pollutant concentrations that can pose health hazards for those with an already impaired health 
system (Koop and Tole 2004; Evans and Smith 2005; Henderson 1996;Auffhammer and Kellogg 
2011). Table 4 shows that yearly average PAPIs did not change significantly from 2000-2004 (6 
units; p-value: 0.128) or from 2006-2009 (4 units; p-value: 0.128). There were no significant 
changes in yearly PAPI bite (fraction of high PAPIs) over the same period either. 
The idea of this analysis is to see whether and to what extent FYP toughness enhanced health of 
the study sample, hence how it is measured is crucial for implementing this quasi-experimental 
design. This study adopts and compares three different definitions of FYP toughness, i.e. 2000 
High/Low, 2005 High/Low and absolute High/Low. 2000 High/Low provinces are those with 
2000 yearly average PAPI or PAPI bite above/below the median of the province yearly average 
PAPI or PAPI bite distribution. 2005 High/Low is defined similarly with 2005 in place of 2000. 
Absolute High/Low provinces are those with yearly average PAPI or PAPI bite above/below the 
median of the province distribution in both 2000 and 2005. Section 2 has verified that a 
dichotomous indicator for High/Low province derived from pre-FYP pollution levels is a 
legitimate proxy for FYP regulatory pressure, hence as a FYP toughness indicator 2000 and 2005 
High/Low fit well for each FYP separately whilst absolute High/Low is the most appropriate for 
both. Identification also requires that the assignment of provinces into different regulatory status 
be random, a condition that can also be shown to be met by all the three High/Lows in the 
section that follows. Combined this richness in High/Low classifications offers one the 
possibility to cross-validate the estimated FYP health impact by varying the composition of more 
and less affected provinces. Detailed division of provinces into High and Low is shown in Table 
1. Around a half of the study sample were living in High provinces in each period, and there 
were no significant changes in this fraction from 2000-2004 and from 2006-2009 (Table 4). 
                                                        
109One additional merit of high PAPI is its ability to mitigate doubts over the credibility of the API data due to 
evidences suggesting that local authorities manipulate their reported APIs around the clean air threshold of 100 
(Chen et al. 2012; 2013). 
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Shorten 3.1 ad 3.2 and it would be good to have one table with the pollution measure and what it 
measures and one table for the health emasures and how they are defined 
3.3 Weather Variables 
Monthly capital city-level110 weather conditions, i.e. temperature, relative humidity, amount of 
rainfall and hours of sunshine, are collected from China Statistics Yearbooks for years 2000-
2009. Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) find a negative health impact of extreme weather 
conditions. This study controls for this possibility by including these weather variables in the 
control set. In particular, weather information is matched to each individual based on his/her 
interview date111 and the health question structure (health in the month prior to the interview) so 
that it reflects the meteorological conditions that are pre-determined for individual health. 
Precipitation level was significantly higher in 2004 (47 millimeters; p-value: 0.000) and in 2009 
(18 mm; p-value: 0.000). Sunlight declined by 16 hours (p-value: 0.000) from 2004-2004 but 
increased by 10 hours (p-value: 0.000) from 2006-2009. 
This is great because it gives you some exogenous variation in pollution exposure. Please 
mention this in the introduction, generally emphasize it more and use also measures that interact 
pollution with these measures.  
3.4 Other Individual and Community Variables 
Other individual and community covariates are obtained from CHNS for years 2000-2009. Since 
target tightness(High/Low) is essentially an indicator for where people lived and the period of 
2000-2009 was a timeframe of rapid economic restructuring (e.g. large-scale labour migration 
and privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises etc.), remarkable socio-demographic 
transformation (e.g. an aging population and declining fertility rate) and nation-wide 
amplification of social security networks (e.g. health insurance and pension programs etc.), one 
might be worried about any systematic differences between High and Low provinces in changes 
in individual behaviour and other authoritative interventions that are also predictive of health, 
e.g. changes in occupational characteristics (Cropper 1977), highest educational degree obtained 
(Ross et al. 2012), marital status (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004), age, smoking behaviour 
                                                        
110There were 3 exceptions in 2000 and 2004. Liao Ning, Shan Dong and Guang Xi provinces each have 2 cities on 
which weather data are available in the 2000 and 2004 China Statistics Yearbooks, but otherwise only weather 
conditions for capital cities of each province are reported by the yearbooks.  
111The interview date ranged from 8/30-12/27 in 2000, 8/21-12/23 in 2004, 8/4-12/24 in 2006, and 8/16-12/26 in 
2009. 
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(Pampel and Denney 2011), rural Hukou (an indicator for permanent rural-urban migration), 
household size and income (Hayward and Gorman 2004), or regional health infrastructure 
generosity (Davis and Reynolds 1975). This analysis controls for a rich set of individual and 
community covariates to ameliorate this kind of concern. Summary statistics of these variables 
are displayed in the rest part of Table 4. 
There were significant changes in almost all the individual characteristics from 2000-2004 and 
from 2006-2009. For example, equivalised real household income (in 2009 Yuan) was around 
26% higher (p-value: 0.000) in 2004 and around 47% higher (p-value: 0.000) in 2009, coinciding 
with the 2-digit GDP growth rate in China over the same period. It is also noteworthy that 
fraction of individuals with a rural Hukou declined by 3 points (p-value: 0.000) over 2000-2004 
but rose by the same magnitude (p-value: 0.002) in 2006-2009. This implies that compositional 
change of residents in High and Low provinces due to inter-regional migration is a cause of 
concern for consistent estimation of the FYP-health association. One advantage of CHNS is its 
12 indexes of community qualities reflecting various regional aspects such as population density 
and diversity, economic condition and public service quality. Each community variable ranges 
from 0-10 and a higher value of, e.g. economic condition, indicates a better economic 
environment. Over the sample period individuals were more likely to live in communities that 
were more densely and diversely populated, performed economically better and provided higher 
quality public health infrastructures (i.e. sanitation, housing, health and social service). This 
suggests that caution should be also be taken in controlling for any possible regional 
confounding. 
Alternatively given the panel nature of the study sample, another reason that is able to account 
for these significant changes in observable individual and community covariates over time and 
that also warrants concern is endogenous sample selection, i.e. there exist systematic differences 
between sample attriters and non-attriters in terms of observables and probably unobservables as 
well. This possibility is carefully dealt with by the empirical model described below. 
 
4. Baseline Model and Identification 
The idea of this analysis is to see how the inter-province variation in the power of the 10th and 
11th Five-Year Plans (FYP) is correlated with pre-post regulation changes in individual health, as 
well as comparing their health effectiveness. This suggests an econometric specification that is 
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akin to a Difference-in-Differences (DID) regression framework. Equation 1 outlines the 
baseline model for identifying the health impact of the FYPs: 
∆𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐴𝑄𝑝 + ∆𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ 𝜃1 + ∆𝑧𝑐𝑝
′ 𝜃2 + ∆𝑤𝑝
′ 𝜃3 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝(1) 
where∆𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑒 is pre-post intervention changes in individual 𝑖’s health (i.e. 
sickness or RAC) who lived in community 𝑐 of province 𝑝. 𝐴𝑄𝑝is the FYP toughness measure 
(i.e. High/Low indicator) which is equal to 1 if province 𝑝 was High and 0 otherwise. ∆𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝 =
𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑒 is a vector of first-differenced individual characteristics, ∆𝑧𝑐𝑝 = 𝑧𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 −
𝑧𝑐𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑒  controls for changes in community covariates and ∆𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑝,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑤𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑒  is a set of 
first-differenced meteorological conditions (Table 4). First-differencing the health equation 
removes any unobserved time-constant individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with one 
or more of the right-hand-side variables while the inclusion of the other explanatory variables 
controls for available confounders the exclusion of which may contaminate the estimated FYP 
impact. It should be noted that changes in individual 𝑖 ’s pre-determined health112  (i.e. it is 
changes in health in the two years before 2000) is also included in ∆𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝  to control for any 
systematic differences between High and Low residents in their pre-existing health conditions 
and hence in their susceptibility to environmental health risks (Seaton et al. 1995). 
The coefficient of interest 𝛿  is identified through variation in provincial FYP toughness and 
variation in changes in health before and after each FYP, among the subsample of non-attriters in 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) under the assumption that changes in individual 
health in High provinces should have been the same as the changes in Low provinces absent the 
interventions. This poses two identification issues. The first one is the possibility of non-random 
panel attrition, i.e. CHNS is an unbalanced panel and individuals can well drop out of the survey 
for reasons that were systematically related to their health or refuse to answer survey questions 
pertaining to their health. Indeed, around 49.6% of the respondents who were present in the 
sample in 2000 dropped out till 2009 and the item non-response rate was around 0.4%. 
Meanwhile, results in Table 5113 suggest that the probability of being present in the sample with 
non-missing health information was significantly and negatively correlated with all the health 
                                                        
112Missing values are recoded as 0 (over 91% of those with non-missing information did not experience differential 
health conditions between 1993 and 1997) and an indicator for imputation is also included on the right-hand-side of 
Equation 1. 
113Each column in Table 5 is a probit regression of a non-attriter dummy on all the explanatory variables in Table 4 
and province-specific time trends. 
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disorders, implying that a weaker individual was more likely to disappear from CHNS or choose 
not to reply to health questions. It also implies that consistent estimation of the health impact of 
the FYPs hinges on whether or not sample selection bias has been sufficiently corrected for. 
Therefore, this study further models an individual’s decision to attrite following Heckman (1979) 
selection model in addition to the underlying health equation given in Equation 1 using a 
specification like: 
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 1[𝑋1
′𝛽1 + 𝑋2
′ 𝛽2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑝 > 0](2) 
where𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝 is a selection indicator for individual 𝑖 in community 𝑐 of province 𝑝 which is equal to 
1 (𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝 = 1) if 𝑖 is observed throughout the sample panel and 0 otherwise. The vector 𝑋1 includes 
all the right-hand-side variables in Equation 1, i.e. 𝑋1 = (𝛼, 𝐴𝑄𝑝, ∆𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑝
′ , ∆𝑧𝑐𝑝
′ , ∆𝑤𝑝
′ )
′
. 𝑋2 is a 
vector of attrition identifiers. Specifically, they should be wave 2000 values of some individual 
covariates that are observed for all people at the start of the panel and affect an individual 𝑖’s 
health trajectory exclusively through determining his/her 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝. Candidates for 𝑋2 that have been 
explored in the survey and economic literature comprise number of item imputations (Zabel 
1998), survey loyalty variables corresponding to the enumerator and the interview process 
(Maitra and Vahid, 2006), affinity measures indicating whether or not a potential respondent is a 
member of the group conducting the survey (Hamermesh and Donald, 2008) and original sample 
membership (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004) among others. Number of item imputations has been 
found to be predictive of item non-response with respondents first failing to answer some 
questions and subsequently refusing to answer any question whereas the rest loyalty or affinity 
variables have been proved to be reflective of an interviewee’s desire to reciprocate previous 
favors and thus cooperate in the interview. Based on these ideas this study makes use of two 
individual-level retention identifiers including a binary indicator for whether or not some 
elements of a respondent’s income were imputed in 2000 and a binary indicator for an 
individual’s sample membership status in 1989 (i.e. the first wave of CHNS). The validity of 
these identifiers is confirmed by the data which will become clearer in the subsequent section. 
Equations 1 and 2 are estimated by maximum likelihood on waves 2000-2004 for the 10th FYP 
and on waves 2006-2009 for the 11th FYP. Consistent estimation of the health impact 𝛿 requires 
that (a) (𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝, 𝑋1
′ , 𝑋2
′ )
′
 be always observed for individual 𝑖  in any post-regulation period; (b) 
(𝑋1
′ , 𝑋2
′ )′ be exogenous across Equations 1 and 2; and (c) 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(∆𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑝, 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑝) = 𝜌. Assumption (c) 
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holds by construction while Assumption (b) is untestable but somewhat standard in the sample 
selection literature (Wooldridge 2002). The remaining problem is that the explanatory variables 
𝑋1 are not observed for drop-outs, and for estimation their missing values are replaced by non-
missing observations in periods before attrition. This imputation method can be justified by the 
short period covered by each FYP (i.e. 2000-2004 for the 10th and 2006-2009 for the 11th). 
Robust standard errors are computed to allow for arbitrary cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
One might still be worried about the tenability of assuming random assignment of provinces into 
High/Low. It is possible that changes in health in High and Low provinces would not have 
followed the same pathway anyway due to their systematic differences in e.g. demographic and 
industrial composition, economic condition, healthcare and environmental amenities. For 
example, if individuals living in initially more polluted provinces invested more in healthcare, or 
if provinces under higher regulative pressure from the FYPs also experienced stronger economic 
growth and hence improved health, the impact of the FYPs will be overestimated (Chay and 
Greenstone, 2003 and 2005; Currie and Neidell 2005; Knittel, Miller and Sanders 2011; Moretti 
and Neidell 2011). Alternatively, if individuals who cared more about health and hence healthier 
moved to provinces endowed with a cleaner air environment, the health benefit of the FYPs will 
be understated. Insofar as variation in these factors is province-specific and time-constant, biases 
in the FYP estimate of this sort are purged out with a first-differenced health equation. The 
section that follows will also argue that endogeneity of 𝐴𝑄𝑝 resulted from time-varying 
confounders like individual health behaviour and other institutional interventions (e.g. economic 
and health system reforms) is less of a problem with the inclusion of time-varying individual and 
especially the twelve community covariates. 
 
 
5. Validity of Attrition Identifiers and Random Assignment of High/Low 
Successful application of the empirical model explained in the previous section relies on the 
feasibility of using original sample membership and income imputation indicator as attrition 
identifiers and conditional independence of the Five-Year Plan (FYP) variable in the estimating 
health equation. This section explores these two identifying assumptions in more detail and 
shows that they are likely to hold within current context. It begins by providing empirical 
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rationale for using the two attrition identifiers and then assures conditional unconfoundedness of 
the FYP toughness indicator. 
5.1 Validity of Attrition Identifiers 
To establish that original sample membership and income imputation indicator are valid 
candidates for identifying sample attrition, this subsection first shows that they are closely 
correlated with individual retention status. This correlation cannot be explained by all the other 
individual and community covariates. Next, it shows that these two instruments are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels in the estimating health equation after controlling 
for the retention correction term, implying that they do not have a direct effect on individual 
health except through determining his/her sample observability. One additional insight provided 
by this exercise is the necessity of using first-differenced health regression (instead of non-
differenced) in obtaining consistent estimates of the FYP impact. 
The first requirement for any valid attrition identifier is its strong correlation with a unit’s 
participating decision. Table 6 compares the fraction with imputed income and original sample 
membership among non-attriters (Column 1) to the fraction among attriters (Column 2). The 
non-attriters (35%; 3,698 obs.) are a panel of individuals who stayed in the sample with non-
missing health information throughout 2000-2009. The remaining individuals are defined as 
attriters (65%; 6,797 obs.). As expected, non-attriters are around 23 points (p-value: 0.000) less 
likely to have some elements of their incomes imputed and 8 points (p-value: 0.000) more likely 
to be an original sample member. More definitive evidences are detailed in Table 7 which 
presents first-stage estimates of Equation 2. Each column in Table 7 corresponds to a probit 
regression of a non-attriter dummy on original sample membership and income imputation 
indicator controlling for all the other explanatory variables in the health equation. The non-
attriter dummy switches on for non-attriters and switches off otherwise. The columns vary by 
which health outcome is under consideration (i.e. changes in pre-determined sickness or RAC) 
and how FYP toughness is measured. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
The probability of being a non-attriter is significantly and inversely correlated with income 
imputation over the regulation period of both FYPs (10th Panel A; 11th Panel B). This implies 
that respondents who were less cooperative at the beginning of the panel were indeed more likely 
to drop out in later periods. Also intuitively, being an original sample member significantly 
raises the odds of staying in the panel, confirming the contention that re-interviewed agents had a 
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tendency to reciprocate previous favors. Tests of joint significance of these two instruments 
suggest that they are always statistically significant at 1 percent level. These significant 
associations, either separately or jointly, are invariant to further including all the other individual 
controls, suggesting that they are not an artifact of statistical correlation between attrition status 
and alternative individual aspects. Overall results in Table 7 provide empirical rationale for using 
original sample membership and income imputation indicator as attrition identifiers in terms of 
the rank condition. 
The second empirical rationale for using original sample membership and income imputation 
indicator is that they are also likely to be uncorrelated with the error term in the health equation. 
Evidences are presented in Table 8, each column of which is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression of Equation 1 that additionally controls for original sample membership, income 
imputation indicator and a retention correction term (i.e. inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from 
Equation 2). The columns vary by the dependent variable (i.e. changes in sickness or RAC) and 
the FYP toughness measure. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The idea is to 
test the statistical significance of these two identifiers: If they are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, it means that they are unlikely to impose a distinct impact on individual 
health except through determining his/her sample observability. It is evident that original sample 
membership and income imputation indicator do not differ significantly from zero at 
conventional levels across all the columns in Table 8, indicating that the possibility for them to 
be separate determinants of individual health between 2000-2004 (Panel A) and 2006-2009 
(Panel B) is minimal. Tests of joint significance of these two variables reinforce this conclusion: 
They are never distinguishable from zero at 1 percent level. Notably, this is not true for non-
differenced health equations. By contrast, the inverse Mill’s ratio tends to be significantly and 
negatively correlated with changes in sickness/RAC, purporting to the chance of positive health-
selection bias and highlighting the necessity of modelling endogenous panel attrition. 
Therefore this subsection suggests that original sample membership and income imputation 
indicator satisfy both the rank and excludability prerequisites for them to be valid instruments. 
The following subsection proceeds to establish the conditional independence of the FYP 
variable. 
5.2 Random Assignment of High/Low 
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Throughout the sample period, there was ongoing transformation in the structure of China’s 
economy (e.g. large-scale labour mobility) and social security (e.g. pension, unemployment and 
health insurance) networks (Giles and Wang, 2013). This, reinforced by the highly decentralized 
administrative system, has produced remarkable imbalances between provinces in their rate of 
economic growth and population migration as well as in their desire for different forms of social 
protection and financing capabilities (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006). As the quasi-experimental 
design of this study relies on the assumption that changes in health of residents in more regulated 
provinces should have been the same as those in less regulated areas absent the Five-Year Plans 
(FYP), these regional diversities raise doubts over the propriety of this presumption. To 
ameliorate this kind of concern, this subsection demonstrates that treatment status, measured 
either by 2000 High/Low (more polluted in 2000), 2005 High/Low (more polluted in 2005) or 
absolute High/Low (more polluted in both 2000 and 2005), is largely uncorrelated with changes 
in observable individual and community characteristics over the regulation period of each FYP. 
This implies that changes in unobserved health determinants are unlikely to be correlated with it 
as well and hence the underlying health trend in High and Low provinces can be assumed to be 
comparable. 
Table 9 begins by presenting the associations of the High/Lows with changes in various 
individual covariates. Results for the 10th FYP are in Columns 1-4 and those for the 11th FYP are 
in Columns 5-8. The columns under each FYP differ by how regulatory pressure is 
approximated. Entries in each column are the differences in the means of changes in included 
variables between the two sets of provinces. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. If the 
assignment of High/Low is random, one would see very few significant differences. This is 
likely to be true within current context. For example, the majority of the comparisons in 
Columns 1-4 are not statistically distinguishable from zero by 2000 High/Low or by absolute 
High/Low. This pattern persists for Columns 5-8: Most of the changes in characteristics of more 
affected individuals do not differ significantly from those of their less affected counterparts, for 
both 2005 and absolute High/Lows. Therefore it is reasonable to postulate that residents of High 
and Low provinces are likely to be similar along their unobserved dimensions as well. Besides, 
absolute High/Low only reveals two more significant contrasts than 2000 High/Low in Columns 
1-4, indicating that endogeneity of absolute High/Low due to its reliance on pollution levels post 
the implementation of the 10th FYP is less of a problem. Nevertheless, High and Low individuals 
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do tend to differ on their pre-existing health conditions and some of their other observed 
covariates (e.g. household income), consequently, all the following analyses will control for 
these aspects. 
Apart from individual health determinants, there is also a potential for provincial imbalances in 
e.g. population composition, economic performance and public welfare amenities to confound 
the FYP estimates. To gauge the severity of this possibility, Table 10 next performs a similar 
analysis for the twelve community quality indicators. It can also be inferred that High and Low 
communities are broadly balanced in terms of these covariates, indicating that the scope for 
omitted regional confounders to bias the estimated FYP-health association is limited as well. For 
example at most two of the community level contrasts can be distinguished from zero by 2000 
High/Low (Columns 1-2). The same can be said for absolute High/Low in Columns 3-4, 
reflecting that this FYP toughness measure is no more likely to be correlated with changes in 
observed and unobserved community covariates over the period of 2000-2004. Yet some of the 
community variables of treated and control localities do differ significantly, e.g. health care and 
social service amenities, especially for the 11th FYP (Columns 5-8). Therefore, these variables 
will be controlled for in the estimating health regression. 
Descriptive evidences provided by this subsection do not stand against the perception of 
conditional independent designation of provinces as High/Low. Furthermore, they suggest that 
absolute High/Low is no more endogenous than 2000 High/Low in estimating the health impact 
of the 10th FYP. These combined with the finding in the previous subsection (i.e. validity of 
attrition identifiers) imply that inferences on the FYP-health association derived by this analysis 
are likely to be reliable. Main results are presented in the following sections. 
 
6. Main Results 
This section presents the main results on the health impact of the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans 
(FYP) (Table 11). The adverse impact of hazardous air conditions may be more closely related to 
Respiratory Allergic Cardiovascular (RAC) symptoms (Columns 5-8) than to self-reported 
sickness (Columns 1-4). Aggregate sickness, however, can capture any unintended damage 
caused by inhalation of pollutant particles. The FYP variables are 2000 High/Low (air quality in 
2000), 2005 High/Low (air quality in 2005) and absolute High/Low (air quality in both 2000 and 
2005). The former two are used to infer the respective impact of the two plans while absolute 
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High/Low is used to pin down their relative effectiveness. As mentioned earlier, the High/Lows 
are defined alternatively by base year average PAPI and PAPI bite because the top-coding of 
PAPI may lead to misclassification of High/Low provinces based on their average PAPIs only 
(Data section). Each column of Table 11 corresponds to a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation 
of Equations 1 and 2 and controls for changes in all the individual, community and weather 
covariates. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values of tests of no sample 
selection bias are in brackets. If the FYPs succeeded in enhancing the public health, one would 
expect a relative shift-down in the incidence of self-reported sickness and RAC among residents 
of High provinces.  
Yet results in Table 11 point to the opposite direction. Stricter emission targets in the first year 
plan are significantly and positively associated with a 6-point increase in both self-reported 
sickness and RAC. (Panel A). We do not find a significant impact of this for the second year plan 
on the probability of being sick but a relative shift-up in RAC of around 5 points among more 
regulated individuals (Panel B). These effects are large: The corresponding percentage increase 
is around 49% for sickness and around 46-56% for RAC. They also suggest that neither the 10th 
nor the 11th FYP fulfilled its health objectives. More definitive comparisons of the two plans are 
provided by coefficients in front of the absolute High/Lows. It can be observed that individuals 
in absolute High provinces were around 6-11 points (49-89%) and 9 points (83%) more likely to 
report sickness and RAC over the period of 2000-2004, compared to their absolute Low 
counterparts. Similarly, growth in the prevalence of sickness and RAC was around 11-13 points 
(89-106%) and 6-7 points (56-65%) faster in absolute High than in absolute Low provinces from 
2006-2009. These larger magnitudes of health deterioration can be explained by the more 
apparent gap in ambient air quality between absolute High and Low areas and they reassure that 
the 11th FYP did no better than its predecessor in improving public health. 
Several additional insights are also provided by Table 11. The first one is that the adverse impact 
of ambient air pollution is not necessarily larger on RAC than on sickness. This may be caused 
by the particular health question structure in China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), i.e. it is 
only related to physical disorders that appeared in the month before the interview. Hence a 
respondent may report as being sick exactly because he/she experienced a short-term RAC 
episode. Second, the FYP coefficients when High/Low is defined by average PAPI do not differ 
significantly from those when High/Low is reclassified by PAPI bite, meaning that top-coding of 
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PAPI is unlikely to cause incorrect assignment of provincial treatment status and hence biased 
FYP estimates. Lastly, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the FYP impact tend to be 
larger in magnitude than their ML counterparts and Wald tests of no sample attrition bias mostly 
reject the null hypothesis for the period of 2000-2004. This implies the possibility of negative 
health selection among treated non-attriters and upwardly biased FYP estimates if non-random 
panel attrition is not controlled for. 
Results above rely on the assumption of random assignment of provinces into High and Low, yet 
a direct test of this assumption is not available. Therefore one may well argue that there still exist 
unobserved health confounders that are systematically related to treatment status and that have 
not been sufficiently captured by all the controls, leading to misinterpreted FYP health impact. 
To check the severity of this possibility, this section re-estimates the baseline model on various 
subsamples of matched treated and control subjects (i.e. propensity score matching114 using all 
the observables). Since the matched samples are more comparable in terms of their observables 
and probably unobservables as well, the refined FYP estimates should be less subjected to 
selection into treatment. Results are presented in Table 12. If the High/Lows (i.e. 2000 
High/Low, 2005 High/Low and absolute High/Low) balance treated and control provinces well, 
one would expect estimates in this table not to be significantly different from those in Table 11. 
As expected, the FYP coefficients in Table 12 do not differ significantly from the main results in 
Table 11, implying that selection bias is less of a problem in this study and providing reassuring 
evidence on the failure of the two plans in reducing environmental health risks. These 
coefficients are also similar in magnitude to those estimated above, but due to a smaller sample 
size, they are less likely to be distinguishable from zero. In terms of those that are significant, 
2000 High/Low is associated with a 5-point (49%) disproportionate increase in the probability of 
being sick among residents who enjoyed a relative air quality improvement from 2000-2004 
(Panel A). The occurrence of RAC disruptions is around 6 points (56%) more likely among 2005 
High individuals (Panel B). The perverse health impact of the FYPs is still made more apparent 
by absolute High/Low comparisons: Incidence of sickness and RAC was around 15 points 
                                                        
114Specifically, each non-attriter in High provinces is matched to its nearest single counterpart in Low provinces 
based on the propensity score, which is the predicted probability of being treated from a probit regression of a 
High/Low indicator on changes in all the individual and community characteristics. It should be noted that matching 
is performed for non-attriters only, hence the probit regression is estimated on the subsample of non-attriters and the 
set of attriters is the same as that in Table 11. 
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(122%) and 14-31 points (130-287%) higher in absolute High provinces than in absolute Low 
provinces (Panel B). 
Overall results in this section point to the conclusion that the FYPs bore little fruit in protecting 
the public health and that the 11th FYP, albeit being more successful in meeting the nationally 
prescribed 𝑆𝑂2  reduction quota, did no better than its predecessor. This finding is robust to 
refining the estimating sample to more comparable High and Low provinces, suggesting that it is 
not an artefact of diverse health trends between treated and control areas that would have 
prevailed even without the FYPs. Furthermore, results not shown here suggest that replacing the 
dichotomous FYP toughness indicator by a continuous measure does not change the estimated 
FYP coefficients qualitatively either. The following section proceeds to provide several more 
robustness checks on the estimated FYP-health association. 
 
7. Further Robustness Checks 
7.1 Other Health Outcome Measures 
There are at least two shortcomings of self-reported sickness and RAC. First of all, it is possible 
for two equally healthy individuals to report distinct levels of health because of their different 
conceptions and expectations of good health (d’Uva et al. 2011). It means that if residents in 
High and Low provinces differed systematically on their inclination to report a weak health for 
reasons that have not been captured by the observed controls (e.g. health of their peers), results 
in Table 11 are misleading. Second, long-term cumulative effects of air pollution are not the 
same as its short-term episodic damages (Peters and Pope III, 2002), implying that benefits of 
any substantial and sustained air quality improvement induced by the FYPs may be 
overshadowed by temporary sickness and RAC disruptions as revealed by the data.  
To determine how these drive the conclusion reached in the previous section, this subsection 
links three alternative health outcome measures to the High/Lows. They are diagnosed sickness 
and RAC for detecting reporting bias in their self-reported counterparts and an indicator for 
chronic cardiovascular disorders (i.e. hypertension, diabetes, myocardial infarction and 
apoplexy) for revealing any incremental influence of pollution exposure (WHO 2006). Results 
are presented in Table 13. If a similar pattern of the FYP-health association emerges, one could 
be certain that self-reported sickness and RAC are adequate indicators for individual health and 
the counter-intuitive FYP impact is not a result of incorrectly chosen health outcome measures. 
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Replacing self-reported sickness and RAC by their more objective counterparts does not make 
much difference to the FYP estimates, either statistically or economically. For example, the 
probability of being diagnosed sick is around 5-21 points (60-251%) higher in provinces where 
the 10th FYP had more relevance. Effects are larger for diagnosed RAC: The magnitude of health 
deterioration is around 4-13 points (105-342%). The 11th FYP was no more superior: It is 
associated with a 7-point (84%) relative shift-up in diagnosed sickness and 3-4-point (79-105%) 
higher incidences of diagnosed RAC among treated residents. These imply that reporting bias in 
self-reported health measures is unlikely to hinder an accurate assessment of the interventions 
and that the two plans accomplished little in terms of the more objective health indicators as 
well. Long-term FYP estimates also broadly mirror the short-term coefficients, suggesting that 
more regulated areas had a disproportionately higher prevalence of chronic cardiovascular 
disorders of around 3-4 points (32-42%). This indicates that the episodic perverse health effects 
attached to the FYPs do not mask their potential cumulative merits. 
7.2 Other FYP Toughness Measures 
Results obtained so far can also be invalidated by errors in the High/Lows, i.e. 2000 High/Low 
(air quality in 2000), 2005 High/Low (air quality in 2005) and absolute High/Low (air quality in 
both 2000 and 2005). At first glance, the choice of province median as the criterion for 
determining treatment status seems a bit arbitrary, and it is not clear whether re-classifying 
provinces by other cutoff points would lead to an opposite interpretation. Besides, PAPI data are 
not available for months before June in 2000 but ambient air quality follows a strong monthly 
pattern (Figures A-C). This raises doubts over the comparability between the various High/Lows 
and hence comparison of the FYP estimates based on them. In addition, Section 2 suggests that 
efforts on environmental protection were primarily targeted at 𝑆𝑂2  emissions, meaning that 
regulation status may be better approximated by 𝑆𝑂2 concentrations than by PAPIs (which are 
constructed from concentrations of all the major air pollutants). Lastly, the High/Lows are 
derived from provincial pollutant concentrations per se (i.e. above/below the median of the 
concentration distribution). For the purpose of this analysis, it is also worthwhile to elaborate on 
these measures by their potential environmental health risks and see if results change 
substantially. Therefore, this subsection focuses on examining whether the perverse FYP impact 
is invariant to the use of alternative FYP toughness measures. If a similar finding shows up, one 
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can safely rule out the possibility of misclassification of provinces into High and Low causing 
biased estimates of the FYP impact (Table 14). 
In Columns 1-4, redefining treated and control provinces by the mean of their base year pollution 
levels does not change the FYP estimates statistically and economically. The 10th FYP is 
associated with a respective 4-8-point (33-65%) and 5-8-point (46-74%) relative shift-up in self-
reported sickness and RAC. Similarly, areas where the 11th FYP had more bite suffered from an 
additional 8-11-point (65-89%) and 5-8-point (46-74%) increase in the same two symptoms. 
This implies that ranking provinces by their typical atmospheric air quality and not by their 
average conditions is not the reason behind the counter-intuitive FYP impact (henceforth all the 
demarcations are based on province median). Columns 5-8 next restrict the time window for 
calculating pre-FYP pollution exposure to July115-December (the sampling months of CHNS), 
but this does not make much difference to the FYP coefficients either. Prevalence of sickness 
and RAC rose by 6-10 points (49-81%) and by 6-9 points (56-83%) among more affected 
individuals from 2000-2004, compared to their less affected counterparts. There was also a 
disproportionate increase in sickness (6 points; 49%) and RAC (5 points; 46%) among treated 
individuals between 2006 and 2009. These suggest that the various High/Lows (i.e. 2000 
High/Low, 2005 High/Low and absolute High/Low) are still comparable to each other despite 
data inadequacy in 2000. They also further support the observation of negligible FYP health 
impact inferred from the High/Lows.  
To more closely capture FYP influence, the next two columns (Columns 9-10) retrieve116𝑆𝑂2 
concentrations from the API data and then determine provincial regulation status by reference 
year 𝑆𝑂2 levels. Estimates in these two columns broadly mirror those in the previous columns: 
The 10th FYP seems to have induced a deeper health deterioration of around 3 points (24%) and 
relevance of the 11th FYP is not significantly related to any health outcome measure. This 
suggests that there is little difference in using PAPI or 𝑆𝑂2  to indicate ambient air quality. 
Furthermore, because data on 𝑆𝑂2 are more likely to be missing (i.e. they are observed only 
                                                        
115Precisely speaking, the sample months should be from August to December. But as the health question purports 
to health conditions one month before the CHNS interview, therefore July is also included in the computation of 
average PAPI and PAPI bite. 
116The reported APIs are the maximum of all the pollutant-specific APIs (i.e. 𝑆𝑂2, 𝑃𝑀10 and 𝑁𝑂2). This means that 
𝑆𝑂2 concentration can be converted from APIs on days when 𝑆𝑂2 is the primary pollutant, as long as one knows 
how pollutant concentration is translated to pollutant-specific API. Based on this idea, this study obtains 𝑆𝑂2 
densities using the formula in Chen et al. (2013) that links API to pollutant concentration. 
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when 𝑆𝑂2 is the primary pollutant), this study prefers to use the High/Lows as FYP toughness 
proxies. Notably, coefficients in Column 11 where FYP toughness is measured directly by 
absolute pollution reduction quotas of the 11th FYP (Table 1) also point to 4-5-point (37-41%) 
higher incidences of weak reports in more affected locations, providing re-assuring evidence that 
the High/Lows are doing a good job and that little health benefits can be attributed to the FYPs. 
These alternative FYP variables considered so far still depend on pollutant concentrations per se, 
for the purpose of this analysis, FYP regulatory status can also be defined on environmental 
health risks associated with provincial pollution levels. This means that the High/Lows cannot be 
fully justified without comparing them to this remaining set of relevance indicators. Therefore, 
the last four columns of Table 14 divide provinces by their Province Health Hazard (PHH). PHH 
is the ratio of province base year 𝑆𝑂2 concentration to the 𝑆𝑂2 concentration threshold (24-hour 
or annual) recommended by China or international air quality guidelines (WHO 2006, Table 
A1). The higher the ratio, the higher the environmental health risks within each province. 
Because all the air quality standards are pollutant specific, 𝑆𝑂2 (rather than PAPI) is used to 
construct PHH. Furthermore, although this analysis attempted to distinguish between 𝑆𝑂2 
standards common in developed countries (i.e. WHO, EU, US and Japan) and those in 
developing countries (i.e. Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China), 𝑆𝑂2  levels in this 
study sample far exceed all the thresholds, leading to no variation in province treatment status 
determined by PHHs that are constructed from various guidelines. Refining the FYP toughness 
measure by PHHs does not lead to significantly different FYP coefficients: The 10th FYP seems 
to have induced a relative shift-up in the probability of being sick of around 3 points (24%) in 
more affected areas, and estimates for the 11th FYP are never statistically significant for either 
sickness or RAC. Hence despite that the High/Lows ignore any nonlinearity in the health-
concentration relationship, they are still doing reasonably well in approximating FYP relevance 
and the perverse interpretation of the FYPs persists.  
7.3 API and Health of City Residents 
As mentioned in the Data section, CHNS does not release its city identifiers so that the city level 
pollution data cannot be directly merged with the study sample. Rather, this analysis aggregates 
city level APIs to the province level and uses PAPI as the atmospheric air quality measure. This 
leads one to worry about how accurate this assignment of pollution concentration is, that is, rural 
residents (69%) must have exposed to distinct pollution levels from their city counterparts (31%) 
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despite being in the same province because the distribution of pollution exposure is highly non-
uniform (Hoek et al. 2002). This also leaves open the question that the counter-intuitive FYP 
impact obtained so far is misguided by incorrectly determined base year pollution levels and 
hence the High/Lows. This subsection exploits this question and compares changes in individual 
health between more and less affected cities (not provinces) to further estimate the FYP impact. 
Sampling cities are identified by matching their population and land area records to those 
published by China statistical office (in China Statistics Yearbooks) using, sequentially, 
Mahalanobis- and Euclidean-distance matching and principal component analysis. The final set 
of matched cities is given in Tables B1-2. APIs are then linked to these cities and city treatment 
status (i.e. 2000 and 2005 CHigh/CLow117) is determined in the same way as that for the 
provinces (i.e. 2000 and 2005 High/Low). Results are in Table 15. If this new set of estimates 
once more tells a similar story, inaccurateness in the High/Lows for neglecting differences in 
pollution concentration between urban and rural areas is less of a problem and it is safe to use 
them to interpret the regulation outcome. 
The FYP estimates in front of the CHigh/CLows in Columns 1-2 cannot be distinguished from 
those in front of the corresponding High/Lows, either statistically or economically. The 10th FYP 
is associated with an 8-point (53%) and 6-point (44%) relative shift-up in sickness and RAC in 
more affected cities. Similarly, more regulated city residents by the 11th FYP also experienced an 
additional increase in the occurrence of these same two symptoms: It was around 2 points (13%) 
for sickness and around 7 points (51%) for RAC. Albeit due to a much smaller sample size, these 
effects are never statistically significant at conventional levels. These suggest that the health 
impact of the FYPs found in the previous sections is not biased by incorrect assignment of 
pollutant concentrations or the High/Lows and that the FYPs indeed accomplished little in 
promoting public health.  
Re-assigning city treatment status by APIs within the sampling months changes the estimated 
coefficients little, suggesting that the above finding is unlikely to merely reflect any 
incomparability between the CHigh/CLows (due to data limitation in 2000) and not the FYP 
impact per se (Columns 3-4). More directly measuring FYP regulatory pressure by reference 
year 𝑆𝑂2 levels does not make the estimates significantly different from those in Columns 1-2 
either, implying that the CHigh/CLows are proper indicators for city regulation status and that 
                                                        
117Absolute High/Low is not allowed by a much smaller sample size. 
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inferences based on them are reliable. The last two columns of Table 15 refine the definition of 
treated and control cities by their environmental health risks using City Health Hazard (CHH). 
CHH is the ratio of city base year 𝑆𝑂2 levels to the 𝑆𝑂2 concentration thresholds recommended 
by China or international air quality guidelines and hence it elaborates on pollutant 
concentrations by their associated health risks (Section 7.2). This too does not alter what has 
been found, implying that the CHigh/CLows are not disqualified by their ignorance of any non-
linearity in the health-concentration association and that the persistent counter-intuitive FYP 
health impact inferred from them allows one to be confident in the quasi-experimental design of 
this analysis. 
 
8. Discussion and concluding remarks: FYP Toughness and Polluting Activities 
 
It is perplexing at first glance that the Five-Year Plans (FYP) generated no more health benefit in 
areas that enjoyed larger air quality improvement, especially for the 11th FYP. This lack of health 
impact is not caused by selection into treatment, incomprehensive health outcome measures or 
inappropriate High/Lows. This leads one to further think about why relative pollution reduction 
and health deterioration occurred simultaneously in High provinces. Air quality regulations are 
associated with substantial investment in pollution abatement technologies and related operating 
and maintenance expenses. It has been observed that, when the specification and application of 
environmental regulations vary intentionally across space, polluting activities tend to re-locate 
from more to less polluted areas to avoid stricter regulation in more polluted areas (Henderson 
1996; Greenstone 2002). Therefore, if polluting activities relocated from more to less affected 
provinces over the FYP period and consequently more affected provinces did not alter their 
pollution abatement measures substantially (due to less burden imposed by these polluting 
industries), pollutant discharges by treated localities would still be higher in each period but 
experience a slower growth over time. This can serve to explain the coexistence of relative air 
quality improvement and health degradation in High provinces. This subsection exploits this 
explanation in more detail. If data show that ambient air quality was persistently worse in High 
provinces statically and that polluting activities tended to be more intensive in Low provinces 
temporally, the perverse health impact of the FYPs estimated by this analysis can be justified. 
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Figures 1-3 begin by presenting cross-sectional comparisons of atmospheric air quality between 
High and Low provinces. Distributions of monthly average PAPIs before and after each FYP are 
plotted for more and less affected areas, respectively. As expected, monthly PAPIs in High 
provinces lie mostly above those in Low provinces in pre-treatment periods (Figures 1A, 2A, 3A 
and 3C). The largest discrepancies suggested by these figures are around 61% (p-value: 0.000) 
by 2000 High/Low118, 12% (p-value: 0.000) by 2005 High/Low and 16-101% (p-value: 0.000-
0.001) by absolute High/Low. This suggests that base year ambient air quality was indeed worse 
in High than in Low locations. More importantly, a similar contrast can be observed in post-
treatment periods as well (Figures 1B, 2B, 3B and 3D). For example, monthly PAPI could be 
around 38% (p-value: 0.000) and 8% (p-value: 0.013) higher in 2000 and 2005 High areas 
towards the end of the FYPs. This discrepancy is more transparent between absolute High and 
Low provinces, i.e. 105% (p-value: 0.000) in 2004 and 18% (p-value: 0.001) in 2009. Hence, 
these findings confirm the conjecture that pollutant concentrations remained higher in more 
regulated areas despite the presence of the FYPs. Furthermore, these comparisons reflect a 
narrowing gap in ambient air quality between the two sets of provinces, providing suggestive 
evidence that air quality deteriorated more in less regulated areas over the sample period. 
To figure out how polluting activities changed in more and less regulated provinces, it would be 
nice to have detailed data on firm locations and outcomes (e.g. growth of employment, 
investment and shipments of manufacturers) so that specific questions, e.g. how FYP toughness 
was associated with output and employment of pollution-intensive industries, can be examined. 
Absent these data it is still possible to obtain some indirect inferences however using a 
specification like (Henderson 1996): 
𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑑𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑄𝑝 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑝𝑡,𝑚−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
1𝑑𝑚𝑗
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗
2
12
𝑗=2
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑗)
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗
1(𝐴𝑄𝑝 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑗) + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
2(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑄𝑝 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑗)
12
𝑗=2
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝑤𝑝𝑚𝑡
′ 𝛽
+ 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑚𝑡                          (3) 
                                                        
118Because PAPI data are not available for months before June in 2000, wave 2001 instead of wave 2000 is used to 
depict the year around distribution of ambient air quality for each province. 
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where𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑑𝑚𝑡  is PAPI of province 𝑝  on day 𝑑  in month 𝑚  of year 𝑡 . 𝐴𝑄𝑝 is a High/Low 
indicator equal to 1 for High provinces and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡is a year indicator equal to 1 for 
post-FYP period and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑝𝑡,𝑚−1is average PAPI of province 𝑝 in month 𝑚 − 1 of 
year 𝑡  which is included to reflect the fact that air pollution persists and dissipates non-
instantaneously119. 𝑑𝑚𝑗is a month indicator equal to 1 if 𝑚 = 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. 𝑤𝑝𝑚𝑡is a vector 
of weather covariates, 𝛼  is a constant and 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑚𝑡  is an error term. The idea is that, after 
controlling for undissipated lagged PAPI levels (𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑝𝑡,𝑚−1 ) and weather effect (𝑤𝑝𝑚𝑡), the 
coefficient 𝜃𝑗
2  ( 𝑗 = 2, … ,12 ) captures changes in polluting activities of Low provinces in 
response to the FYPs and the coefficients 𝜃𝑗
2 + 𝛾𝑗
2 (𝑗 = 2, … ,12) reflect the equivalent changes 
in High provinces. This specification is estimated by OLS on waves 2001-2004 and on waves 
2006-2009 of the pollution data (i.e. for each FYP). Results are plotted in Figures 4-5. If 
pollution-intensive industries moved from High to Low provinces, one would expect plots for 
Low provinces to lie above those for their High counterparts. 
This is indeed the case. For example, except for February and June, the monthly cycle of 2000 
Low provinces always lies above that of 2000 High provinces (Figure 4A). The gap between the 
plots for 2005 High and Low provinces is less transparent, nevertheless, it still points to a more 
positive shift-up in pollutant discharges from socioeconomic activities in less regulated areas 
over 2006-2009 (Figure 5A). As might be expected, these two patterns are confirmed by 
corresponding contrasts between absolute High and Low provinces (Figures 4C and 5C). 
Furthermore, changes in predicted PAPIs of High and Low provinces tract well with their 
changes in polluting activities (Figures 4B, 4D, 5B and 5D), and the monthly coefficients used to 
produce these figures are jointly significant at 1 percent level (Table A2). This provides re-
assuring evidence that these plots are capturing aspects of socioeconomic activities that are 
related to ambient air quality, over and above the effects of undissipated past pollution 
discharges and current weather conditions. Therefore, it seems that investment in pollution 
abatement technologies and related operating and maintenance costs incentivized pollution-
intensive industries to re-locate from more to less regulated areas. This, combined with the 
                                                        
119It is not clear at the outset how many lags should be included in order to sufficiently control for the lasting effect 
of previous pollutant concentrations. Results in Table A3 show that coefficients in front of the monthly dummies 
obtained when two lags are included do not differ significantly from those when only one lag is controlled for, hence, 
Equation 3 includes just one lag of monthly average PAPI. 
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finding of a persistent worse air quality in High than in Low provinces, explains the coexistence 
of a relative shift-down in both pollution exposure and health among treated individuals over the 
FYP period and hence justifies the perverse health impact of the FYPs estimated by this analysis. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Pre-FYP PAPIs and High/Low classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Province Quota Amt.SO2 PAPI,1-12 High PAPI,1-12
(%) (10,000 tons) (unit) (%)
Panel A: Mean in 2000
Liao Ning *** *** 346.8 71.9
Hei Longjiang *** *** 338.7 77.4
Jiang Su *** *** 360.9 81
Shan Dong *** *** 378.3 88.6
He Nan *** *** 362.1 84.8
Hu Bei *** *** 309 70.5
Hu Nan *** *** 221.5 46.7
Guang Xi *** *** 347.4 73.3
Gui Zhou *** *** 301.7 69.5
Observations *** *** 1,888 1,888
Panel B: Mean in 2005
Liao Ning 12 119.7 356.4 76.7
Hei Longjiang 2 50.8 350.4 77.3
Jiang Su 18 137.3 348.8 78.1
Shan Dong 20 200.3 371.9 92.6
He Nan 14 162.5 320.7 67.1
Hu Bei 7.8 71.7 339 70.4
Hu Nan 9 91.9 340.9 63.8
Guang Xi 9.9 102.3 328.8 71.2
Gui Zhou 15 135.8 371.9 85.8
Observations 9 9 3,285 3,285
Panel C: 2000 High/Low
Liao Ning *** *** High Low
Hei Longjiang *** *** Low High
Jiang Su *** *** High High
Shan Dong *** *** High High
He Nan *** *** High High
Hu Bei *** *** Low Low
Hu Nan *** *** Low Low
Guang Xi *** *** High High
Gui Zhou *** *** Low Low
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Table 1 continued 
 
Notes: Data are from China Ministry of Environmental Protection and China Health and Nutrition Survey. Province 
Air Pollution Index (PAPI) and high PAPI (PAPI>300) are two atmospheric quality measures. A higher value of 
PAPI denotes a higher level of air pollution. Provinces are divided into High and Low by their pre-FYP average 
PAPIs or PAPI bites (fraction of high PAPIs). 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low 
provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: 2005 High/Low
Liao Ning *** High High High
Hei Longjiang *** Low High High
Jiang Su *** High High High
Shan Dong *** High High High
He Nan *** High Low Low
Hu Bei *** Low Low Low
Hu Nan *** Low Low Low
Guang Xi *** Low Low Low
Gui Zhou *** High High High
Panel E: Absolute High/Low
Liao Ning *** *** High ***
Hei Longjiang *** *** *** High
Jiang Su *** *** High High
Shan Dong *** *** High High
He Nan *** *** *** ***
Hu Bei *** *** Low Low
Hu Nan *** *** Low Low
Guang Xi *** *** *** ***
Gui Zhou *** *** *** ***
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Table 2: Trends in PAPIs of High/Low provinces 
 
Notes: Data are from China Ministry of Environmental Protection and China Health and Nutrition Survey. Province 
Air Pollution Index (PAPI) and high PAPI (PAPI>300) are two atmospheric quality measures. A higher value of 
PAPI denotes a higher level of air pollution. Provinces are divided into High and Low by their pre-FYP average 
PAPIs or PAPI bites (fraction of high PAPIs). 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low 
provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 2004 DID 2006 2009 DID
Panel A: 2000 High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI 66.495*** 17.539*** -48.957*** -1.118 3.722 4.840
(6.709) (4.292) (7.612) (3.394) (3.173) (4.646)
(2) High-Low, High PAPI 0.164*** 0.070*** -0.094*** 0.020 -0.004 -0.024
(0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
Observations 1,888 3,294 5,182 3,285 3,276 6,561
Panel B: 2005 High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI 35.255*** 31.529*** -3.726 17.285*** 10.474*** -6.811
(6.832) (4.268) (7.650) (3.380) (3.168) (4.633)
(2) High-Low, High PAPI 0.089*** 0.098*** 0.009 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.001
(0.020) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
Observations 1,888 3,294 5,182 3,285 3,276 6,561
Panel C: Absolute High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI 96.722*** 46.798*** -49.923*** 14.024*** 12.039*** -1.985
(8.634) (5.801) (10.071) (4.365) (4.233) (6.081)
Observations 1,050 1,830 2,880 1,825 1,820 3,645
(2) High-Low, High PAPI 0.238*** 0.165*** -0.072** 0.106*** 0.080*** -0.026
(0.027) (0.021) (0.035) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028)
Observations 1,048 1,830 2,878 1,825 1,820 3,645
10th FYP 11th FYP
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Table 3: Trends in self-reported sickness in High/Low provinces 
 
Notes: Data are from China Health and Nutrition Survey. Self-reported sickness and Respiratory Allergic 
Cardiovascular (RAC) are two binary indicators equal to 1 if an interviewee self-reported as the corresponding 
symptom in the 4 weeks prior to his/her interview and 0 otherwise. Province Air Pollution Index (PAPI) and high 
PAPI (PAPI>300) are two atmospheric quality measures. A higher value of PAPI denotes a higher level of air 
pollution. Provinces are divided into High and Low by their pre-FYP average PAPIs or PAPI bites (fraction of high 
PAPIs). 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 
High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low provinces are those with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2000 2004 DID 2006 2009 DID 2000 2004 DID 2006 2009 DID
Panel A: 2000 High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI 0.012 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.003 0.049*** 0.046*** -0.001 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
(2) High-Low, High PAPI 0.011 0.003 -0.008 -0.017 0.064*** 0.082*** 0.005 0.010 0.004 -0.017 0.014 0.031*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Observations 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396
Panel B: 2005 High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI -0.027*** 0.009 0.037** -0.048*** -0.038*** 0.010 -0.023*** 0.019 0.042*** -0.050*** -0.011 0.039**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
(2) High-Low, High PAPI -0.027*** 0.009 0.037** -0.048*** -0.038*** 0.010 -0.023*** 0.019 0.042*** -0.050*** -0.011 0.039**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Observations 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396 3,698 3,698 7,396
Panel C: Absolute High/Low
(1) High-Low, PAPI -0.012 0.043** 0.054** -0.046*** 0.051*** 0.097*** -0.014 0.052*** 0.066*** -0.051*** 0.033** 0.083***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
Observations 2,016 2,016 4,032 2,016 2,016 4,032 2,016 2,016 4,032 2,016 2,016 4,032
(2) High-Low, High PAPI -0.013 0.007 0.020 -0.062*** 0.038** 0.099*** -0.013 0.024 0.037* -0.062*** 0.010 0.072***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
Observations 1,996 1,996 3,992 1,996 1,996 3,992 1,996 1,996 3,992 1,996 1,996 3,992
RAC
10th FYP 11th FYP10th FYP 11th FYP
Sick
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable 2000 2004 (2)-(1) P-value 2006 2009 (6)-(5) P-value
Health outcomes (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise)
   Self-reported sickness 0.079 0.160 0.081 0.000 0.129 0.156 0.027 0.000
   RAC (Respiratory,Allergic,Cardiovascular) 0.051 0.155 0.104 0.000 0.129 0.136 0.007 0.248
Pollution measure
   PAPI (unit) 329.6 335.4 5.8 0.128 352.6 356.2 3.5 0.128
   High PAPI (=1 if PAPI>300) 0.737 0.732 -0.005 0.675 0.786 0.790 0.004 0.715
Fraction in High provinces
   By PAPI (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise)
      2000 High 0.555 0.557 0.002 0.754 0.542 0.545 0.003 0.771
      2005 High 0.572 0.571 -0.002 0.840 0.586 0.586 0.000 0.991
      Absolute High 0.620 0.618 -0.001 0.894 0.620 0.624 0.004 0.763
   By high PAPI (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise)
      2000 High 0.551 0.541 -0.010 0.215 0.558 0.565 0.007 0.430
      2005 High 0.572 0.571 -0.002 0.840 0.586 0.586 0.000 0.991
      Absolute High 0.617 0.607 -0.010 0.332 0.631 0.638 0.007 0.574
Weather
   Prov. Monthly temperature (degree) 25.0 25.1 0.081 0.132 25.9 25.7 -0.222 0.000
   Prov. Monthly humidity (%) 75.5 75.1 -0.472 0.000 74.2 74.2 -0.033 0.679
   Prov. Monthly amount of rainfall (mm) 112.6 159.3 46.676 0.000 135.9 153.9 18.014 0.000
   Prov. Monthly hours of sunshine (hour) 189.8 173.4 -16.339 0.000 179.8 189.7 9.932 0.000
Occupation (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise)
   Currently working 0.558 0.493 -0.065 0.000 0.529 0.557 0.028 0.002
   Employment position
      Permanent 0.141 0.110 -0.031 0.000 0.112 0.101 -0.011 0.061
      Temporary 0.044 0.067 0.023 0.000 0.077 0.087 0.010 0.075
      Self-employed 0.384 0.313 -0.071 0.000 0.332 0.360 0.028 0.002
      Family worker 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.673 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.757
   Work unit
      State-owned enterprises 0.106 0.090 -0.016 0.001 0.087 0.083 -0.004 0.436
      Collective-owned enterprises 0.049 0.025 -0.024 0.000 0.024 0.018 -0.006 0.017
      Private enterprises 0.082 0.125 0.043 0.000 0.142 0.163 0.021 0.002
      Family contract farming 0.324 0.243 -0.081 0.000 0.260 0.277 0.017 0.035
Education (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise)
   Currently in school 0.171 0.161 -0.010 0.108 0.125 0.090 -0.035 0.000
   Educational attainment
      Primary school degree 0.243 0.240 -0.003 0.658 0.197 0.220 0.023 0.002
      Low-middle school degree 0.284 0.308 0.024 0.001 0.290 0.317 0.027 0.001
      High-middle school degree 0.145 0.174 0.029 0.000 0.185 0.159 -0.026 0.000
      College degree or higher 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.830 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.929
Other individual and household
   Household size (unit) 4.017 3.746 -0.271 0.000 3.755 3.759 0.004 0.919
   Equivalised real household income (2009 Yuan) 9506.2 11962.9 2456.7 0.000 14051.0 20725.1 6674.1 0.000
   Married (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.616 0.697 0.081 0.000 0.753 0.780 0.027 0.001
   Widowed (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.045 0.062 0.017 0.000 0.067 0.078 0.011 0.017
   Divorced (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.073 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.161
   Female (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.503 0.516 0.013 0.113 0.517 0.508 -0.009 0.307
   Age (year) 37.5 44.2 6.673 0.000 47.4 50.7 3.220 0.000
   Minority (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.140 0.148 0.008 0.185 0.140 0.144 0.004 0.600
   Rural Hukou (=1 if rural; 0 otherwise) 0.617 0.591 -0.026 0.000 0.610 0.639 0.029 0.002
   Currently smoking (=1 if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.236 0.243 0.007 0.290 0.245 0.269 0.024 0.003
   Urban residence (=1 if urban; 0 otherwise) 0.317 0.321 0.004 0.592 0.315 0.300 -0.015 0.074
11th FYP10th FYP
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Table 4 continued 
 
Notes: Data are from China Health and Nutrition Survey in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. The study sample consists 
of a panel of the 2000 cross-section aged between 1-102y over the sample period. Due to sample attrition, sample 
sizes vary across waves. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation between health and attrition status 
 
Notes: Each column corresponds to a probit regression of a non-attriter dummy on the variables listed in the table. 
The non-attriter dummy is equal to 1 for non-attriters and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by individual. 
Sample sizes differ across columns due to missing values in health outcome variables. 
 
 
Table 6: Tabulation of attrition identifiers by attrition status 
 
Notes: It is based on observations in the first sample period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community (unit; 0-10)
   Population density 5.672 5.785 0.113 0.000 5.663 5.824 0.161 0.000
   Population diversity 4.518 4.667 0.149 0.000 5.118 5.346 0.228 0.000
   Economic condition 4.500 5.761 1.261 0.000 6.346 6.187 -0.159 0.007
   Education 3.264 3.306 0.042 0.052 3.354 3.313 -0.041 0.127
   Sanitation 5.780 6.368 0.588 0.000 6.525 6.576 0.051 0.352
   Health service quality 5.587 5.162 -0.425 0.000 4.899 5.798 0.899 0.000
   Social service quality 1.735 2.828 1.093 0.000 3.102 3.305 0.203 0.000
   Housing quality 5.895 6.515 0.620 0.000 6.918 7.442 0.524 0.000
   Transportation quality 5.659 5.919 0.260 0.000 5.740 5.801 0.061 0.170
   Communication quality 4.782 5.682 0.900 0.000 6.085 6.649 0.564 0.000
   Traditional market quality 5.896 5.121 -0.775 0.000 4.770 4.664 -0.106 0.129
   Modern market quality 4.702 4.727 0.025 0.606 4.551 4.057 -0.494 0.000
Observations 10,495 6,707 17,202 17,202 6,149 5,292 11,441 11,441
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Sick RAC Sick RAC
Health status -0.093*** -0.074** -0.017 -0.049
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.047)
Individual covariates Y Y Y Y
Community covariates Y Y Y Y
Weather covariates Y Y Y Y
Province-specific time trends Y Y Y Y
Observations 28,603 28,578 28,536 28,536
Self-reported Doctor-diagnosed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Non-attriter Attriter Diff. (2)-(1) P-value
Income imputed in 2000 0.279 0.512 -0.233 0.000
Original sample member in 1989 0.629 0.551 0.078 0.000
Observations 3,698 6,797 10,495 10,495
Fraction of the panel 35% 65% 100% 100%
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Table 7: Estimates of the sample selection equation 
 
Notes: Each column corresponds to a probit regression of a non-attriter dummy on the listed variables in the table. 
The non-attriter dummy is equal to 1 for sample non-attriters and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. P-values of test of joint significance of the income imputation and original sample membership 
indicators are reported in brackets. 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or 
PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low provinces are those with 
above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
Income imputed in 2000 -0.554*** -0.538*** -0.570*** -0.495*** -0.554*** -0.538*** -0.570*** -0.495***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.042)
Original sampling unit in 1989 0.201*** 0.329*** 0.280*** 0.355*** 0.200*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.342***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.052) (0.077) (0.041) (0.043) (0.051) (0.074)
P-value of test of joint significance [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
Income imputed in 2000 -0.482*** -0.482*** -0.562*** -0.413*** -0.482*** -0.482*** -0.561*** -0.412***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.041)
Original sampling unit in 1989 -0.015 -0.015 -0.154*** 0.218*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.145*** 0.221***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.052) (0.072) (0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.070)
P-value of test of joint significance [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
FYP variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2000/2005 High/Low Absolute High/Low
Sick RAC
2000/2005 High/Low Absolute High/Low
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Table 8: Significance of attrition identifiers in the health equation 
 
Notes: Each column corresponds to an Ordinary Least Squares regression of a first-differenced health indicator on 
the listed variables in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of joint 
significance of income imputation and original sample membership indicators in the first-differenced health 
equations are reported in brackets. The corresponding p-values in non-differenced health equations are reported in 
braces. 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 
High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low provinces are those with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.296** -0.304** -0.258 -0.179 -0.067 -0.108 -0.031 -0.023
(0.139) (0.136) (0.196) (0.211) (0.138) (0.135) (0.176) (0.197)
Income imputed in 2000 0.100* 0.100** 0.097 0.055 0.009 0.024 0.007 0.005
(0.053) (0.051) (0.076) (0.071) (0.053) (0.050) (0.066) (0.066)
Original sampling unit in 1989 -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.035 0.044 0.052 0.052 -0.027
(0.029) (0.037) (0.048) (0.069) (0.030) (0.037) (0.045) (0.064)
P-value of test of joint significance-change [0.077] [0.031] [0.224] [0.738] [0.147] [0.034] [0.207] [0.879]
P-value of test of joint significance-level {0.985} {0.953} {0.411} {0.915} {0.683} {0.567} {0.609} {0.582}
Observations 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.103 -0.103 -0.049 0.068 -0.099 -0.099 0.020 0.038
(0.086) (0.086) (0.104) (0.098) (0.087) (0.087) (0.103) (0.088)
Income imputed in 2000 0.016 0.016 -0.011 -0.056* 0.042 0.042 0.005 -0.035
(0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.044) (0.031)
Original sampling unit in 1989 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.095* 0.037 0.037 0.028 0.074
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.052) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.051)
P-value of test of joint significance-change [0.740] [0.740] [0.947] [0.058] [0.182] [0.182] [0.683] [0.208]
P-value of test of joint significance-level {0.000} {0.000} {0.004} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.012} {0.009}
Observations 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996
FYP variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2000/2005 High/Low Absolute High/Low
Sick RAC
2000/2005 High/Low Absolute High/Low
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Table 9: Balancing test of High/Lows, changes in individual covariates 
 
Notes: It is based on the subsample of non-attriters. 2000 High/Low provinces are those with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low 
provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Changes in pre-determined health
   Self-reported sickness -0.004 -0.004 -0.025** -0.026** -0.020** -0.020** -0.025** -0.026**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
   Self-reported RAC (Respiratory,Allergic -0.003 -0.003 -0.020** -0.020** -0.015** -0.015** -0.020** -0.020**
   and Cardiovascular) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Changes in occupation
   Currently working 0.033** 0.010 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.030* 0.030* -0.009 -0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
   Employment position
      Permanent -0.000 0.008 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
      Temporary 0.013 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.007 0.007 -0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
      Self-employed 0.030** -0.001 0.081*** 0.059*** 0.023 0.023 -0.011 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
      Family worker -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
   Work unit
      State-owned enterprises 0.008 0.019** 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
      Collective-owned enterprises -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.010 -0.009* -0.009* -0.021** -0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
      Private enterprises 0.011 -0.020* 0.007 -0.015 0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.023
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017)
      Family contract farming 0.017 0.011 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.004 0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Changes in education
   Currently in school -0.013 0.005 -0.020* -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
   Educational attainment
      Primary school degree -0.011 0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.010 -0.010 0.028 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
      Low-middle school degree -0.014* -0.014* -0.006 -0.007 -0.021 -0.021 -0.043** -0.031
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
      High-middle school degree 0.011** 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.022** 0.022** 0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
      College degree or higher -0.004 0.007** -0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Changes in other individual covariates
   Household size 0.081** 0.079** -0.024 -0.025 0.002 0.002 0.044 0.027
(0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.054) (0.053)
   Equivalised real household income 382 1,003*** 2,603*** 3,073*** 1,557** 1,557** 2,029** 2,737***
(375) (374) (566) (569) (705) (705) (918) (991)
   Married 0.003 0.008 -0.024* -0.020 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
   Widowed 0.002 -0.005 0.005 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
   Divorced -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
   Rural Hukou -0.013 -0.002 -0.023 -0.015 -0.019** -0.019** -0.035*** -0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
   Currently smoking 0.017* 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.022 0.017
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996 3,698 3,698 2,016 1,996
10th FYP, 2000-2004 11th FYP, 2006-2009
2000 High/Low Absolute High/Low Absolute High/Low2005 High/Low
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Table 10: Balancing test of High/Lows, changes in community covariates 
 
Notes: It is based on the subsample of non-attriters. 2000 High/Low provinces are those  with above/below median 
average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low  provinces are defined similarly. Absolute High/Low 
provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 2005. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Changes in community characteristics
Population density -0.121 -0.027 -0.040 0.031 0.240 0.240 0.234 0.434*
(0.112) (0.113) (0.171) (0.126) (0.180) (0.180) (0.182) (0.245)
Population diversity -0.013 -0.087 0.023 -0.034 -0.109 -0.109 -0.195 -0.242
(0.148) (0.148) (0.232) (0.213) (0.156) (0.156) (0.227) (0.219)
Economic condition -0.722 -0.457 -0.359 -0.158 -0.548 -0.548 -0.871 -0.617
(0.504) (0.507) (0.718) (0.733) (0.494) (0.494) (0.667) (0.670)
Education -0.059 0.046 -0.213* -0.130 0.094 0.094 0.067 -0.004
(0.083) (0.084) (0.125) (0.121) (0.096) (0.096) (0.136) (0.146)
Sanitation -0.071 0.290 -0.370 -0.087 -0.119 -0.119 0.560 0.392
(0.281) (0.280) (0.379) (0.415) (0.269) (0.269) (0.393) (0.377)
Health service quality 0.374 0.659 0.371 0.585 0.999** 0.999** 0.773 1.045*
(0.444) (0.441) (0.553) (0.509) (0.477) (0.477) (0.553) (0.585)
Social service quality 0.172 -0.922* 0.451 -0.393 -1.168* -1.168* -0.524 -0.611
(0.498) (0.490) (0.707) (0.654) (0.630) (0.630) (0.997) (0.931)
Housing quality -0.002 0.002 -0.414 -0.407 -0.294 -0.294 -0.546 -0.617*
(0.189) (0.189) (0.277) (0.267) (0.223) (0.223) (0.345) (0.330)
Transportation quality 0.463 -0.764 0.619 -0.339 0.153 0.153 -0.968 -0.509
(0.525) (0.523) (0.673) (0.754) (0.534) (0.534) (0.758) (0.797)
Communication quality -0.433* -0.705*** -0.634* -0.835** -0.221 -0.221 0.114 0.410
(0.244) (0.238) (0.342) (0.337) (0.239) (0.239) (0.345) (0.348)
Traditional market quality 0.085 0.369 1.333 1.555 -2.253*** -2.253*** -3.492*** -3.486***
(0.721) (0.721) (1.063) (1.077) (0.601) (0.601) (0.804) (0.786)
Modern market quality 0.058 -0.203 0.098 -0.105 -1.364*** -1.364*** -1.545** -1.794***
(0.603) (0.604) (0.860) (0.874) (0.430) (0.430) (0.589) (0.575)
Observations 105 105 56 57 105 105 56 57
10th FYP, 2000-2004 11th FYP, 2006-2009
2000 High/Low Absolute High/Low Absolute High/Low2005 High/Low
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Table 11: Health impact of the 10th and 11th FYPs 
 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating the sample selection model described in the text by maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of no sample selection bias are reported in 
brackets. Sample sizes differ by the composition of High and Low provinces. 2000 High/Low provinces are those 
with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. 
Absolute High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 
2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
High 0.058*** -0.013 0.109*** 0.062* 0.061*** -0.005 0.085*** 0.087**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.034) (0.035) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.036)
High - OLS 0.063*** -0.005 0.120*** 0.073** 0.065*** 0.002 0.097*** 0.086***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.028) (0.015) (0.016) (0.030) (0.027)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.059] [0.017] [0.416] [0.586] [0.050] [0.007] [0.281] [0.968]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
High 0.025 0.025 0.106*** 0.127*** 0.046** 0.046** 0.058* 0.069**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.030)
High - OLS 0.030 0.030 0.097*** 0.117*** 0.047** 0.047** 0.067** 0.055*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.031) (0.029)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.138] [0.138] [0.210] [0.317] [0.838] [0.838] [0.582] [0.281]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sick RAC
2000/2005 Absolute 2000/2005 Absolute
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Table 12: Health impact of the 10th and 11th FYPs – matched sample 
 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating the sample selection model described in the text by maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of no sample selection bias are reported in 
brackets. Sample sizes differ by the composition of High and Low provinces. 2000 High/Low provinces are those 
with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. 
Absolute High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 
2005. Each non-attriter in High provinces is matched to his/her nearest single counterpart in Low provinces based on 
a propensity score, which is the predicted probability of being treated from a probit regression of a High/Low 
indicator on changes in individual and community covariates. In each panel, three sets of results are displayed, 
varying by how the nearest single control is defined (i.e. within 0.01, 0.005 or 0.001 points of the estimated 
propensity score of the treated subject). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
(1) High - Matched, 0.01 0.053*** -0.040* 0.137 -0.013 0.030 -0.006 0.100 0.065
(0.020) (0.021) (0.088) (0.068) (0.019) (0.021) (0.066) (0.089)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.044] [0.009] [0.910] [0.477] [0.005] [0.018] [0.277] [0.891]
Observations 9,716 9,554 4,687 4,747 9,750 9,569 4,782 4,730
(2) High - Matched, 0.005 0.052*** -0.040* 0.102 -0.054 0.029 -0.007 0.109 0.063
(0.020) (0.021) (0.090) (0.066) (0.019) (0.021) (0.071) (0.078)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.049] [0.008] [0.739] [0.049] [0.004] [0.014] [0.540] [0.818]
Observations 9,703 9,541 4,548 4,521 9,738 9,555 4,598 4,500
(3) High - Matched, 0.001 0.048** -0.039* 0.100 0.062 0.028 -0.005 0.076 0.083
(0.020) (0.022) (0.119) (0.086) (0.019) (0.021) (0.092) (0.122)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.030] [0.021] [0.405] [0.346] [0.003] [0.019] [0.479] [0.913]
Observations 9,600 9,338 3,935 3,919 9,626 9,340 3,919 3,894
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
(1) High - Matched, 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.030 0.060* 0.060* 0.222* 0.019
(0.030) (0.030) (0.089) (0.089) (0.032) (0.032) (0.130) (0.131)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.361] [0.361] [0.375] [0.478] [0.732] [0.732] [0.543] [0.562]
Observations 9,633 9,633 4,687 4,747 9,656 9,656 4,782 4,730
(2) High - Matched, 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.020 -0.038 0.062* 0.062* 0.140* 0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.113) (0.070) (0.033) (0.033) (0.077) (0.100)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.343] [0.343] [0.603] [0.011] [0.769] [0.769] [0.693] [0.338]
Observations 9,584 9,584 4,548 4,521 9,608 9,608 4,598 4,500
(3) High - Matched, 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 0.152* 0.096 0.064 0.064 0.314*** 0.011
(0.039) (0.039) (0.082) (0.066) (0.045) (0.045) (0.079) (0.083)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.153] [0.153] [0.951] [0.951] [0.857] [0.857] [0.415] [0.006]
Observations 9,123 9,123 3,935 3,919 9,123 9,123 3,919 3,894
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Absolute
Sick RAC
2000/20052000/2005 Absolute
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Table 13: Health impact of the 10th and 11th FYP – other health outcome variables 
 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating the sample selection model described in the text by maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of no sample selection bias are reported in 
brackets. Sample sizes differ by the composition of High and Low provinces. 2000 High/Low provinces are those 
with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in 2000. 2005 High/Low provinces are defined similarly. 
Absolute High/Low provinces are those with above/below median average PAPIs or PAPI bites in both 2000 and 
2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable PAPI High PAPI PAPI High PAPI
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
(1) High - Sick, diagnosed 0.046*** 0.014 0.208*** 0.192***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.028) (0.026)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.935] [0.653] [0.000] [0.000]
(2) High - RAC, diagnosed 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.118*** 0.131***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(3) High - Long-term cardiovascular illness -0.004 -0.014 -0.000 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.023)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
(1) High - Sick, diagnosed 0.011 0.011 0.044 0.065**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.056] [0.056] [0.218] [0.346]
(2) High - RAC, diagnosed 0.025* 0.025* 0.016 0.039**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.020)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.729] [0.729] [0.748] [0.885]
(3) High - Long-term cardiovascular illness 0.026* 0.026* 0.038 0.042*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.041] [0.041] [0.012] [0.013]
Observations 10,495 10,495 5,575 5,536
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y
2000/2005 Absolute
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Table 14: Health impact of the 10th and 11th FYPs – other FYP toughness measures 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating the sample selection model described in the text by maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of no sample selection bias are reported in 
brackets. Sample sizes differ by the composition of High and Low provinces.Provinces are first divided into 
High/Low by the mean of their base year PAPIs in Columns 1-2 and PAPI bites in Columns 3-4. Columns 5-8 next 
restrict the time window for calculating average PAPI and PAPI bite to the sampling months, i.e. July to December. 
The next two columns then replace average PAPI and PAPI bite by annual 𝑆𝑂2concentration extracted from the API 
data. The next column directly use absolute pollution reduction quotas prescribed by the 11th FYP to indicate FYP 
regulatory status. The last 4 columns define FYP toughness measures by environmental health risks associated with 
base year pollution levels. Province Health Hazard (PHH) is the ratio of province base year 𝑆𝑂2 concentrations to 
the 𝑆𝑂2 concentration thresholds recommended by China or international air quality guidelines. The higher the PHH 
the higher the environmental health risks and hence FYP regulatory pressure. Although this analysis attempted to 
distinguish between 𝑆𝑂2 standards common in developed countries (i.e. WHO, EU, US and Japan) and those in 
developing countries (i.e. Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China), 𝑆𝑂2 levels in this study sample far exceed 
all the thresholds, leading to no variation in province treatment status determined by PHHs that are constructed from 
various guidelines. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Quota
0/5 Abs. 0/5 Abs. 0/5 Abs. 0/5 Abs. 0/5 Abs. 5 0/5 Abs. 0/5 Abs.
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
(1) High - Sick 0.035* 0.075** 0.020 0.081*** 0.058*** -0.032 0.065*** 0.098*** 0.026* -0.029 0.026* -0.029 0.026* -0.029
(0.020) (0.030) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.049) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.029) (0.015) (0.029) (0.015) (0.029)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.024] [0.165] [0.017] [0.669] [0.059] [0.126] [0.049] [0.443] [0.034] [0.761] [0.034] [0.761] [0.034] [0.761]
Observations 10,495 6,729 10,495 6,799 10,495 3,317 10,495 7,992 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865
(2) High - RAC 0.048*** 0.075*** 0.022 0.084*** 0.061*** -0.035 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.022 -0.016 0.022 -0.016 0.022 -0.016
(0.019) (0.027) (0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.048) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.026)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.017] [0.096] [0.008] [0.746] [0.050] [0.035] [0.033] [0.146] 0.026 0.479 [0.026] [0.479] [0.026] [0.479]
Observations 10,495 6,729 10,495 6,799 10,495 3,317 10,495 7,992 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
(1) High - Sick 0.025 0.113*** 0.025 0.075*** -0.068*** 0.029 0.025 0.055** -0.018 0.001 0.046** -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001
(0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.051) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.035)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.138] [0.150] [0.138] [0.193] [0.107] [0.184] [0.138] [0.168] [0.107] [0.863] [0.154] [0.107] [0.863] [0.107] [0.863]
Observations 10,495 6,729 10,495 6,799 10,495 3,317 10,495 7,992 10,495 5,865 10,495 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865
(2) High - RAC 0.046** 0.075*** 0.046** 0.049* -0.029 0.048 0.046** 0.053** -0.033 -0.022 0.038* -0.033 -0.022 -0.033 -0.022
(0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.046) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.049) (0.021) (0.023) (0.049) (0.023) (0.049)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.838] [0.522] [0.838] [0.130] [0.666] [0.833] [0.838] [0.386] 0.700 0.865 [0.768] [0.700] [0.865] [0.700] [0.865]
Observations 10,495 6,729 10,495 6,799 10,495 3,317 10,495 7,992 10,495 5,865 10,495 10,495 5,865 10,495 5,865
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
PHH-Daily PHH-AnnualPAPI-Avg. High PAPI-Avg. PAPI,7-12 High PAPI,7-12 SO2 (µg/m³)
215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Health impact of the 10th and 11th FYPs – city residents 
 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating the sample selection model described in the text by maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values of test of no sample selection bias are reported in 
brackets. Cities are first divided into High/Low by the median of their base year APIs in Columns 1-2 and API bites 
in Columns 3-4. Columns 5-8 next restrict the time window for calculating average API and API bite to the 
sampling months, i.e. July to December. The next column then replaces average API and API bite by annual 
𝑆𝑂2 concentration extracted from the API data. The last 2 columns define FYP toughness measures by 
environmental health risks associated with base year pollution levels. City Health Hazard (CHH) is the ratio of city 
base year 𝑆𝑂2 concentrations to the 𝑆𝑂2 concentration thresholds recommended by China or international air quality 
guidelines. The higher the CHH the higher the environmental health risks and hence FYP regulatory pressure. 
Although this analysis attempted to distinguish between 𝑆𝑂2 standards common in developed countries (i.e. WHO, 
EU, US and Japan) and those in developing countries (i.e. Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China), 𝑆𝑂2 
levels in this study sample far exceed all the thresholds, leading to no variation in province treatment status 
determined by CHHs that are constructed from various guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SO2
API High API API High API (µg/m³) Daily Annual
Panel A: 10th FYP, 2000-2004
(1) CHigh - Sick 0.005 0.082 0.005 0.152*** 0.024 0.024 0.024
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.095] [0.107] [0.095] [0.195] [0.476] [0.476] [0.476]
(2) CHigh - RAC -0.012 0.061 -0.012 0.101* 0.072 0.072 0.072
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.134] [0.161] [0.134] [0.145] [0.485] [0.485] [0.485]
Observations 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803
Panel B: 11th FYP, 2006-2009
(1) CHigh - Sick 0.000 0.021 -0.077 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.075) (0.067) (0.080) (0.074) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.296] [0.158] [0.125] [0.215] [0.146] [0.146] [0.146]
(2) CHigh - RAC 0.065 0.073 0.027 0.065 0.035 0.035 0.035
(0.075) (0.075) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Wald test of indep. eqns. [0.846] [0.769] [0.569] [0.839] [0.636] [0.636] [0.636]
Observations 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803 1,803
Changes in pre-determined health Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in individual covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in community covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Changes in weather covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
CHHMonths 1-12 Months 7-12
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Figures 1-3: Distribution of monthly average PAPIs 
 
Figure 1A: 2000 High/Low, 2001                          Figure 1B: 2000 High/Low, 2004 
 
 
Figure 2A: 2005 High/Low, 2006                          Figure 2B: 2005 High/Low, 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 3A: Absolute High/Low, 2001                   Figure 3B: Absolute High/Low, 2004 
 
Figure 3C: Absolute High/Low, 2006                   Figure 3D: Absolute High/Low, 2009 
 
Notes: Data are from China Ministry of Environmental protection. Because PAPI data are not available before June 
in 2000, wave 2001 instead of wave 2000 is used as the control period for the 10th FYP (i.e. 2001 V.S. 2004). 
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Figures 4-5: Changes in polluting activities and predicted PAPIs 
Figure 4A: 2000 High/Low, activity                    Figure 4B: 2000 High/Low, predicted PAPI 
 
Figure 4C: Absolute High/Low-10th, activity         Figure 4D: Absolute High/Low-11th, predicted PAPI 
 
Figure 5A: 2005 High/Low, activity                    Figure 5B: 2005 High/Low, predicted PAPI 
 
Figure 5C: Absolute High/Low-11th, activity    Figure 5D: Absolute High/Low-11th, predicted PAPI 
 
Notes: These plots are based on monthly coefficients and predicted values from Columns 1 and 3 in 
Table A2. Because PAPI data are not available before June in 2000, wave 2001 instead of wave 2000 is 
used as the control period for the 10th FYP. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Air quality guidelines 
 
 
 
Table A2: Estimates for monthly cycles of polluting activities 
 
 
 
 
 
Source
Annual 24-hour Annual 24-hour
WHO 20 20 50
European Union 125 40 50
United States 78 366 50 150
California 105 20 50
Japan 105 100
Brazil 80 365 50 150
Mexico 78 341 50 120
South Africa 50 125 60 180
India 15/60/80 30/80/120 50/60/120
(Sensitive populations/Residential/Industrial)
China 20/60/100 50/150/250 40/100/150 50/150/250
(Class I/II/III)
SO2 (µg/m³) PM10 (µg/m³)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable
Monthly PAPI, lag 1 0.542*** 0.480*** 0.423*** 0.286*** 0.355*** 0.340*** 0.291*** 0.273***
(0.035) (0.043) (0.084) (0.097) (0.042) (0.046) (0.089) (0.093)
Monthly PAPI, lag 2 0.118*** 0.325*** 0.063 0.093
(0.042) (0.096) (0.043) (0.095)
Month 2 5.748 23.069 -78.146** -35.513 66.605*** 67.869*** 67.598*** 72.709***
(22.984) (23.917) (31.609) (33.836) (12.676) (12.714) (18.452) (19.669)
Month 3 -37.647* -27.348 -126.586***-111.965*** -22.412* -18.946 -33.022 -29.689
(22.136) (22.726) (28.824) (28.834) (13.216) (13.358) (21.440) (22.031)
Month 4 17.832 19.651 -69.249** -54.097 39.974*** 37.920*** 47.247** 41.049*
(23.618) (23.575) (33.721) (33.654) (13.494) (13.436) (23.488) (23.817)
Month 5 24.532 29.340 -90.877*** -49.196 45.744*** 47.706*** 80.518*** 81.160***
(23.908) (23.837) (34.993) (35.986) (12.692) (12.843) (23.709) (23.759)
Month 6 119.865*** 122.378*** 81.369** 112.203*** 29.135** 28.661** 73.855*** 69.667***
(23.433) (23.575) (34.114) (34.545) (12.897) (12.870) (26.359) (26.328)
Month 7 88.584*** 92.982*** 47.238 105.307*** 23.190* 20.669 66.647** 57.886**
(22.698) (22.777) (38.533) (39.812) (13.534) (13.480) (27.715) (28.393)
Month 8 82.725*** 78.456*** 46.522 51.292 55.451*** 52.919*** 80.762*** 71.061**
(20.659) (20.599) (34.759) (34.747) (12.978) (12.981) (28.766) (29.657)
Month 9 -4.474 -10.160 -109.066** -115.157*** 6.934 6.458 10.872 4.165
(24.498) (24.476) (42.597) (42.530) (13.824) (13.803) (26.740) (27.168)
Month 10 0.394 -9.690 -42.782 -79.645** 12.746 9.992 13.660 5.507
(23.634) (23.600) (35.155) (37.214) (13.693) (13.682) (22.925) (23.620)
Month 11 -56.024** -59.735*** -134.223***-127.894*** 24.485* 23.726* 18.390 16.725
(22.830) (22.658) (31.811) (31.999) (12.828) (12.790) (20.643) (20.551)
Month 12 20.072 18.510 -14.562 -25.476 -40.185** -40.522** -33.326 -32.467
(21.150) (21.141) (31.593) (31.878) (16.252) (16.220) (24.654) (24.762)
Post*Month 2 -97.090*** -105.757*** -112.247***-118.382*** -74.919*** -72.352*** -66.432*** -63.704***
(29.468) (29.381) (39.980) (39.911) (16.612) (16.695) (24.220) (24.298)
Post*Month 3 41.158 26.231 107.141*** 69.206* 14.978 11.784 41.068* 38.115
(26.936) (27.325) (35.795) (36.795) (16.306) (16.391) (23.962) (24.464)
Post*Month 4 20.769 24.288 -20.083 3.001 -36.584** -33.996** -6.234 1.023
(25.585) (25.379) (41.737) (42.680) (15.499) (15.486) (22.926) (23.432)
Post*Month 5 -19.100 -22.686 22.392 -20.125 -55.138*** -56.568*** -32.616* -33.413*
(25.108) (24.876) (39.637) (40.755) (13.938) (14.011) (19.430) (19.524)
Post*Month 6 -74.510*** -82.959*** -82.965** -105.881*** -38.043*** -38.091*** -31.690* -31.196*
(20.627) (20.938) (32.421) (32.553) (12.883) (12.872) (17.485) (17.450)
Post*Month 7 -39.620** -46.854*** -53.768** -97.497*** -43.741*** -41.840*** -26.867* -24.323
(17.703) (17.693) (26.796) (27.719) (12.619) (12.486) (15.554) (15.335)
10th FYP, 2001-2004 11th FYP, 2006-2009
2000 Absolute 2005 Absolute
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Table A2 continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post*Month 8 -40.561** -42.403*** -57.427** -70.405*** -47.312*** -45.852*** -29.509* -25.747
(15.874) (15.882) (23.167) (23.214) (12.153) (12.083) (17.028) (16.717)
Post*Month 9 -1.523 -0.428 41.866 34.637 14.569 15.535 65.859*** 68.563***
(22.623) (22.620) (35.441) (35.056) (14.207) (14.162) (20.682) (20.597)
Post*Month 10 -51.916** -48.904** -91.092*** -80.668** -42.072** -39.694** -54.986** -49.823*
(23.299) (23.350) (34.768) (35.053) (16.922) (16.931) (25.554) (25.590)
Post*Month 11 29.470 27.008 80.219** 46.962 -39.086** -41.107** -1.398 -5.447
(23.990) (23.919) (32.547) (34.030) (16.355) (16.413) (23.271) (24.072)
Post*Month 12 -39.170 -36.584 -32.777 -17.149 32.658* 33.016* 42.163 46.119*
(23.903) (23.932) (36.635) (37.270) (19.403) (19.387) (28.319) (28.015)
High*Month 2 13.631 2.792 106.187*** 79.975** -1.369 -0.194 -13.546 -19.868
(25.123) (25.589) (33.037) (34.054) (14.695) (14.669) (19.801) (21.146)
High*Month 3 12.150 6.452 74.534** 90.539*** 14.132 13.700 18.669 14.587
(23.761) (24.088) (30.248) (30.844) (17.339) (17.320) (23.022) (23.462)
High*Month 4 21.596 18.948 42.786 47.608 -28.059* -27.747* -10.470 -12.162
(23.919) (23.893) (34.156) (34.039) (16.098) (16.054) (22.536) (22.687)
High*Month 5 9.327 9.926 62.948* 64.422** -20.497 -21.887 -19.598 -24.422
(23.155) (22.984) (32.818) (32.828) (13.659) (13.733) (18.043) (19.074)
High*Month 6 -64.332*** -65.664*** -86.707*** -80.305*** -11.599 -11.296 -16.194 -19.329
(20.707) (20.814) (31.101) (31.080) (12.796) (12.762) (18.036) (18.567)
High*Month 7 -9.646 -13.384 -3.579 -25.068 0.016 0.705 13.330 11.520
(17.879) (17.969) (30.191) (30.173) (12.655) (12.588) (17.515) (17.740)
High*Month 8 -30.361* -24.457 -37.279 -9.468 -21.959* -21.151* 9.662 9.174
(16.733) (16.695) (27.354) (28.176) (12.054) (12.000) (16.641) (16.672)
High*Month 9 70.741*** 75.507*** 147.419*** 166.083*** 17.824 16.918 60.100*** 57.723***
(22.181) (22.139) (37.171) (37.326) (14.425) (14.508) (21.516) (21.723)
High*Month 10 30.651 42.415* 49.804 106.355*** 21.252 21.949 41.613** 40.604*
(22.876) (22.888) (33.757) (37.465) (14.512) (14.490) (20.924) (21.014)
High*Month 11 33.827 36.083 106.295*** 104.591*** -28.558* -29.380* -5.595 -10.554
(24.515) (24.417) (32.487) (32.651) (15.543) (15.555) (20.950) (21.659)
High*Month 12 -8.895 -8.677 -1.524 9.403 16.220 13.780 17.119 10.950
(23.274) (23.222) (33.414) (33.630) (19.660) (19.744) (26.482) (27.657)
High*Post*Month 2 62.907** 71.159** 62.686 80.780** 13.818 10.712 30.503 28.228
(30.209) (30.158) (38.838) (39.038) (16.265) (16.397) (23.080) (23.309)
High*Post*Month 3 -21.567 -8.803 -102.822*** -78.071** -10.069 -8.811 3.254 5.755
(27.583) (27.847) (35.578) (36.329) (17.902) (17.872) (24.510) (24.616)
High*Post*Month 4 -56.274** -57.944** -9.333 -38.062 6.153 5.572 -8.333 -10.706
(26.057) (25.837) (39.727) (40.512) (16.106) (16.086) (22.911) (23.016)
High*Post*Month 5 8.955 6.425 -25.525 -7.467 14.122 14.862 29.712* 28.411*
(25.003) (24.896) (37.728) (37.938) (12.904) (12.896) (16.199) (16.281)
High*Post*Month 6 49.629*** 56.122*** 44.485 53.503* 0.382 0.500 16.471 17.082
(18.718) (19.016) (28.441) (28.318) (10.978) (10.985) (15.867) (15.923)
High*Post*Month 7 0.470 4.510 -2.898 18.371 14.007 12.697 20.163* 18.569
(13.126) (13.125) (18.350) (18.464) (9.617) (9.538) (11.228) (11.326)
High*Post*Month 8 -9.202 -10.863 14.500 12.617 5.759 5.328 -3.512 -5.321
(10.843) (10.857) (15.530) (15.456) (8.821) (8.788) (12.674) (12.712)
High*Post*Month 9 -54.775*** -58.208*** -86.368*** -84.267*** -38.885*** -39.100*** -75.197*** -76.679***
(19.150) (19.198) (30.571) (30.236) (11.338) (11.363) (17.197) (17.310)
High*Post*Month 10 -17.605 -23.009 37.342 19.441 -9.873 -10.526 17.950 17.337
(21.880) (21.936) (32.392) (32.768) (15.612) (15.628) (25.056) (25.066)
High*Post*Month 11 -33.177 -31.765 -106.991*** -83.410** 0.459 2.475 -3.965 2.626
(24.556) (24.495) (32.744) (33.913) (17.841) (17.863) (22.937) (23.949)
High*Post*Month 12 -9.796 -7.741 18.302 0.633 -29.873 -28.821 -34.194 -34.064
(24.029) (23.897) (35.155) (35.661) (21.663) (21.679) (29.398) (29.391)
Constant 109.451*** 88.371*** 239.209*** 175.575*** 234.787*** 213.989*** 323.844*** 288.712***
(31.518) (32.112) (46.004) (48.944) (23.618) (26.438) (39.250) (52.886)
Observations 6,579 6,579 3,655 3,655 6,561 6,561 3,645 3,645
R-squared 0.165 0.166 0.242 0.245 0.093 0.093 0.100 0.100
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Appendix B: City Identification 
 
Each province in China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) has two sampling cities 
in every wave. The two sampling cities are called City 1 and City 2. 
Two variables are used to identify the cities – city total population and land area. 
Within the sample (or CHNS), the population variable is available from 2000-2009, 
but the land area variable is missing in 2000. Also, population information is missing 
for City 1 in one province in 2000, and land area information is not observed for City 
1 in one province in 2004. Official records on city total population (region- or city-
level) and land area (region- or city-level) are collected from China City Statistics 
Yearbooks. 
Minimum distance matching and Principal Component Analysis on the two variables 
are performed wave by wave, for City 1 and City 2, respectively. Final results are in 
Table A1 for City 1 and Table A2 for City 2. Details are in Tables A3-A14. 
 
Table B1: City 1 – matching results 
 
Notes: The first two columns refer to distance matching, based on Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance 
measures, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Province Dist.-Mahalanobis Dist.-Euclidean Principal Component Final choice
Panel A: First best match
Liao Ning Shen Yang Shen Yang Shen Yang Shen Yang
Hei Longjiang Ha Er Bing Ha Er Bing Ha Er Bing Ha Er Bing
Jiang Su Su Zhou Su Zhou Chang Zhou Su Zhou
Shan Dong Ji Nan Ji Nan Lai Wu Ji Nan
He Nan Zheng Zhou Zheng Zhou Nan Yang Zheng Zhou
Hu Bei Jin Zhou Jin Zhou E Zhou Jin Zhou
Hu Nan Lou Di Lou Di Xiang Tan Lou Di
Guang Xi Bei Hai Bei Hai He Zhou Bei Hai
Gui Zhou Liu Pan Shui Liu Pan Shui Gui Yang Liu Pan Shui
Panel B: Second best match
Liao Ning Da Lian Da Lian Da Lian Da Lian
Hei Longjiang Jia Mu Si Jia Mu Si Qi Qi Ha Er Jia Mu Si
Jiang Su Su Zhou Su Zhou Wu Xi Su Zhou
Shan Dong Liao Cheng Liao Cheng Zao Zhuang Liao Cheng
He Nan Luo Yang Luo Yang Xin Yang Luo Yang
Hu Bei E Zhou E Zhou Huang Shi E Zhou
Hu Nan Huai Hua Huai Hua Lou Di Huai Hua
Guang Xi Wu Zhou Wu Zhou Gui Gang Wu Zhou
Gui Zhou An Shun Zun Yi An Shun An Shun
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Table B2: City 2 – matching results 
 
Notes: The first two columns refer to distance matching, based on Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance 
measures, respectively. In terms of the second best match for He Nan province in Panel B, outcome 
based on Mahalanobis distance matching is chosen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Province Dist.-Mahalanobis Dist.-Euclidean Principal Component Final choice
Panel A: First best match
Liao Ning Ying Kou Ying Kou Da Lian Ying Kou
Hei Longjiang Shuang Ya Shan Shuang Ya Shan Jia Mu Si Shuang Ya Shan
Jiang Su Yang Zhou Yang Zhou Zhen Jiang Yang Zhou
Shan Dong Tai An Tai An Lai Wu Tai An
He Nan He Bi He Bi An Yang He Bi
Hu Bei Shi Yan Shi Yan E Zhou Shi Yan
Hu Nan Yue Yang Yue Yang Chang De Yue Yang
Guang Xi Wu Zhou Wu Zhou Fang Cheng Gang Wu Zhou
Gui Zhou Liu Pan Shui Liu Pan Shui Liu Pan Shui Liu Pan Shui
Panel B: Second best match
Liao Ning Liao Yang Liao Yang Hu Lu Dao Liao Yang
Hei Longjiang Ji Xi Ji Xi He Gang Ji Xi
Jiang Su Zhen Jiang Zhen Jiang Tai Zhou Zhen Jiang
Shan Dong Liao Cheng Liao Cheng Zao Zhuang Liao Cheng
He Nan Shang Qiu Nan Yang Zhou Kou Shang Qiu
Hu Bei Xian Ning Xian Ning Huang Shi Xian Ning
Hu Nan Huai Hua Huai Hua Chang Sha Huai Hua
Guang Xi Bei Hai Bei Hai Bei Hai Bei Hai
Gui Zhou An Shun An Shun An Shun An Shun
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis explores issues related to health in China by looking at three different 
issues.  
 
The first chapter investigates the role of nutrition as one of the major determinants of 
bodyweight and estimates the income effects on individual nutritional intakes using 
China Health and Nutrition Survey. Understanding the socio-economic gradient in 
health outcomes and behaviours is crucial for the design of policies to reduce health 
inequalities. Recent years have witnessed a sharp increase in obesity levels 
throughout the world, turning it into one of the largest and most costly public health 
risks. While Chinese obesity rates are still comparatively low, the country is facing 
large increases in obesity and bodyweight.We investigate the role of nutrition as one 
of the major determinants of bodyweight and estimate income effects on individual 
nutritional intakes using the Chinese health and Nutrition Survey from 1998 to 2006. 
We propose an innovative identification strategy using changes in marginal tax rates 
for non-agricultural individuals and supply shocks affecting agricultural production 
for agricultural individuals as instruments for income. In addition, we use a refined set 
of instruments using (tax) bracket creep resulting from inflation and nominal 
denomination of tax schedules. We find that simple OLS and FE estimates commonly 
used in the demand literature yield biased results compared to our IV estimates. We 
find hump-shaped Engel curves in calories for both non-agricultural and agricultural 
households with similar income elasticitiesbetween 0.08 and 0.09 at median 
income.We also find significant gender differences: Females are more income elastic 
towards calorie and other macronutrients than males. Poor males from non-
agricultural background are more income elastic towards fat. Couples are the least 
income elastic towards calories and other nutrient intakes in the non-agricultural 
sector, but they are the most income elastic in the agricultural sector. Our results 
suggest that strong income growth in China has resulted in a shift in females’ diet 
patterns away from the traditional one—mainly rice (and carbohydrates) —and no 
change in diets of males. 
 
The second chapter explores the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1968-
1976) on health, consumption and labour supply in later life (between 1989-2011) 
using the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey. The Chinese Cultural Revolution led 
to a nationwide expansion of schools during the period 1968-1976 with the aim of 
equalising access to education (and educational attainment) across individuals and 
across geographical areas. We exploit regional differences in the extent of the 
expansion, especially between rural and urban districts, as well as cohort differences 
in exposure to the treatment to identify its impact120. We further distinguish between 
the impact of exposure in primary and secondary schooling and find that it has 
induced the treated cohorts to obtain significantly more years of primary education, 
adopt healthier consumption habits and engage more actively in the labour market, 
though with a mixed health impact.  
 
                                                        
120Fully treated cohorts pertain to those born between 1959 and 1965, and the partially 
treated cohorts are those born in 1955-1958 (before) or in 1966-1970 (after). 
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The third chapter aims to evaluate and compare the health impact of two air quality 
regulations in China. It finds that being more regulated by the FYP was inversely 
associated with significantly higher incidences of pollution-related illnesses. To 
explain this perverse health-policy relationship, this chapter suggests that the FYP did 
not succeed in inducing pollution-heavy industries to substantially alter their pollution 
control technologies and may have caused heavy polluters to relocate from more to 
less regulated areas, leading to persistently worse ambient air quality in High 
provinces and larger pollution increases in Low provinces over the regulation period. 
 
 
 
